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Abstract 
Alexandra Lucia Abello Colak  
Security Provision and Governing Processes in Fragile Cities of the 
Global South: The case of Medellin 2002-2012 
 
Key words: Urban security, urban south, governmentality, Medellin, 
urban violence, ungoverned areas, state-building 
The incidence of violence and the configuration of areas of instability, which 
have accompanied rapid urbanisation processes in the global South, have 
led to a wide range of responses by state authorities at different levels. 
These responses include attempts to control, prevent and/or manage various 
forms of violence and crime. An emerging literature on urban security aims to 
improve our understanding of public security provision in volatile urban 
contexts in the global South. This literature has so far been dominated by 
policy-oriented and state-centric analyses, as well as by critiques of the way 
neoliberal governance is shaping responses to urban instability. These 
analytical approaches tend to ignore the political aspects and governmental 
consequences of security provision in fragile cities. This thesis argues that 
Foucault’s work on governmentality and ethnographic methodologies offer 
analytical and methodological tools that can help us address limitations in 
predominant analytical frameworks and contribute to fill gaps in the literature. 
The thesis develops an alternative critical approach to the study of urban 
security using those tools and employs it to investigate security provision in 
Medellin. This alternative approach focuses on the way security shapes 
governing processes in particular contexts and on their implications for those 
who are most vulnerable to urban fragility. Moreover, the thesis uses this 
innovative approach to investigate the security strategy implemented in 
Medellin since 2002, as part of what has come to be known as the ‘Medellin 
Model’. By exploring this particularly relevant case, this thesis highlights the 
significance of undertaking empirical explorations of the rationality of security 
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strategies in different urban contexts and the importance of taking into 
account people´s differentiated experiences of security provision. 
Furthermore, this thesis argues that this alternative approach helps us 
understand the way power is exercised for particular purposes and on 
particular subjects in an attempt to deal with urban violence and insecurity. It 
also argues for the inclusion of these dimensions in contemporary studies of 
urban security in the global South.   
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Introduction 
 
This thesis is about the analytical approaches used within the emerging 
literature on urban security to understand public responses to rising violence, 
crime and instability in fragile cities of the global South. It is also about 
developing a new way of exploring security provision in these volatile 
contexts which could enhance our understanding of the processes that 
shape security responses in particular contexts and of their implications for 
those who are most vulnerable to urban fragility.  
What I offer in this thesis is a different avenue for the study of security 
responses in fragile urban contexts, and an example of how an alternative 
approach informed by Foucault’s work on power and using methods drawn 
from ethnographic approaches sheds light on aspects that other predominant 
approaches have overlooked.  The thesis sets out to put this critical 
analytical framework into practice in the exploration of a particularly 
influential case: the security strategy used in Medellin as part of what has 
come to be known as the ‘Medellin Model’. In studying the case of Medellin 
through this alternative critical approach, I aim to problematise predominant 
analytical approaches and contribute to the literature on urban security in the 
global South.  
This thesis argues that we need an analytical approach which allows for 
critical and empirically rooted explorations of the interface between security 
provision and governing processes, in order to be able to interpret the wide 
range of responses authorities are implementing to contain, prevent or 
manage rising levels of violence and insecurity. I argue that we need to 
acknowledge and engage critically with the way power is used to govern, 
because this is a key determinant of urban security. Additionally, we need 
more empirical explorations of how the state interacts with different sectors 
of the population, constructing them as subjects of its power. This is 
necessary to be able to recognise the particular ways in which people are 
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affected by urban instability and to understand what kind of security is being 
delivered to them on the ground.   
As I analyse further in chapter one, there are three predominant approaches 
within the current literature on urban security in the global South, and in 
particular on security provision in fragile cities. The first one is a policy-
oriented approach that focuses on the design, implementation and 
assessment of security policies, and on the institutional factors that affect 
their outcomes. A second state-centred approach that looks at the impact 
that security governance has on the strengthening of weak or fragile states, 
and finally, a critical approach that is concerned with the way neoliberal 
governance has affected the implementation of security responses and the 
meaning of security itself in urban contexts.  
Through these analytical approaches, different analyses of urban security in 
various cities of the global south have contributed to our understanding of 
some of the challenges that authorities are facing when dealing with violence 
and insecurity and some implications of the security strategies they have 
implemented. However, the focus and methodological tools used within 
predominant approaches have led to important gaps in the literature 
concerned with urban security provision in the global South. The aim of this 
thesis is to offer a different theoretical starting point that can help to fill some 
of these gaps. I focus on three of them which I consider particularly 
important. The first one is a limited understanding of the way power works 
and flows through the security provision process; the second is the little 
knowledge of which economic, social and institutional processes, beyond 
neoliberalism, affect the configuration of security responses in particular 
contexts; and, finally, the lack of understanding of how people experience 
security provision on the ground, especially those who are most affected by 
urban violence. I argue that until these dimensions are brought in to studies 
of urban security, our understanding of the crafting, performance and 
implications of contemporary public initiatives designed to deal with urban 
violence, crime and instability remains very limited. 
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In chapter two I argue that Foucault’s extensive work on power provides 
useful analytical and conceptual tools to develop an alternative analytical 
approach that can help to fill those gaps. Through his historical and empirical 
studies of power relations in the west and, in particular, on the complex 
processes and techniques involved in the management of European 
societies, Foucault developed an innovative approach for investigating 
power, government and authority, which could be applied in different 
contexts. In this thesis, I use his notion of governmentality to put the issue of 
power right at the heart of the study of security responses in fragile cities.  
The notion of governmentality was first used by Foucault to denote a way of 
thinking about and exercising power which emerged in Europe in the late 18th 
century in response to problems generated by the expansion of urban areas. 
It referred to a new form of governing populations through ‘apparatuses of 
security’ which included not only armies and police forces, but also health, 
welfare and education systems, with the objective of ensuring the optimal 
functioning of economic and social processes (Foucault 2007). Foucault’s 
definition of governmentality later became the foundation of an analytical 
approach to studying government practices in contemporary societies. This 
approach departs from the assertion that power is always exercised guided 
by a rationality, or a ‘form of thinking’ that defines ‘who can govern; what 
governing is; what or who is governed’ and for what purposes. Within the 
governmentality approach, government, or the ‘conduct of conduct’ as 
Foucault defined it, is regarded as an attempt to shape, regulate or control 
human conduct undertaken by multiple actors (authorities and agencies), 
using different techniques and forms of knowledge in the search of particular 
ends (Dean 2010).  
By using governmentality as a lens to explore security provision, I intend to 
highlight that the design and implementation of security initiatives implies a 
process by which authorities identify and define particular problems as a field 
for governmental intervention and action. It also involves the process of 
choosing particular strategies to deal with those governmental problems, 
based on specific ways of understanding the nature and causes of such 
problems, and exercising power over certain groups based on their relation 
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to those problems –as victims, perpetrators, or groups at risk, for example. 
Through the use of governmentality I aim at highlighting that security policies 
in fragile cities of the global South are part of wider processes of governing in 
these cities, by which power is exercised in a particular way, for a particular 
purpose, and on particular subjects. 
Within predominant analyses of security provision in the global South, 
security responses are regarded either as apolitical strategies to deal with 
violence and crime, as a means to achieve the consolidation of the state, or 
as a consequence of the advance of neoliberalism. By using 
governmentality, I aim at articulating an alternative approach that allows us 
to uncover and unpack the political aspects and governmental consequences 
of urban security. This alternative approach allows us to investigate the 
assumptions and calculations that lead to changes in security strategies in 
particular contexts, as well as the technologies of power that are used on 
particular objects and subjects in the process of containing urban violence 
and dealing with urban crime. In other words, I suggest an alternative 
analytical approach that allows us to research empirically the logic or 
rationale of governing processes concerned with urban security. The 
application of such approach enabled me to ask the following questions: how 
is urban fragility being governed in a particular context? Which processes 
lead to the configuration of a particular form of governing violence and 
insecurity? What is the rationality that guides the implementation of security 
strategies in a particular context? What are the imaginaries that lead those in 
power to choose certain strategies over others? How are specific 
communities, groups or citizens constructed as subjects of state intervention 
within security strategies? And what are the implications of a particular 
rationality for those subjects? 
In order to answer those questions, I have developed a three-step analytical 
strategy that enables studies of public security strategies –polices, 
programmes, initiatives– in different fragile urban contexts. The strategy 
involves: (i) identifying political, social and economic processes that produce 
changes in the way security problems are framed and understood; (ii) 
analysing the governmental responses to those problems using critical 
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discourse analysis to look in particular at how those problems are 
understood by authorities and how these lead to the use of particular 
strategies; and, finally, (iii) analysing the kind of security that these ways of 
understanding and techniques produce on the ground, from the perspective 
of those who become subjects of state intervention. 
Given that rationalities of government are geographically and historically 
specific and that they can change, the alternative analytical approach I 
suggest starts with explorations of shifts in the way authorities, at different 
levels, think and respond to acute problems of urban violence and instability. 
As I discuss in the first chapter, some scholars have interpreted changes in 
authorities’ responses to urban violence and insecurity in different cities as a 
consequence of the urbanisation of capital and the entrenchment of 
neoliberalism. These analyses raise our awareness of the way economic and 
political manifestations of neoliberal governance shape policy makers’ 
imaginaries and strategies in a wide range of fields, including crime control 
and security provision. I argue, nevertheless, that we need an analytical 
strategy for a study of urban security provision that does not restrict the 
analysis to neoliberal forces. Using Foucault’s suggestion that it is possible 
to analyse governing processes by breaking them down into the multiple 
processes that constitute them (Faubion 1994:227), I suggest that the first 
step to study urban security in a particular context is to make visible 
relations, neoliberal and non-neoliberal processes, contingencies and factors 
that have influenced authorities’ imaginaries of urban security problems. In 
this way, it is possible to undertake a genealogical analysis of the strategies 
policy makers implement at a specific point in time. 
In chapter two, I explain how I develop this analytical approach using 
Foucault’s contributions and, in particular, the governmentality framework 
which provides conceptual tools to investigate power relations. In that 
chapter, I argue that different methods of data collection and analysis provide 
better access to underexplored aspects of the provision of security in cities of 
the global South. The use of discourse analysis, for example, serves to 
uncover the assumptions and the way in which expert fields of knowledge 
and language frame the choices and practices of those who are in charge of 
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dealing with security problems. I also argue that ethnographic 
methodologies, which have been neglected within analyses of security 
provision in the global South, can be used to undertake empirical 
observations of the implications that particular rationalities have on the way 
security is delivered. This involves engaging with the experiences of those 
who are constructed as subjects of particular forms of power and whose 
identities are recreated during the implementation of security strategies. By 
recognising and analysing their voices and their own realities, it is then 
possible to unravel the impact of security policies and programmes from the 
perspective of those who are most vulnerable to urban fragility, as well as to 
track ways in which people resist governing processes that are set in motion 
in the process of dealing with security problems.  
The combination of these types of methods as a means to undertake 
empirical examinations of rationalities of government that guide the 
implementation of security strategies in fragile cities constitutes an innovation 
for urban security research and thinking. I claim that the analytical and 
methodological strategy suggested here not only enriches the quality of the 
analysis of urban security in particular contexts, but it also allows us to see 
contradictions and unforeseen consequences of security initiatives that other 
approaches fail to recognise.  In order to demonstrate the workings of this 
critical approach, its advantages as well as its limitations, I have used it to 
analyse security responses implemented in Medellin between 2002 and 
2012. In chapter three I discuss the research strategy I used to study this 
particular case. This methodology drew heavily on ethnographic approaches 
and relied on the combination of discourse analysis and participant 
observation as main methods of enquiry. In the same chapter I also offer an 
analysis of some of the main challenges I faced during the implementation of 
this research methodology in an urban context characterized by high levels 
of violence and insecurity.  
The examination of this case through this distinctive analytical and 
methodological approach has enabled me to provide new insights about a 
security strategy that has gained recognition as a promising way of dealing 
with problems of violence in fragile urban contexts. Throughout the 2000s  
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national and local authorities in Medellin articulated an integral security 
strategy that has been credited with an impressive decrease in levels of 
urban violence, major improvements in indicators of quality of life for 
residents and an urban miracle (Maclean 2015; Hermelin et al 2010, Cerda 
et al. 2012). In chapter four, I provide an analysis of the history of security 
provision in this city, so as to understand the context in which this strategy 
emerged. Furthermore, I provide an analysis of this strategy’s components 
which include a wide range of initiatives such as pacification techniques, 
socioeconomic programmes and opportunities for groups at risk, 
participatory forms of governance, community policing strategies, 
infrastructural investments in some of the most marginalised communities of 
the city accompanied by improved access to services1, innovative solutions 
to improve urban mobility, and efficient management and planning practices 
under principles of good governance.  
With the support of development agencies, international organisations and 
donors (such as the IADB, UNDP, World Bank, OAS and cooperation 
agencies), the city’s authorities were able to marketise what is known today 
as the ‘Medellin Model’, and to position the city globally as a laboratory of 
good practices (Alcaldia de Medellin 2011), and as test-bed for urban 
innovation and a model Latin American city (The Guardian 2012). The so-
called ‘Medellin model’ has become a benchmark for policymakers2 and the 
city’s experience has influenced the debate on urban security in the global 
South (UN Habitat 2010), with policy programmes and state interventions 
carried out in some of the most marginalised communities of this city put 
                                                          
1This type of state intervention was coined as ‘social urbanism’ by Medellin’s local 
authorities. 
2 Local authorities from various cities often visit the city to learn from Medellin’s experience. 
The European Forum for Urban Security, for example, organised a study visit for mayors of 
seven Guatemalan municipalities to Medellin and Bogota. The aim was to allow the 
Guatemalan mayors to learn from these cities’ experience in implementing citizen security 
and crime prevention policies (see: http://efus.eu/en/about-us/our-partners/partners/8554/). 
The governor of Rio de Janeiro, who was credited with the implementation of the integral 
security approach in that city, visited Medellin on several occasions, as well as Mexican 
policymakers who have been trained in the Medellin model. Alliances with other local 
governments have entered into order to promote the application of the lessons learnt from 
the state initiatives implemented in Medellin. 
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forward as successful and even replicable in other urban contexts (Acero 
ND).  
By using an alternative analytical approach to research the configuration of 
the mixed security strategy implemented in Medellin throughout the 2000s, 
this thesis offers a new perspective on the ‘Medellin Model’. I have used the 
governmentality informed approach, and a combination of critical discourse 
analysis and methods drawing from ethnographic approaches to analyse 
some of the processes and factors that have led to the configuration of such 
integrated security strategy in Medellin. I have also unpacked the rationality 
of security efforts revealing the assumptions and calculations that steered 
interventions in marginalised urban communities and finally, exposed the 
contradictions of this security approach through resident’s experiences of 
security provision in these urban communities.  
The research has revealed that the combined security strategy used in 
Medellin as part of a wider urban transformation and development effort 
originated in the construction of marginalised urban communities as 
‘ungoverned areas’. These were considered areas of particularly high levels 
of vulnerability which were also strategic sources of instability and illegality. 
From the perspective of policymakers and security authorities, these areas, 
which displayed the lowest levels of quality of life and extreme poverty, 
needed to be integrated into the city. The state had for too long been absent 
and unable to exercise control of the means of coercion in these areas and, 
in their view, this had enabled illegal armed groups to exercise territorial and 
social control of the communities.  
In chapter five, I show how, in order to be integrated into what has been 
regarded as the prosperous city order, these ungoverned areas and their 
populations were seen by policymakers and security agents as being in need 
of state transformation, control and normalisation. The wide range of 
initiatives implemented in marginalised urban communities intended to serve 
these purposes and made the residents of these communities subject to 
different forms of state power. Through increased police and military 
presence, the state intended to regain control of these historically neglected 
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areas (Felbab-Brown 2011). Simultaneously, through slum upgrading 
initiatives, socioeconomic programmes and initiatives targeting ‘at risk’ 
groups, it sought to address extreme levels of poverty and inequality 
(Echeverri and Orsini 2010; Devlin and Chaskel 2010) and reduce endemic 
levels of violence (Maclean 2015).  The analysis also revealed that once 
subject to multiple forms of state intervention and power, these ungoverned 
areas were constructed as useful exhibits for the internationalisation of the 
city, for the attraction of capital and the marketisation of a so-called 
innovative model of urban transformation.  
The analysis revealed that the configuration of the ‘Medellin Model’ during 
the 2000s and its multifaceted security strategy in particular represented a 
different way of imagining the city, its marginalised populations, the role of 
the state and the causes of urban violence. These new ways of 
understanding were influenced both by local and national processes. In this 
regard, in chapter five I argue that the security strategy implemented, often 
attributed to the visionary leadership of two consecutive independent 
mayors, was partially shaped by the advance of a neoliberal development 
agenda carried out by local elites which made it necessary to reconsider the 
way of handling high levels of violence and crime in order to favour the 
attraction of investors. This, however, was not the only process leading to a 
new way of understanding and delivering security in the city. The mixed 
security strategy in Medellin was also shaped by the national security 
strategy implemented by the Uribe government (2002-2010), which focused 
on defeating insurgent groups across the country by employing military 
means. This national security strategy made the taking back and occupation 
by the state of territories historically controlled by illegal groups a national 
priority. Finally, another important factor influencing local authorities’ 
willingness to focus public spending on marginalised communities and to 
open opportunities for citizens’ participation was the role played by the city’s 
strong civil society and by community-based organisations rooted in 
marginalised areas. These actors had been articulating an alternative 
discourse on development and developing alternative forms of dealing with 
chronic violence in these areas since the 1990s.  With the arrival of two 
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independent candidates to the Mayor’s Office, they took the opportunity to 
advocate for a progressive urban agenda in the city and to influence the way 
policymakers interacted with residents living in these areas.  
Shaped by these multiple forces and processes, the security strategy in 
Medellin prioritised the establishment of a permanent state presence in 
neighbourhoods, the reduction of homicide rates and the improvement of the 
state’s capacity to occupy urban space, in order to transform illegal cultures 
in marginalised urban communities and persuade those seen as prone to 
violence to not engage in such. Inspired by ethnographic methodologies, I 
used participant observation and informal conversations to access insights 
on residents’ daily experiences of this type of state presence and power 
which constructed them as ‘ungoverned citizens‘. Complemented with semi-
structured interviews and focus groups, these observations revealed that the 
combination of repressive and preventive interventions did not lead to 
changes in problematic entrenched police practices which perpetuate the 
stigmatisation of vulnerable groups and violence at the neighbourhood level.  
In chapter six, I provide evidence of how some of the mechanisms used by 
the state to try to pacify and transform these communities unleashed 
processes that allowed violent illegal actors to deepen their influence on 
these communities and created unforeseen challenges to community actors 
and residents who strived to resist violence and build democratic forms of 
citizenship in these contexts. I argue that an unexpected outcome of state 
efforts to govern the ‘ungoverned areas of Medellin’, as a means to secure 
the city, was the creation of conditions that favoured the preservation and 
consolidation of a complex social order characterised by still chronic but less 
visible levels of violence and insecurity. In this social order, men, women, 
children and young people from marginalised communities are forced to 
navigate multiple perils and insecurities daily, while legal and illegal actors 
simultaneously exercise their authority and multiple forms of power on them.    
The research revealed targets, assumptions, calculations, techniques and 
forms of knowledge on which the authorities in Medellin relied with a view to 
exercising power on ‘ungoverned communities’. These constituted a new 
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logic of governance of urban insecurity in the city and as such I argue that it 
also revealed the way the state intended to build its authority and legitimacy 
in this urban context. In chapter seven, I unpack the governmentality of 
urban insecurity and what it suggested regarding the process whereby the 
local state sought to address urban fragility in Medellin. I also argue that in 
order to address the most visible symptoms of state weakness and urban 
instability, the local state focused on pacifying large proportions of the urban 
population that remained excluded from the legal economy and from the 
benefits of neoliberal urban development. By categorising certain populations 
as ‘ungoverned’, the state justified the implementation of ‘special’ 
interventions in these areas, which aimed at constructing passive and loyal 
citizens. Through coercion and control, but also through socioeconomic 
incentives and a limited form of integration into the city, the state intended to 
pacify these areas, develop new ways of managing urban violence while 
projecting to those living outside these communities an image of efficiency 
and diligence.  
Based on the evidence I collected in Medellin, I suggest that although the 
pacification and government of ‘ungoverned areas’ allowed the state to 
develop its capacity to exercise power –even though this power was not all-
encompassing or unchallenged– and marketise the city as a hub for 
investors, it nonetheless left residents in precarious living conditions and 
amidst chronic levels of insecurity and risk.  By the end of the decade and 
following the implementation of a multifaceted security strategy, residents of 
marginalised urban communities experienced a limited form of citizenship 
and were subject to both illegal and legal forms of coercion on a daily basis. 
The aim of my study of the Medellin case through an alternative analytical 
approach is to demonstrate the relevance of exploring the interface between 
security provision and governing processes, and to offer a new approach to 
study urban security which takes into account the role that socio-political 
relations play in the provision of security in fragile cities. The analysis 
developed here concentrates on the governmental consequences of the way 
in which authorities, in a global city of the global South regarded as 
‘successful’, chose to deal with violence and urban fragility. Through an 
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analytical approach based on Foucault’s work on governmentality and 
combining methods of analysis, I was able to undertake an empirical 
examination of the workings of security policies and programmes in Medellin, 
in terms of their aims and methods and from the perspective of those who 
were targeted by the state in the process of making the city safer. The 
approach allowed me to unpack the way power was exercised through a 
wide range of mechanisms and for which purposes, but it also highlights 
important dynamics taking place at local and community level that are 
invisibilised  within predominant approaches to urban security in the global 
South. For example the way children, women and young people experience 
multiple violences, the role illegal economies and their brokers play in 
marginalised urban areas and people’s experiences of multifaceted forms of 
public security.  
The insights produced demonstrate that studying urban security provision 
using this alternative analytical approach provides a better understanding of 
how security responses are crafted and of the way they affect the 
construction of state power and legitimacy in particular contexts. When 
compared to policy-focused and state-centred approaches, the alternative 
critical approach developed in this thesis is better equipped to shed light on 
the governmental implications of security provision in different contexts. It 
also provides a more nuanced understanding of how particular security 
approaches are experienced by those who become targets of public efforts 
to contain, prevent or manage urban violence in fragile cities.  
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Chapter 1 
Urban Security in Fragile Cities: A Critical Review 
 
Introduction 
This chapter presents a critical overview of the emerging literature on urban 
security in the global South. It argues that the preponderance of three main 
analytical approaches has led to important gaps in this literature regarding 
the political aspects and governmental consequences of security provision in 
fragile urban contexts. The chapter also argues that analytical and 
methodological innovation is needed in order to fill theses gaps and to 
address some of the limitations of existing approaches. The chapter starts 
with an overview of urban violence and instability in the global South and an 
analysis of the type of responses that authorities are implementing to 
address such challenges. The chapter then concentrates on three analytical 
approaches that seem predominant within the urban security literature: a 
policy oriented approach, a state-centred approach and a critical approach 
focused on the impact of neoliberal governance on security provision. The 
chapter pays especial attention to the limitations of these approaches in 
grasping contemporary security responses in cities affected by chronic levels 
of violence and insecurity.  
The Urban Present and Future 
Cities have been critical to the configuration of contemporary societies. As 
Tilly’s historical analysis demonstrated, urbanization processes and 
concentration and circulation of capital and coercion associated with 
European cities were crucial to the consolidation of modern states in the 
west (Tilly 1990). Cities have also been hubs for the incubation and 
transmission of culture, key sites for the circulation of capital (Harvey 1985), 
sites in which struggles and renegotiations of meanings and practices of 
citizenship continuously take place (Holston and Appadurai 1999; Bayat and 
Biekart 2009) and strategic places where local, national and transnational 
forms of political and economical power converge (Hobsbawn 2005; 
Lefebvre 2003).  
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The importance of cities in the definition of human future can only be 
expected to increase in this century given current urbanization patterns. The 
global urban population is steadily rising at an annual growth rate of 2%, 
which is expected to bring the world’s urban population to around 5 billion in 
2030 (UNFPA 2007). The urban transformation of the planet that is 
underway has however a socio-spatial particularity: it is being driven by the 
global South. Since 1950s most of the urban growth has taken place in the 
South at an astonishing pace and it will continue to do so in the next three 
decades of this century. On average, 7.1 million people are expected to join 
urban areas in Latin America and the Caribbean every year, 15 million in 
Africa and around 43 million in Asia. At this growth rate, by 2030, 80% of the 
world’s urban population will inhabit cities in the Global South, especially 
African and Asian cities (Chant and McIlwaine 2009:97).  
This unprecedented urban turn led by the global South has come with 
opportunities but also with huge challenges. In the context of globalization, 
southern cities have grown fast in the absence of adequate planning, with 
retreating states and with urban economies unable to support the arrival of 
millions of new dwellers (this is what Gilbert 1995 calls hyperurbanisation3). 
The outcome is the configuration in contemporary cities, of profound internal 
divisions and borders that separate the majority of the urban population who 
are ‘prevented from, or restricted in, the fulfilment of their basic needs 
because of their economic, social or cultural status, ethnic origins, gender or 
age’, from minorities who ‘benefit from the economic and social progress that 
is typically associated with urbanization’ (UNHABITAT 2010/2011). This 
urban divide manifests itself in the form of space inequality, inequality of 
opportunities, economic divides (income) and social divisions that are likely 
to produce ‘social instability and high social and economic costs not only to 
the urban poor but the society at large’ (UNHABITAT 2010/2011:viii).  
Approximately three quarters of economic activities worldwide currently take 
place in cities (Muggah 2012), however the incidence of poverty in urban 
areas has increased, as have various forms of inequality. A major driver of 
                                                          
3 As referenced by Chant and McIlwaine 2009:102 
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urban poverty and inequality was the implementation of structural adjustment 
programmes imposed on developing countries during the 1980s and 1990s. 
These produced job losses on the public sector, reductions in public 
investment and an increase in the cost of services that had a special impact 
on fast growing cities (McIlwaine 2002; Portes and Roberts 2005). As many 
as one billion people have ended living in slums with chronic physical, social, 
economic and political deprivations. One in three urban dwellers lives in 
inadequate housing and 90% of them live in slums located in the global 
South4 (UN-HABITAT 2007, Chant and Mcillwaine 2009:113).  Although 
urban poverty levels are still lower than in rural areas, the difference has 
narrowed in the last three decades and urban inequality levels have become 
extremely high and pervasive in many cities in Africa, Latin America and the 
Caribbean5.  
In southern cities poverty has its own particularities; poor people are not only 
consistently pushed towards greater dependency on informal economies, but 
they are also sentenced to experience high levels of insecurity. Residents of 
poor urban communities are affected by high insecurity in tenure of land, 
they are also vulnerable to environmental hazards, to natural or man-made 
disasters, to infectious diseases which are more likely in densely populated 
communities and also exposed to increasing levels of violence and crime 
(UNHABITAT 2007, 2010/2011:84).  
Urban Violences and the Emergence of ‘Fragile Cities’ 
The number of international and intra-state conflicts has been in decline 
globally (Harbom and Wallensteen 2009) and today more people die violently 
in countries that are not experiencing conventional wars or where 
successfully negotiated peace agreements put an end to internal conflicts 
                                                          
4 it seems that the overall proportion of people living in slums in developing regions declined 
since 1990s, however the number of people is huge and it is projected to increase. 
5 Based on selected samples across different regions, the UNHABITAT found that African 
cities are the most unequal with an average Gini coefficient of 0.58, followed by Latin 
American cities with 0.52 (UNHABITAT 2010/2011: XIII). Despite that Asian cities show a 
lower degree of income inequality (Gini average of 0.384) the economic urban divide is 
widening in that continent too. 
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such as in Central and South America, the Caribbean and parts of Sub-
Saharan Africa (Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2011). During the 2000s, in 
Latin America and the Caribbean alone, 1,4 million people lost their lives as 
a result of violent crime (Casas-Zamora and Dammert 2012). 
According to the 2011 World Development Report, one and half billion 
people live in areas affected by fragility, conflict, organized criminal violence, 
civil unrest and terrorism, which also create ‘cycles of repeated violence, 
weak governance and instability’ (World Bank 2011). Those cycles of 
violence are mostly taking place in non-conflict settings and specifically in 
urban areas of the global South. The incidence of urban terrorism has also 
been suggested to be greater in cities of less developed countries which 
contributes to what Beall called ´a shift from peasant wars of the 20th century 
to the urban wars of the 21st century´ (Beall 2007:2).  
In many countries in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, some cities 
have become favourable sites for the reproduction of multiple and chronic 
forms of violence and have homicide rates up to 70 percent higher than rural 
areas (World Bank 2011). In Mexico for example, where 10 of the 50 most 
violent cities in the world were located in 2013 (Citizen Council for Public 
Security and Criminal Justice 2014), the homicides rates in some urban 
areas surpassed by as much as three times the national rate and in countries 
like El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Jamaica, urban violence causes 
more victims than the armed conflict causes in Afghanistan (Geneva 
Declaration Secretariat 2011; Small Arms survey 2007; World Bank 2011). 
Cities like San Pedro Sula, Johannesburg, Goma, Ciudad Juarez , San 
Salvador, Karachi, Rio de Janeiro, Cape Town, Caracas, Guatemala, Detroit, 
Kingston, Kabul, Bagdad, Lagos and Medellin represent a new type of urban 
category within the security and development literature, these are the fragile 
cities of this century (Mugahh 2014a; Muggah and Savage 2012; Koonings 
and Kruijt 2007, 2009). These cities are seen as urban spaces where ‘a 
failure of localized social contracts binding governments and citizens and a 
declining ability to regulate and monopolise legitimate violence across their 
territories’ (Muggah and Savage 2012; Mugaah 2014b) produce chronic 
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levels of instability and violence. In this type of city it is common to find high 
levels of inequality, marginalisation of large portions of the population, social 
disorganisation, underinstitutionalisation, hybrid forms of authority and 
multiple layers of coercion being exercised by a wide range of armed actors 
and entities (Mugahh 2014b). Some of these fragility affected urban areas 
are increasingly regarded as ‘ungoverned spaces’ which remain at the 
margins of state control and that have at least three features: First, they are 
characterised by long periods of weak institutional presence, in which 
representatives of law and order are absent or only symbolically present 
(Koonings and Kruijt 1999; Clunan and Trinkunas 2010; Pion-Berlin and 
Trinkunas 2011) and by state institutions’ incapacity ‘to control violence, to 
offer protection, and to respond to the demands of its citizens’(OECD 
2009:24). Second, ungoverned spaces are areas where powerful non-state 
actors are in control of means of coercion and violence with priority to the 
state (Davis 2009; Koonings and Kruijt 1999), and third, where social and 
institutional conditions (such as impunity) facilitate the emergence of violence 
and security threats (OECD 2009).  
 
One of the most dramatic and unsettling manifestations of urban fragility are 
endemic levels of violence. Urban violence in fragile cities is very complex. In 
few cities it is still the result of confrontations between state forces, 
insurgents and foreign troops, but in the great majority it includes a mix of 
delinquency, violence exercised by a wide range of armed groups6, intra-
family and gender-based violence, ethnic violence, interpersonal and 
communal violence, vigilantism and different forms of state violence. 
Although these diverse expressions of violence have been categorised  
according to political, economic, institutional and social motivations (Moser 
2004), there is increasing recognition that it is more accurate to talk about 
the existence of different forms of urban conflict in fragile cities of the global 
south (Beall et al 2013; Moser and McIlwaine 2014). In these contemporary 
urban conflicts, multiple forms of violence interlink, overlap, and reinforce 
each other (World Bank 2011).  
                                                          
6 Such as youth gangs, organised criminal groups, militia groups and paramilitary groups. 
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The most salient characteristic of violence in fragile urban contexts is the 
existence of processes by which different forms of violence interact 
systemically via ‘knock-on effects’, creating what Moser and Rodgers have 
described as violence chains (Moser and Rodgers 2012). The processes 
involved in the reproduction of urban violence and insecurity are influenced 
both by social, economic and political structural factors, as well as by 
particular local conditions (Winton 2004). Additionally the actors associated 
with some of the most visible forms of urban violence, such as youth gangs 
and organised criminal groups for example, are engaging in ever more 
complex relations with the state, society and the legal economy. Arias´ 
research in Rio de Janeiro´s favelas for instance, illustrates the way contacts 
between criminal actors, members of the police, civic leaders and politicians 
create networks that offer protection and political influence to criminals (Arias 
2006). Violent actors in cities of the global South are also interacting in ways 
that make distinctions between them very blurred, as Winton´s analysis of 
gang networks reveals (Winton 2014).  
It is very difficult to understand contemporary urban violence dynamics by 
looking at victimisation levels and at the number of violent deaths occurred 
over particular periods of time. However homicide rates have become key 
indicators of the problem or urban fragility. Although these quantitative 
measures of violence do not capture the complex way in which violences 
interact and are distorted by underreporting from public institutions, they 
illustrate incidence and spatial distribution patterns of the problem. They also 
allow for some basic comparative analyses. Homicide rates in cities across 
the globe for example, show that Latin American, Caribbean and Sub-
Saharan African cities are the most severely affected by lethal violence, with 
Latin America exhibiting the fastest growing pattern since 1999 (UNODC 
2011). In 2014, the list of the 50 cities with the highest levels of homicides in 
the world included 43 Latin American cities, 3 in South Africa and 4 in the 
United States (Citizen Council for Public Security and Criminal Justice 2014). 
Despite annual fluctuations, other studies have also shown the prevalence of 
urban violence in Central and South America, the Caribbean and Sub-
Saharan Africa (Muggah and Savage 2012; UNODC 2011). 
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Quantitative indicators also demonstrate that urban violence is very unevenly 
distributed. Homicide rates vary greatly among cities in the same country, but 
also between neighbourhoods and population groups in the same city. In 
general, the poorest and most marginalised communities are the most 
affected by violence and insecurity (Winton 2004; McIlwaine and Moser 
2007; Briceño-León and  Zubillaga 2002). In some cities there are 
neighbourhoods with homicide rates under the global average of 6.9 and 
other neighbourhoods where homicides rates are of up to 3 digits. The later 
ones generally endure higher levels of urban poverty too. For example, the 
three most prosperous neighbourhoods in Cape Town concentrated 1% of 
the total homicides occurred in the city in 2004, while the three poorest 
concentrated 44%. In the most marginalised neighbourhoods, the homicides 
rates reached up to 200 homicides per hundred thousand inhabitants (City of 
Cape Town 2011).  
Another key feature of lethal violence in fragile cities is that it especially 
affects young men from marginalised communities. In Brazilian cities for 
instance, the highest victimization rates are among young black males from 
the poorest neighbourhoods. In 2007 the national homicide rate in that 
country was 25 per 100.000 inhabitants, but the rate for black youths 
reached 66 per 100.000 (OECD 2011a). In general, global homicides rates 
show that fatal violence mostly affects men7. However victimisation among 
women is growing in some cities. Additionally, the differences on 
victimisation levels based on gender substantially drop when forms of non-
lethal violence are taken into account (World Bank 2011). In the case of 
nonfatal physical, sexual and psychological abuse for example, women 
disproportionately endure the highest levels of victimisation8.  
In addition to chronic levels of violence affecting urban areas in non-conflict 
settings, such as San Pedro Sula, Caracas, Chihuahua, Kingston , Rio de 
                                                          
7 It is estimated that sixty percent of the deaths caused by homicides in 2012 were of men 
between 15 and 44 years (WHO 2014) In addition, men commit the majority of violent 
crimes, from domestic violence to homicide. 
8 According to the 2014 Report on Violence Prevention by WHO, UNODC and UNDP, one in 
five women reports having been sexually abused as a child and one in three women reports 
having been a victim of physical or sexual violence by an intimate partner at some point in 
her lifetime. 
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Janeiro, Johannesburg and Ciudad Juarez; armed confrontations in the 
context of conventional conflicts and terrorism also constitute important 
sources of violence in some southern cities like Gaza, Baghdad, Fallujah, 
Kandahar, Tripoli or the Syrian city of Aleppo. Cities are important battlefields 
in conflicts involving state security forces, rebel groups (and western forces) 
and experience as a result, high numbers of casualties. The strategic role 
that cities still play in traditional and modern forms of warfare are leading 
some security experts in the North to identify them as the primary sites of this 
century’s wars and forms of combat (Hills 2004; Vautravers 2010; Muggah 
and Savage 2012; Beall 2007; Rodgers 2007).  
Urban violence in fragile cities whether as a consequence of diffuse forms of 
violence or conventional wars, has profound repercussions on people’s 
wellbeing and huge human, social and economic costs9. In contexts where 
levels are chronic, violence produces forced migrations, constant fear, 
stigmatisation and discrimination against those who reside in the most 
affected communities. Violence also reduces growth and produces negative 
social impacts, it affects relations, erodes trusts and social cohesion, limits 
access to employment and education and reduces mobility of people and 
capital (World Bank 2009; World Bank 2011; Chant and McIlwaine 2009:60). 
Urban violence impacts on peoples’ livelihoods by distorting family, social 
and community relations, by limiting people’s ability to access resources for 
survival (Moser 2004) and by reducing people’s and communities’ 
possibilities to overcome marginalisation and poverty. It also limits citizenship 
for those who reside in violence-affected areas and are unable to exercise 
their formal rights and freedoms in a meaningful way (Pearce 2007). 
Calculations of the direct economic costs of urban violence on national 
productivity and development, which take into account losses due to deaths 
and disabilities, to property crimes and to disincentives to local and foreign 
                                                          
9 In human lives: in 2008 alone, in Latin America and the Caribbean more than 130.000 
people died by firearms (UNODC 2011, UN-HABITAT 2012:75) 
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investment, also show that the losses represent in some cases an important 
percentage of countries’ GDP10.  
Multidisciplinary research on violence in the global South has highlighted that 
the impact of urban violences, as well as people’s perceptions and 
experiences of insecurity differ massively according to gender, age, class, 
ethnicity and race (McIlwaine and Moser 2007; Hume 2009; Moser and 
McIlwaine 1999, 2004; Orjuela 201011). Experiences of violence, insecurity 
and fear are, as Moser and McIlwaine suggest ´specific and shaped by wider 
political and socioeconomic power structures and by individual identity 
formation’ (Moser and McIlwaine 2014). The differentiated consequences 
and experiences of urban violence reveal the paradoxes inherent to life in 
fragile cities. For example, in the case of women´s safety, cities in the global 
South seem to offer simultaneously conditions that act as triggers and risks 
of gender-based violence (such as poor living conditions associated to urban 
poverty), and also opportunities for women to cope better with violence (such 
as easier access economic resources and institutional support, compared 
with rural areas (McIlwaine 2013).  Although the differences in experiences 
and risks of urban violence based on gender, have tended to be sidelined 
within mainstream policy and academic debates on violence and security 
(Hume 2004), in the decade in question, they slowly started to be noticed 
and to be integrated into global discourses on urban safety. Qualitative and 
participatory research has also highlighted the agency of those who are 
vulnerable to urban violences in the global South (Pearce 2009). Although 
people living in marginalised communities are exposed to some of the most 
dramatic manifestations of urban violence and live with high levels of fear, 
they also develop a wide range of responses to insecurity and violence 
(Auyero and Kilanski 2015). Some of these responses reproduce violence 
(for example when they involve taking ´justice´ in their own hands and in 
                                                          
10 The World Bank calculated that the economic cost of insecurity and violence in Central 
America represented almost 8% of its GDP.  In Guatemala violence cost the country more 
than 7% of GDP in 2005, more than twice the damage caused by Hurricane Stan the same 
year (World Bank 2011:5) 
11 For an example of how perceptions of security and development vary among different 
minorities in Colombo, Sri Lanka. 
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extreme cases lynchings (Godoy 2004); but others responses are non-violent 
in nature.  
Urban insecurity has also been identified as a powerful force shaping cities 
both spatially and socially (Caldeira 1996, 2000; Rodgers 2004). As panicked 
citizens who can afford to live in proliferating gated communities try to 
escape from real and perceived levels of insecurity and large sectors of 
society identified as dangerous get excluded from the enjoyment of urban 
space and life; spatial and social divisions widen in fragile cities of the global 
South.  
Today urban violence and instability are not only recognised as development 
problems (World Bank 2011; Moser and McIlwaine 2006; Moncada 2013a) 
and as posing huge challenges to the consolidation of democracies in 
several states12 (Casas-Zamora and Dammert 2012; Ungar 2011), but also 
as sources of security threats to western democracies and to the 
international community as a whole (OECD 2009; Diggins 2011). Increasing 
concerns with terrorism, drug trafficking and transnational criminal networks 
are driving attention towards fragile cities, most of which are located in the 
global South. In particular, the capacity of non-state actors to thrive in fragile 
urban areas is especially worrying for policymakers, military and security 
experts and international organisations (Norton 2003; Lamb ND). 
With a growing tendency towards conceptualising contemporary forms of 
global risk as the result of the existence of spaces of non-governance or mis-
governance at national and urban levels (Mitchell 2010; Clunan and 
Trinkunas 2010; Diggins 2011) this attention is translating into a wide range 
of public interventions and security initiatives.  
 
 
 
                                                          
12 In Latin America for example, the reduction of citizens’ trust in the state’s capacity to 
protect citizens´ basic rights is weakening support for democratic institutions and fostering a 
move towards more authoritarian attitudes. 
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Contemporary Security Responses to Urban Instability 
  
Urban violence and other symptoms of urban fragility are now a key concern 
for citizens (Latinobarometro13), and an essential area of intervention for 
policymakers, planners, development agencies, security experts, 
international and regional organizations (Jütersonke et al 2009; UN-
HABITAT 2007;  Caldeira 2000) and more recently, humanitarian 
organisations (Muggah and Savage 2012; Reid-Henry and Sending 2014). 
The last decade in particular has seen an important surge in efforts to 
contain and prevent urban violence and crime in Latin America, the 
Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa and South and Southeast Asia (OECD 
2011a, 2011b; UNDP 2012, 2010a).  
In Latin America and the Caribbean for example, where levels of violence are 
especially dramatic14 , there is an impressive record of public initiatives -as 
shown by the recent mapping exercise by the Igarapé Institute15 which 
registered 1,300 interventions across the region since the 1990s. The 
explosion in the number of interventions aimed at dealing with urban violence 
and improving security in the cities of the global South has only intensified 
since the mid-2000s. The global assessment of armed violence reduction 
initiatives by the OECD (2011a) registered the increase in number and scope 
of crime prevention and urban violence reduction initiatives in Latin America, 
the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa and South and Southeast Asia. The 
report shows that there has been an important surge in policies and 
programmes over the last decade, and an explosion in the number of 
interventions since the mid-2000s. In only six countries used as case studies, 
                                                          
13 Violence and delinquency are the most pressing worries for Latin Americans, together with 
unemployment, corruption and poverty (Latinobarómetro 2011) 
http://www.latinobarometro.org/latino/latinobarometro.jsp 
14 Only in Latin America and the Caribbean 1,4 million people lost their lives as a result of 
violent crime during the past decade (Casas-Zamora and Dammert 2012) The region also 
has the highest homicide in the world, and murder is the most prevalent cause of death in 
various cities in countries like Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, El Salvador and Mexico (UNDP 
2012:25) 
15 Undertaken with the support of the Inter-American Development Bank and InSight Crime 
http://igarape.data4.mx/ 
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as many as 570 armed violence reduction and prevention interventions were 
identified between 1990 and 2012, including 179 in Brazil, 45 in Burundi, 219 
in Colombia, 44 in Liberia, 58 in South Africa and 25 in Timor-Leste. Around 
two-thirds of these programs were implemented between 2006 and 2010. 
Many of the interventions implemented in cities in Brazil, Burundi, Colombia 
and South Africa since the 1990s were found to ‘have combined enforcement 
with conflict prevention, peace building, crime reduction, and citizen security 
priorities’ (OECD 2011a:32).  
Although many efforts by national, state and local tiers of government have 
relied on the use of hard fisted measures, there is undoubtedly increasing 
interest, among policy circles and support -from cooperation, international 
and development agencies, for the implementation of responses that are 
wider in scope, objectives and tactics. Many initiatives are led by local and 
national authorities and public institutions, but others by civil society actors or 
involve public-private collaborations with the support of international 
agencies. Urban security strategies are intended to contain, reduce, manage 
and in some cases, prevent urban violence, especially in poor and 
marginalised urban areas and are now at the heart of the way security is 
provided in southern cities.  
Public responses to urban violence and instability, meaning the security 
policies, programmes and initiatives implemented by local, regional or 
national authorities, can generally be located somewhere on a wide 
spectrum that goes from hard-coercive techniques to soft-preventive 
initiatives. The specific location of security initiatives on that spectrum 
depends on how the problem of violence is understood by authorities, the 
tools chosen to deal with it and the objectives public security initiatives seek 
to achieve. 
Coercive and Military-based Approaches 
Urban security strategies relying on the use of coercion and the repressive 
capacity of police and military institutions, such as the Mano Dura (Iron Fist) 
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policies implemented in Central America16 and Mexico during the 1990s, 
have been widespread across cities struggling with high levels of urban 
violence. Militaristic initiatives have been widely used in Latin America to 
deal with gang related violence and with the expansion of drug trafficking,  
but are also the dominant response to urban problems in other regions (such 
as south Asian cities for example17). These coercive responses rely on the 
deterrent capacity of harsh punishments and emphasise the individual 
responsibility of those who commit crimes but do not aim at transforming 
structural factors producing violence and insecurity in these contexts.  
The involvement of western powers in conflicts which have cities in the 
global South as battlefields have also contributed to militaristic approaches 
being still very present in the security agenda (Graham 2010). Concerns with 
the increasing power of criminal organisations and terrorist groups in urban 
areas have motivated the adaptation of military strategies and tactics to deal 
with security threats in urban contexts and the further involvement of military 
forces in the provision of public security (for the case of Mexico see Meyer 
2013). To some military and security analysts the type of warfare that has 
taken place in the last decade in some Iraqi, Afghan, Mexican and Brazilian 
cities, represents a new type of armed conflict (Peterke 2010).  Violence in 
these urban contexts varies and it can  involve very different actors, such as 
insurgents, militias, gangs, drug cartels, state forces and foreign troops, but 
in all cases it takes place in densely populated areas of the urban South with 
intensity, fatalities and levels of organisation that resemble, and in some 
cases surpass, that of traditional conflicts.  
An emerging interpretation of this phenomenon is that we are witnessing the 
‘urbanization of warfare and security’ (Coward 2009). Contemporary military 
doctrine, especially in the west, is responding to this phenomenon with what 
Graham calls ‘military urbanism’ (Graham 2010). This is leading not only to 
the increasing blurring of previous clear distinctions between internal and 
                                                          
16 See Hume (2007a) for an analysis of the use of this kind of policies in El Salvador, in 
response to youth gangs.   
17 See IDS 2014 
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external, and between military and policing areas of action (Bigo 2005; 
Abrahamsen and Williams 2009; Mitchell 2010), but also to the securitisation 
and militarisation of cities in the global South (Muggah and Savage 2012).  
In cities affected by increasing levels of urban violence and insecurity, 
changes in military strategies, doctrines, training and equipment (Vautravers 
2010) are leading to novel forms of intervention. Policing and military 
interventions in urban spaces are now focusing on the management and 
administration of space (Moser and Rodgers 2005), as well as on the 
effective administration and control of everyday life. As some interventions in 
cities of the global South reveal, contemporary security practices include 
simultaneous attempts to control territory, to keep order in streets and efforts 
to manage populations´ welfare (Dillon 2004; Duffield 2007). The use of 
technology, such as computer mapping technologies and systems like 
COMPSTAT and surveillance cameras  is becoming increasingly useful for 
these purposes.  
Police and military interventions attempted during the 2000s in cities like 
Medellin (with the Operation Orion), Rio de Janeiro (with the Pacification 
Police Units (UPP), Ciudad Juarez, Tijuana and West Kingston (Felbab-
Brown 2011), are examples of such processes by which more traditional 
security goals merge with biopolitical projects. Based on theories of social 
disorganisation, these interventions aimed at improving urban security by 
guaranteeing state’s effective control of ungoverned spaces have 
increasingly relied on a combination of pacification techniques, community 
and problem–solving oriented policing, socio-economic initiatives and efforts 
to improve delivery of services in marginalised urban areas. In some cases 
pacification efforts have also included initiatives targeting ‘at risk’ groups, as 
well as slum renewal and environmental design projects.  
These strategies make use of military and heavy-armed police operations to 
physically retake spaces ruled by criminal groups. Policing in these contexts 
focuses on the consolidation of territorial control by public authorities and on 
weakening non-state actors’ influence. However it also aims at winning local 
populations’ allegiance and combines socioeconomic programmes, 
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community policing and wider engagement with social networks in those 
areas (Felbab-Brown 2011; Muggah 2012). That is why these types of 
security strategies often require the participation of a wide range of 
institutions and actors in the form of public-civil and public-community 
partnerships, as well as adapting security forces’ roles, tactics and functions. 
This means that police officers are often asked to take on new tasks and in 
some cases to act as ‘social workers, civil engineers, schoolteachers, nurses 
and boy scouts’ (Muggah and Mulli 2012:65) in ways that analysts regard as 
strikingly similar to counterinsurgency strategies (Muggah and Mulli 2012 for 
Rio and Jensen 2010 for Cape Town).  
These new security strategies characterised by the combination of security 
and development measures tend to specially target the urban poor. Through 
the construction of police stations in strategic areas and in some cases by 
creating special military-police operations with increased reaction capacity in 
marginal areas, authorities seek to create conditions for the arrival of other 
state agencies. On a more routine basis, security tactics of territorial control 
such as raids in problematic areas, check points and routine stop and search 
tactics continue to take place while accompanied by socio-economic 
programmes in intervened communities.  
Preventive Approaches and the Move towards Mixed Security 
Responses 
As the examples above illustrate, security provision in fragile urban contexts 
is becoming increasingly more complex and diversified in its strategies and 
instruments as attempts have been made to contain and manage urban 
violence. Public security provision is gradually moving away from the 
exclusive use of hard fisted responses, towards more integrated approaches 
combining reactive measures and a wide range of crime and violence 
prevention policies (UNDP 2010a, 2010b; UN HABITAT 2007). 
Drawing inspiration from different theories developed in European and 
American contexts18, but also inspired by local understandings of urban 
problems, urban security initiatives in fragile and violence affected cities of 
                                                          
18 Such as social disorganization and broken-window theories 
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the global South have included sector-specific approaches focusing on 
improving urban governance, criminal justice reforms and intelligence and 
community policing. Programmes for youth at risk inspired by public health 
approaches, social capital and cohesion promoting programmes, conflict 
transformation, urban renewal, situational prevention and slum upgrading19, 
and more recently, gang truces20, are also part of the wide range of 
measures being used to deal with urban violence (Moser 2004; Muggah 
2012; Muggah 2014).   
In many countries security provision still is dominated by militarised 
strategies and by sporadic repression of problematic communities and 
groups, as a means to address security problems. Punitive security 
approaches are highly institutionalized, massively supported by the public 
and continuously reinforced by international campaigns like the wars on 
drugs, on terrorism and on organised crime. However in various cities of the 
global South local policymakers, civil society organisations, local elites, 
donors and development agencies have started to turn towards these wide 
range of preventive initiatives (OECD 2011) and towards ‘integrated and 
holistic approaches’ (Moser 2004). 
This highlights a new trend regarding urban security responses in the global 
South. Halfway through the second decade of this century coercive and 
preventive approaches are increasingly used in combination with urban 
planning strategies which take into account existing socio-economic and 
spatial fractures in cities. This means that the number of actors involved in 
dealing with the problem is diversifying, as well as the strategies used 
(Moser and McIlwaine 2014; Muggah 2012; UN–Habitat 2007; Rojas 2010).  
Shifts in the kind of responses used to deal with violence and insecurity in 
fragile cities throughout the 2000s illustrate the merging of different global, 
                                                          
19 For example the Urban Integrated Projects implemented in poor communities of Medellin, 
the Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) project implemented in 
Khayelitsha in Cape Town, the urban regeneration project implemented in Ciudad Juarez 
(Todos Somos Juarez) and the Favela Barrio project in Rio de Janeiro. 
20 These have been used in San Salvador, Medellin, Kingston, Port-of-Spain, São Paulo and 
Tijuana to reduce violence.  
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regional and local security agendas with traditional geopolitical narratives, 
global discourses on urban development and security and local practices. 
Western security doctrines and donors have supported reforms to policing 
and public security provision in the global South, with the intention of 
reducing the risks associated with the lack of effective administration of 
space and people by states (Mitchell 2010). International organisations have 
also been promoting a broader security agenda for the cities. The 2007 UN-
HABITAT Global report which focused on urban security, suggested for 
example an agenda based on the notion of human security (UN-HABITAT 
2007). This agency together with other developmental agencies like the 
UNDP, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, as well 
as the European Union have also supported a wide range of initiatives 
aiming at preventing crime and reducing violence in cities. These have 
focused on the promotion of good governance arrangements especially at 
local level and on the involvement of civil and community actors in strategies 
to improve urban security (UNDP 2010b; IADB 2003; World Bank 2011). At 
local level there have also been changes, with local authorities and elites 
paying more attention and slowly changing their attitudes and ways of 
engaging with marginalised communities (see UN-Habitat 2011; Riley et al 
2001).  
In Latin America and the Caribbean the combination of a wide range of 
programmes and initiatives is especially visible. In this region the adoption of 
Citizen Security as opposed to the state centred notion of national security 
(seguridad nacional), has created some space for the promotion of an 
interdisciplinary look at the problem and awareness to the need of linking 
human rights and the rule of law to the provision of security. This has led to 
some progress in terms of policy design, to the inclusion of preventive 
mechanisms and social policies and the promotion of efforts to exchange 
ideas and learning across the region on how to deal with institutional 
challenges (Dammert 2013; Abello Colak and Angarita 2013)21. Security 
                                                          
21 The systematisation of successful initiatives across the region supported by the IADB and 
the creation of a citizen security database of public security and safety programmes and 
projects in Latin America and the Caribbean are examples of these efforts 
http://igarape.data4.mx/# 
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sector reforms and police reforms in particular have also taken place in the 
search for forms of public security provision that respond to citizen needs. 
These reforms aimed at improving institutional accountability and police 
legitimacy through community oriented approaches for example (Dammert 
2007b; Ungar 2011), have faced major obstacles and have yielded unequal 
results across the region (Uldriks 2009; Fruhling 2009). Latin America and 
the Caribbean has also been a key site for the implementation of more 
comprehensive initiatives integrating urban planning and environmental 
design into efforts to make cities safer.  
 
Recently, some analysts have started to warn of signs that security 
responses to urban violence might be moving towards the management of 
security (Moser and Mclwaine 2014; Abello Colak and Pearce 2015) given 
the limitations of existing approaches to effectively control and eliminate the 
problem of violence. The mounting anxiety of local authorities and urban 
elites who seek to promote the integration of their cities to global flows of 
capital favours the adoption of management strategies. The consequences 
of implementing management oriented security initiatives, such as the 
brokering of truces between powerful gangs or criminal groups, which might 
produce temporary de-escalations of urban violence, yet which leave the 
power of armed groups and structural factors fuelling urban instability 
untouched, need to be further researched. This is the case, especially given 
the risk of deepening existing gaps between the kind of security provision 
available to different sectors of society (Abello Colak and Pearce 2015). 
 
 
Urban Security Thinking in Fragile Cities: A Critical Review  
The initiatives being implemented in the fragile cities of the global South to 
improve urban security are key to reducing and addressing the devastating 
impact of urban violence and instability. They are also important for other 
social, economic, political and cultural urban processes that will define the 
prospect of human development and peace in this predominantly urban 
century. There is, however, for the time-being, insufficient knowledge on how 
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a wide range of security responses to urban violence and instability come 
about and on their impact and outcomes. In this regard, a recent overview of 
the state of theory and knowledge on the interconnection between 
urbanisation, poverty and violence, funded by Canada’s International 
Development Research Centre (IDRC) and the United Kingdom’s 
Department for International Development (DFID), recognised that there is 
insufficient knowledge regarding the effectiveness of interventions designed 
to mitigate and reduce insecurity in medium and lower income cities 
(Muggah 2012:vi).  
A body of literature focused on the provision of security in cities is only 
emerging and consolidating now, with academic contributions from different 
disciplinary corners like criminology, urban studies, urban sociology, urban 
geography, anthropology and political science. Compared to the now 
extensive multidisciplinary literature on urban violence, the literature on 
urban security is much limited, especially regarding security provision in 
cities of the global South. Paradoxically, the security studies field has been 
relatively absent from the knowledge production around security provision in 
urban contexts. The increasing importance of dynamics taking place in 
fragile cities and spaces in the global South will however put urban security 
right at the centre of the security agenda in the near future.  
In the next section I explore analytical approaches that seem predominant 
within the existing urban security literature, placing special attention on how 
scholars and a wide range of international bodies have attempted to study 
public security responses in cities affected by chronic levels of violence and 
instability.   
Analytical Approaches to the Study of Urban Security  
Existing studies of contemporary forms of security provision in cities 
struggling with urban violence and instability can be broadly clustered into 
three different groups based on their analytical choices and focus: Policy 
oriented analyses, State-Centred analyses and Critical Analyses of Urban 
security and neoliberalism. Each of these groups encompasses a number of 
contributions which have engaged with the task of studying security 
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initiatives while focusing on particular issues and using particular analytical 
lenses. In this section I identify the general characteristics of these three 
broad analytical clusters and provide an analysis of some of their advantages 
and limitations. Table 1 provides a summary of this analysis.  
Table 1. Predominant Analytical Approaches to the Study of Urban Security 
in the global South       
Main Analytical 
Approaches 
for the Study 
of Urban 
Security in 
Fragile Cities 
Main Focus Advantages Limitations 
Policy-
Oriented 
Analyses 
 
 
Policy design 
Policy 
Implementati
on  
Policy 
Results 
(impact/effect
iveness) 
Institutional 
aspects that 
affect security 
provision in 
cities 
 
 
Provide Context 
specific 
information on  
existing 
institutional 
capacities 
Context specific 
evidence of impact 
on violence and  
(in)security (what 
works and what 
does not work as 
intended) 
Potential for 
comparative 
analyses 
Tendency to rely on the 
most visible indicators of 
violence while ignoring more 
complex processes 
reproducing urban violences  
There is little engagement 
with issues of power  
Security provision is studied 
as a technical process with 
little connection with socio-
economic, political, and 
cultural urban processes 
State-Centred 
Analyses of 
Security 
Provision 
 
 
 
 
 
State/Urban 
 
 
 
Draws attention to 
the way security 
Tendency to rely on western 
notions of state that do not 
capture dynamics in the 
global South 
Overlooks human centred 
notions of security 
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Fragility 
State building  
Security-
development 
nexus 
 
provision affects 
state-building 
processes in 
fragile contexts 
(specially 
legitimacy, 
monopoly of 
coercion and 
territorial 
sovereignty)  
Ignores differentiated 
experiences of (in)security 
and people’s responses 
Does not recognise how 
security is constituted by 
social actors 
Does not question structural 
factors, including the impact 
of neoliberal processes   
Critical 
Analyses of 
Urban Security 
and 
Neoliberalism 
 
 
Neoliberalism  
Urbanisation 
of Capital 
 
 
Illustrates the way 
security is 
connected to socio 
political and 
economic 
processes 
Tendency towards 
generalizations and 
deterministic explanations  
No space for contingency 
and agency in the analysis 
It does not recognise the 
role of non-neoliberal 
dynamics  
 
Policy Oriented Analyses 
This type of analysis mainly focuses on the policy characteristics of security 
initiatives and responses as well as on their effectiveness. Analyses under 
this category are primarily concerned with an exploration of the design and 
implementation aspects of security responses, but also with assessments of 
the impact these security programmes and initiatives have. The most 
common questions guiding analyses in this category are: what are the best 
ways to contain, prevent, or manage violences and insecurity in cities? What 
affects, whether positively or negatively, the implementation of security 
responses in fragile urban contexts? Do particular security initiatives work at 
reducing violence, crime and insecurity? And what are the intended and 
unintended effects of particular security policies or initiatives, taking into 
account the stated objectives of those policies?  
Examples of these policy oriented analyses include studies and broad 
reviews of policy responses in contexts of urban violence produced by 
institutions like the Inter-American Development Bank, studies and reports 
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on urban (in)security produced by United Nations dependencies such as UN-
Habitat, UNODC and UNDP, by the World Bank and the WHO, as well as the 
rapidly expanding literature on crime and violence prevention (International 
Centre for the Prevention of Crime 2012, OECD 2011b). This type of studies 
are becoming highly influential in the definition of policies among a wide 
range of local authorities, especially in African and Latin American cities, 
given the efforts by international bodies to support knowledge transfer 
among cities and institutions.  
This category also includes region specific literatures, such as the ‘citizen 
security’ literature produced in Latin America (Basombrio 2012, 2013) or the 
literature on security and justice provision in South Africa (Van der Spuy 
2012; Burger and Boshoff 2008). In the case of the prolific citizen security 
literature which rapidly expanded since the 1990s when the first books were 
published, it has predominantly focused on the role played by dysfunctional 
systems of law and order and state institutions on the impressive increases 
in violence levels during the last two decades in this region. It includes 
country specific analyses of security policies implemented by national and 
local governments (Llorente 2005b22; Ruiz 201323; Bobea 201224) and of 
existing institutional arrangements for the provision of citizen security and 
their shortcomings (Diamint 2004; Llorente and Rubio 2003). The citizen 
security literature also includes analyses of security sector reforms attempted 
in the region and their mixed results, with particular attention to police 
institutions and criminal justice systems (Bailey and Dammert 2005; 
Dammert 2007b; Fruhling 2009; Uldriks 2009; Campesi 2010). These 
analyses highlight important obstacles to reform processes in the region, for 
example the politicization of the police forces (Ungar 2011) and the existence 
of adverse political conditions that reduce incentives and create constrains to 
institutional democratic reforms to the security sector (Fuentes 2009).  
                                                          
22 See for an analysis of the citizen security policies implemented in Bogota. 
23 See for a study of violence prevention and slum upgrading policies implemented in Chile. 
24 See for an analysis of a comprehensive citizen security policy in Dominican Republic. 
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More recently, analysts of citizen security in Latin America and the 
Caribbean have started to focus on the sophistication of organised crime and 
the challenges this poses to national and citizen security across the region 
(Thoumi et al 2010; Garzon Vergara 2012; Jaramillo and Perea 2014; Garay-
Salamanca & Salcedo-Albarán 2011; Abello Colak and Guarneros-Meza 
2014). This keeps the regional policy agenda on urban security focused on 
state institutional capacity (Mathieu and Nino Guarnizo 2012,) and on the 
limitations faced by the state in the face of new configurations of urban 
violence and crime. In this context the citizen security literature is dominated 
by the question of what is the best way in which the state can handle what is 
seen as a growing ‘security gap’ in the region (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas, 
2011).  
This body of literature, as well as contributions from scholars’ observations in 
other contexts have contributed to our understanding of the characteristics of 
existing institutions currently involved in the provision of security in cities 
(police institutions, local authorities, justice system and the penal system) 
and the factors that hamper their capacity to address the reproduction of 
multiple violences and the mutation of violent actors (Townsend 2009 for the 
case of Trinidad and Tobago for example). The academic literature has 
made evident for example how underfunded, undertrained and easily 
corrupted police forces are contributing to security problems (Macaulay 
2002), and the tendency towards the privatisation of security (Abrahamsen 
and Williams 2007). It has also provided evidence of the limitations faced by 
local authorities during the implementation of preventive oriented approaches 
(Hoppert-Flamig 2013). These analyses have highlighted how local 
leadership, bureaucracy efficiency, multi-level institutional coordination and 
better public management practices can lead to more effective management 
of security provision in some cities (Leyva Botero 2010 for the example of 
Medellin). 
Although the number of rigorous evaluations of violence and crime 
prevention and reduction initiatives is limited (Muggah 2012), there is 
increasing demand for the production of reliable data on urban security and 
for more evidence based studies on what works and what does not work in 
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terms of improving urban security. There is growing interest among 
policymakers, international agencies and scholars in undertaking policy and 
programme evaluations (for example the IADB 2013; Moestue et al. 2013). 
The private sector in some cities has also shown interest and supported this 
type of policy-oriented analyses (for example in Central America the private 
sectors funded a study on Medellin´s citizen security strategy25).   
Policy-oriented analyses undertaken by academics in different fields have 
provided important insights and evidence into the working of security 
responses and crime prevention initiatives in particular contexts and into their 
unintended consequences. From those types of analyses we know for 
example, that weak institutional capacities have been a major obstacle for 
the implementation of effective public policies to tackle urban violence in 
Latin America (Fruhling 2012). Also that punitive solutions, including military 
interventions, have been in most cases incapable of sustainably diminishing 
homicide rates and have instead worsened security problems (Aguilar 2006; 
Jütersonke et al 2009; Peace Studies Group 2011) while also resulting in 
numerous human rights violations. We also know that security policies 
implemented in the context of the war on drugs have contributed to the 
current crisis of many penal and justice systems in Latin American countries 
(Uprimny Yepes et al 2012).   
Analyses of preventive approaches have also started to suggest that in 
certain contexts combined security approaches have helped reduce some 
forms of urban violence. Recent studies, some of them inspired by the notion 
of resilience26 suggest that some initiatives have begun reversing some of 
the manifestations of fragility and promoted resilience in low- and medium-
income settings. The most promising initiatives, it is argued, tend to privilege 
consultation and dialogue with communities, coordination among different 
layers of government, a proactive approach to urban safety and 
comprehensive multisectoral approaches which target macro- and micro-
                                                          
25 See Mejia-Restrepo 2013 
26 Understood as the process by which urban systems, individuals, communities, authorities 
and private and civil society adapt, cope and recover and transform from risks, hazards and 
shocks such as chronic levels of violence, without resorting to violence and with minimum 
damages to security, and key public social and economic institutions (Muggah 2014) 
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level risk factors as well as political, economic and social drivers of urban 
violence (Muggah 2014:352; Davis 2012; Bellis et al. 2010; Falkenburger 
and Thale 2008). A comparative evaluation of the  implementation of five 
Interamerican Development Bank supported citizen security projects in 
Central America and the Caribbean found out that the most successfully 
implemented projects were those which included mechanisms for 
communities´ participation, situational diagnostics, trained practitioners and 
protocols, presence of community officers and simple project design with 
limited number of state institutions involved and more direct routes to service 
delivery (IADB 2013). These are common elements highlighted within the 
specialised policy-oriented literature; however there is also evidence that 
more comprehensive security efforts to tackle violence and crime, can also 
bring socio-economic investment, urban development, civil society 
participation and transformations of the built environment right into the centre 
of urban security practices in ways that are often problematic and pose the 
risk of ‘criminalizing social policy’ (Dixon 2006) or even ‘criminalising urban 
governance’ (Meth 2011). 
Case specific analyses provide important insights regarding contemporary 
forms of security provision and their time and territorial impacts. For example 
in the case of Rio de Janeiro’s pacification efforts since 2008, policy-oriented 
analyses highlight that the combination of coercive police intervention 
followed by social programmes reduced gang related violence, but it also 
increased living costs in some communities. The impoverishing effects of 
these state interventions have created conflicts between residents and the 
state in these areas (Werling 2014; Vieira da Cunha and Da Silva 2011).  
The importance of policy impact focused analyses is unquestionable. They 
offer possibilities for undertaking comparative analyses for example. 
However these analyses have some limitations too. One is the criteria they 
use to evaluate security policies.  As Werling (2014) argues for the case of 
Rio, assessments of policy intervention often rely on ‘macro-level’ 
administrative data or community ‘case studies’ and these data do not 
capture other real changes on the ground. Policy analyses also tend to rely 
exclusively on the most visible indicators of violence for impact evaluations. 
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Homicide rates as well as high impact crimes, such as robberies and 
victimisation levels are commonly used as measures of shifts in urban 
security. These types of quantitative measures facilitate comparative efforts, 
but limit our capacity to recognise and address other manifestations of urban 
violence and insecurity, for example, domestic violence, non-lethal violence 
against certain population groups (women, children, the elderly, or minority 
groups) or underreported forms of intimidation such as extortion and forced 
urban displacement. Within policy-oriented analyses of urban security, these 
types of security problems are easily eclipsed.  
The complex interaction between different types of violence and the diverse 
processes and factors that might drive fluctuations in quantitative indicators 
of urban violence are also difficult to acknowledge and explain within policy 
oriented analyses that try to comprehend the policy impact of security 
responses. An example of this type of limitations is the way homicide rates 
reductions have been attributed to public policies in statistical analyses27, in 
cases where these reductions were driven by other factors, such as the 
hegemony achieved by a powerful criminal actor in particular areas and the 
resulting reduction in violent competitions for criminal control of territories 
and illegal economies28.  
Another limitation of policy oriented analytical approaches is that they do not 
tend to engage critically with questions of power, such as who participates in 
the definition of security policies and who is excluded? Who defines what is 
to be secured and how? Whose security is privileged or neglected in the 
process of providing security? Within policy-oriented analyses, security 
policies are often regarded as technical and apolitical interventions to deal 
with violence and crime, and in consequence these approaches do not have 
suitable tools to explore the political economy of security provision, the wider 
political, social and economic context in which security provision is inscribed, 
                                                          
27 for example in the case of Medellin an epidemiological based study argued that a 
considerable reduction in homicides rates in the 2000s was the result of the construction of 
Metrocable (an aerial cable-car system used for public transport in hilly zones of the city). 
28 Reductions in levels of urban violence due to this process have been reported in Medellin 
and Ciudad Juarez. 
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or to even question what kind of crime and violence are considered policy 
priorities and why.  
The importance of the inclusion of politics and the political economy 
dimensions in analyses of the way security policies are crafted and their 
outcomes in the global South is highlighted by contributions revealing that 
the level of integration of cities in licit and illicit global economic flows affects 
both patterns of violence and political responses to it (Moncada 2013a). A 
number of scholars has studied urban security responses in connection with 
the functioning of political systems and political processes in different 
contexts (Muller 2012; Meth 2011; Moncada forthcoming; Fuentes 2009; 
Gutierrez-Sanin et al. 2009; Fourchard 2012; Maclean 2014). Their analyses 
show that powerful actors’ interactions as well as socioeconomic dynamics 
deeply impact on the nature, shape and trajectory of public responses to 
violence in each context. In the case on Mexico city for example, Muller 
shows how informal political negotiations, bargaining processes and power-
sharing arrangements between central state and local power centres, 
produce politically negotiated  forms of local policing, as well as fragmented 
and selective security provision (Muller 2012). In this respect, Hills finds that 
in post-conflict cities policing can take different forms in particular contexts 
according to power relations; power struggles and negotiations (Hills 
2009:53).  
Along the same lines, analyses of changes in the repertoire of security 
policies implemented in the three main Colombian cities in the last decade 
have pointed to the formation of coalitions in larger municipalities with an 
influential middle class (Gutierrez et al 2009; MacLean 2015) and to the 
political role played by the private sector (Moncada 2013b) as the key forces 
shaping local policy responses to urban violence in these cities. Moncada´s 
research shows that depending on their relation to urban space and violence 
the private sector in these cities either endorsed or opposed particular 
security approaches and helped to determine the type of responses 
implemented by local authorities in each of these cities (Ibid).These are 
important contributions that bring in to the analysis of urban security, 
questions regarding the role of politics. However as it will be highlighted later 
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in this chapter, still little attention has been paid to the power structures in 
which security is inscribed and on the actual working of power within security 
provision and its implications for the kind of security that is delivered on the 
ground. 
State-Centred Analyses of Security Provision  
The growth of the ‘fragile, ‘weak’ and ‘failed states’ literature, during the last 
decade (Boas and Jennings 2005; Fukuyama 2004; Koonings and Kruijt 
2004;Krasner and Pascual 2005) and the merging of security and 
development discourses and agendas in what some refer to, as the security-
development nexus (Duffield 2001, 2010; Stern and Ojendal 2010;) illustrate 
the consolidation of a framework that has come to dominate academic and 
policy agendas regarding security and development.  
This analytical and policy framework, calls for increasing attention, 
assistance and intervention in fragile states in the form of state-building 
projects which combine economic development with security strategies 
(Clunan and Trikunas 2010). These attempts to increase states’ capacity to 
exert effective sovereignty, especially in ‘problematic’ areas, include not only 
traditional recipes such as training the police, equipping military forces and 
building state bureaucracies’ capacities, but also include increasing local 
populations’ access to social services, promoting economic development and 
civic and community involvement. These last aspects, previously ignored 
within the security studies agenda, are now regarded as key factors in the 
production of local, national, regional and international security. 
The ‘fragile state literature’ focuses on the state’s incapacity or unwillingness 
to exert a monopoly of violence,  on territorial fragmentation and political 
instability in countries of the global South, and suggests that these conditions 
constitute a major challenge to contemporary foreign policy and a threat to 
global stability (Diggins 2011). In the context of  the consolidation of ‘mega’ 
slums across the global South, where it is assumed that state weakness can 
create enabling environments for the emergence of potentially violent and 
hostile non-state actors (Norton 2003; Rapley 2006) and with levels of 
insecurity and violence rising in some cities, there seems to be growing 
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preoccupation with the configuration of ‘fragile cities’ where authorities and 
public and civil institutions struggle to regulate and monopolize legitimate 
violence across their territories (Muggah and Savage 2012; Muggah 2014b).  
This analytical framework built around the notion of weakness and fragility 
has brought the state back to the centre stage in the security studies agenda. 
A functioning state, capable of delivering security and enabling economic 
growth and welfare is regarded as the cure to security problems emerging 
from the global South (Clunan 2010). In that context war-torn and post-
conflict societies have seen the deployment of multiple efforts to create, 
rebuild, or strengthen states’ capabilities to deliver services at different 
levels, including at the urban and neighbourhood level. 
Today urban dynamics are seen as decisive for state-consolidation in the 
rapidly urbanising global South. In the same way that European cites shaped 
the development of state configurations in the global north (Tilly 1992), cities 
in fragile states have started to be recognised as strategic sites for the 
development or deterioration of state core functions. Comparative research 
on cities and states at LSE suggests for example that the way different types 
of conflict are managed in cities, can promote or prevent the unravelling of 
the state through processes of state erosion, consolidation or transformation 
(Beall et al 2011). 29 
Concerns with ‘state fragility’ and ‘state-building’ processes have inspired 
analyses of urban security in the global South which focus on the relation 
between security provision and state consolidation, by looking in particular to 
how the delivery of services such as security and justice in cities might affect 
efforts to strengthen the state (Kaplan 2014). These analyses adopt a state-
centred approach in their study of security governance arrangements and of 
security policies, programmes and initiatives, and tend to focus on the impact 
security responses have on state legitimacy, on its monopoly of coercion and 
its capacity to exercise territorial and social control. An example of such 
approach is Felbab-Brown’s analysis of the pacification and socio economic 
                                                          
29 See the Cities and Fragile States project at LSE, available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/ also 
Tipping Point of Urban Conflict project, available at http://www.urbantippingpoint.org/. 
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strategies undertaken in Rio, Medellin, Ciudad Juarez and Kingston, which 
focused on how these security responses intended to address the lack of 
territorial control exercised by the state in urban areas controlled by violent 
actors and the low legitimacy of the state among local urban communities 
(Felbab-Brown 2011).  
Given that the delivery of security and justice has been regarded as a 
determinant of state legitimacy in fragile and post-conflict contexts, a key 
concern for scholars in this cluster is with improving efficiency in the delivery 
of these services. Some analysts have explored the role played by non-state 
actors in the provision of security and justice in the context of institutional 
shortcomings and slow improvements at state level. Some of them have 
argued that donors interested in improving justice and security provision in 
fragile contexts, need to incorporate these non-state actors in their 
programmes (Scheye 2009).  
Other scholars have explored the role played by local responses to urban 
insecurity and violence in the development of national security promotion 
efforts.  For example Muggah and Colleta’s analysis of a wide range of urban 
security promotion activities undertaken in Sudan, Haiti, EL Salvador, Brazil, 
Venezuela and Colombia, such us community security mechanisms, at risk 
youth and gang programmes and urban renewal and population health 
programmes (Colletta and Muggah 2009), or Carranza-Franco’s exploration 
of municipal policies in Medellin Colombia regarding reintegration of ex-
combatants (Carranza-Franco 2014). These analyses suggest that security 
responses at city level can underpin, redefine, support, reinforce and 
enhance national security promotion efforts, such as Demobilisation and 
Reintegration programmes (DDR) and Security Sector Reforms (SSR). 
Compared with policy-oriented analyses, state-centred analyses provide a 
more complex understanding of what urban security entails in contexts of 
fragility. They draw our attention to the impact security provision has beyond 
violence indicators and crime rates and on state-society relations. Within 
these analyses the provision of urban security is studied as a key 
determinant of state stability and as a means to advance state-building 
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processes. This is an important contribution given the proven impact security 
provision has on the state’s capacity to deliver other services and on the rule 
of law, law enforcement and good governance; however this state focus also 
entails some limitations. 
 On the one hand state-centred analyses of security have led to functionalist 
notions of security provision in which security policies and institutions are 
regarded simply as tools meant to allow the state to accomplish two main 
ideal attributes: legitimacy and capacity to exert monopoly of violence within 
a given territory. Security provision is in consequence studied as the process 
of achieving the control and centralisation of the means of coercion, and as a 
set of strategies used to deal with actors competing with the state for 
legitimacy (for example Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2011). This minimalist and 
instrumental notion of security impedes us from seeing security provision as 
a result and as a reproducer of much more complex social dynamics and of 
relations and structures of power with a given society.  
On the other hand, the degree to which states achieve the ideal attributes 
inspired by Weber’s definition of the state, has served to measure the 
success or failure of state building processes across the south (Muller 
2012:15). As critics of the ‘state fragility framework’ suggest, the notion of 
state failure and fragility uses western democracies as a point of reference in 
the analysis and this limits our capacity to comprehend existing state 
configurations and social processes in the global South on their own merit 
(Muller 2012; Zurcher 2007). It also contributes to the reification of the state 
as a ‘universal a priori predicate to our social existence rather than a product 
of our social existence’ (Bratsis 2006:930) by ignoring the historicity and 
particularity of state formation processes and democratic consolidation in the 
west. By comparing the south to the supposedly ideal state model in the 
north, the fragility literature has as a result produced a very prescriptive 
agenda for state-building orientated interventions and promoted notions of 
‘good governance’ and ‘effective sovereignty’ based on the western state of 
the 20th century, that also limits our understanding of what security provision 
                                                          
30 cited in Muller 2012 
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means and entails in alternative forms of social, economic, cultural and 
political organisation in the global South and under the impact of 
globalisation (Clunan and Trinkunas 2010:18). 
Because they tend to overlook the way security provision is embedded in the 
working of particular social orders and shaped by historical and 
socioeconomic processes and trajectories of state consolidation as they 
unfold in non western societies, state-centred analyses have limited 
analytical tools to explore and understand security provision in fragile cities in 
their own context. The importance of this criticism is highlighted by analyses 
of democracy and state in the context of rising violence in the global South 
which suggest that the chronic levels of violence that have been catalogued 
as a failure of democracy or a failure of the state in Latin America for 
example, might be on the contrary an´ integral part of the current model of 
development´ (Moser and McIlwaine 2014), a necessary element in the 
configuration of democratic governance and forms of resistance to it (Arias 
and Goldstein 2010) and the result of the working of the state (Muller 2012; 
Pearce 2010). 
 State-focused analyses of security provision tend to ignore security 
problems and forms of violence that do not seem to affect the state’s ability 
to effectively govern territories and populations. The focus on the state risks 
reinforcing traditional notions of security at the expense of human centred 
notions that could bring into the debate the different ways in which people 
experience (in)security on the ground and how they develop strategies and 
articulate responses to overcome contexts of insecurity (Luckham and Kirk 
2012).  
 Finally, state-centred analyses of security provision seem unable to grasp 
the social, political and economic realities in which insecurities are inscribed 
(Abello Colak & Pearce 2009, Luckham 2009) and the complex interactions 
between state and non-state actors as they evolve in the global South. In this 
regard an expanding body of literature focusing on hybridity in security 
provision (Willems 2015; Luckham and Kirk 2012; Boege at al 2008; 
Abrahamsen and Williams 2009) has called for more empirical research on 
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hybrid security arrangements. This is relevant to the study of security 
provision in urban contexts. It could help us understand the wide range of 
interactions and negotiations that take place among formal and informal 
actors for the daily provision of security and welfare in the global South, and 
the overlap and complex interactions between ‘traditional, personal, kin-
based or clientelistic logics with modern, imported or rational actor logics’ in 
governance processes (Luckham and Kirk 2012:13).  
Critical Analyses of Urban Security and Neoliberalism 
A limited number of academics have explored security provision in the 
context of social and economic dynamics unleashed by neoliberal urban 
development in the global South (Freeman 2012; Humphrey 2013; O´Neill 
and Thomas 2011; Samara 2010; Jensen 2010; Campesi 2010; Orjuela 
2010; Kairos 2012; Muller 2012).Their analyses are representative of a 
critical approach to the study of urban security which takes into account 
contemporary forms of neoliberalism and their impact on state and popular 
responses to security problems.   
Neoliberalism as an economic and political project has been shaping cities in 
the global North and South since the 1980s. The implementation of 
neoliberal economic policies for example has reduced state intervention in a 
wide range of areas and restructured urban economies31. It has also led to 
the adaptation of urban space to the needs of global capital. Neoliberal 
discourses and practices are characterised, according to Harvey, by their 
ideological commitment to pursuing ´´human well-being...by liberating 
individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills´´ (Harvey 2005:2). However 
through processes of deregulation, privatization and commodification, 
neoliberal capitalist globalization has accentuated levels of inequality and 
exclusion, creating contemporary ´cities of extremes´ (Bayat and Bierkart 
2009). In these cities the better off seek shelter in gated communities while 
the urban poor are pushed to live in areas where prices of land are cheaper 
and police control tighter. In what are seen today as neoliberal cities of the 
global South, privatization has also created disparities in citizens´ access to 
                                                          
31 By producing shifts from manufacturing to services  
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a wide range of services and accentuated processes of informalisation.  
Driven by neoliberal logics, these types of processes have been recognised 
as having a profound impact on the way security is provided and on the 
meaning of urban security itself.   
Some analysts suggest for example that neoliberalism has contributed to the 
configuration of forms of security provision that ignore structural causes of 
insecurity and emphasise the individual responsibility of those who commit 
crimes. This contributes to legitimising the use of punitive solutions to 
security problems, including hard fisted measures, military interventions and 
in some cases, even social cleaning campaigns and lynching. As Muller 
argues for the case of Mexico City (Muller 2013), the consequences of such 
responses to urban insecurity involve the criminalisation of poverty and the 
configuration of a neoliberal form of penal state which responds to crime, 
insecurity and violence through the punitive government of urban marginality. 
Critical analyses of urban security in the global South have argued that 
neoliberal urban development has reduced security to the protection of 
economic growth and to the preservation of capital accumulation processes. 
This is the case because the advance of neoliberalism is often accompanied 
by the framing of crime as a threat to market lead growth and of the poor as 
dangerous and threatening for the city’s economic development and its 
social stability. This leads to the implementation of different forms of security 
provision in affluent areas and in marginalised areas. Widening gaps in the 
provision of services among sectors of the population are also evident in 
cities where renewal plans undertaken by mixed coalitions of public actors 
and private investors seek to create business districts and strategic areas to 
attract tourism and revitalise local economies. The creation of such 
neoliberal enclaves often produce the physical, material and subjective 
exclusion of certain groups who cannot be consumers or who are regarded 
as threatening or undesirable. Veliz and O´Neill (2011) provide evidence of 
such processes of exclusion in Guatemala City, where informal vendors 
faced forced removal from the historic city centre due to renewal projects 
aiming at increasing security and promoting economic development in the 
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city. The exclusion from the city centre not only affected street vendors, but 
also their working class clients who depended on the informal economy. 
By recognizing the way economic processes affect the identification of 
security threats and the design and implementation of security strategies; 
these critical analyses open security research to new dimensions. Analyses 
within this analytical approach highlight the way security discourses and 
practices influenced by the advance of neoliberalism impact on the nature of 
citizenship and on parameters of social and economic inclusion. For 
example, through the construction of categories of dangerous citizens, or 
what O´Neill and Thomas (2011) call the ‘anticitizens of a neoliberal social 
order’, security policies produce and justify the privatisation of public space. 
This often occurs through the implementation of safety programmes and 
particular forms of policing (Jensen 2010). As an example, urban 
regeneration efforts in Cape Town and the security policies and ´clean up 
strategies´ accompanying it have produced the exclusion of homeless youth 
(Van Blerk 2013) and the displacement of marginalised young black people 
(Samara 2011) from the city´s streets. 
These contributions highlight the importance of studying security provision 
empirically and in relation to particular power relations, hierarchies and 
socio-economic processes that shape cities in the global South. As security 
provision is studied in the context of processes and dynamics as they unfold 
in the urban South, opportunities appear to recognise that security 
governance can reciprocally have an impact on the power relations and on 
socioeconomic and political processes that shape it. In this regard Mitchell’s 
analysis of state practices, broken windows policing and zero tolerance 
narratives in Iraq, shows us for example that security provision can have 
profound impacts beyond indicators of violence and insecurity. Policing 
practices in this case helped to produce new forms of governance and 
opened ‘ungoverned’ spaces and populations to market forces, facilitating 
the entrenchment of neoliberal practices such as privatisation 
entrepreneurialism and responsabilization (Mitchell 2010).  
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These critical analyses of responses and discourses of security governance 
in cities of the global South, have made a great contribution to our 
understanding of the way institutional, economic, cultural and social 
processes associated to the expansion of neoliberalism have greatly 
influenced urban security. However they are also confronted with some 
limitations.  These analyses tend to lead to linear and over deterministic 
explanations of processes of social change where the only recognised 
shaping force is the expansion of neoliberalism and the market society. This 
ends in simplistic analyses that do not account for other non-neoliberal 
forces, factors and processes involved in the configuration of urban realities. 
By only focusing on the forces unleashed by the urbanisation of capital and 
the market, analyses of changes in responses to urban violence in this 
cluster, end up ignoring the role of contingency and also the complex 
processes by which many social and political actors influence the 
configuration of urban security in these contexts. 
This criticism is particularly relevant for the analysis of contemporary forms of 
urban security which combine coercive strategies, preventive programmes 
and efforts to integrate marginalised sectors of the population to the city 
proper. These comprehensive responses seem to be associated to changing 
attitudes and practices by a wide range of institutional, social and economic 
actors with different interests, objectives and agendas, but also to long 
standing demands of inclusion by local communities, which have been made 
more visible and influential through processes of democratisation.  
An analytical approach circumscribed to neoliberal processes risks ignoring 
the influence of processes of resistance that always accompany the advance 
of neoliberalism, as well as the role played by agency (Caldeira 2009). 
Contemporary responses to urban violence in fragile cities signal the 
appearance of new ways of engagement with the poor and marginalised 
sectors of society; these might be shaped by neoliberal forces but also by 
local and community processes that are often underestimated. Local forms of 
contestation and resistance influence state responses, because 
governmental intervention are dialectic processes shaped by quotidian 
practices (Perez Fernandez 2010:55) and not only by global discourses and 
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practices.  I argue that taking into account local forms of resistance in the 
analysis of urban security responses, can thus help us avoid 
oversimplifications or generalisations over the way neoliberal forces are 
shaping security governance in the global South.  
Addressing Limitations in Existing Analytical Approaches and Filling 
Some Gaps in the Urban Security Literature  
From the previous analysis of the contributions and limitations of 
predominant analytical approaches to the study of urban security in the 
global South, three main vacuums in the emerging literature of urban security 
stand out: i) we know very little about the way power works and flows 
through the security provision process; this is due to the lack of engagement 
with issues of power beyond the role of politics and political actors; ii) 
absence of explorations of economic, social and institutional processes that 
affect the configuration of security responses which take into account, but 
are not only restricted, to the influence of neoliberalism; and iii) the lack of 
empirical explorations of the realities and experiences of security provision 
on the ground, from the perspective of those who are targeted by security 
responses. I argue that until these dimensions are brought in to the study of 
urban security, our understanding of contemporary initiatives to contain, 
manage or prevent violence and insecurity is incomplete. 
Existing analytical approaches to urban security in the global South have not 
engaged with the question of how notions of security and insecurity are 
constructed and continually reimagined, and what the implications of this 
process are for security provision. As critical security thinkers have argued 
since the late 1990s, both security and insecurity are socially constructed 32 
through processes that reflect and respond to power structures in our 
societies33 (Tickner 1995; Booth2005, 2007; Wyn Jones 1999; Buzan 2007). 
Through analyses of traditional concepts and methodologies in security 
                                                          
32 the Copenhagen School and other critical security thinkers for example, have pointed out 
how securitization processes allow social actors to portray certain issues as a threat and to 
legitimise a wide range of security and military actions do deal with them. 
33 Uncovering the political dimensions of security has been a key priority for critical security 
thinkers since the late 1990s. 
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studies for example, critical security thinkers have challenged the assumed 
objectivity of security ideas and practices, demonstrating that security studies 
is not an apolitical form of expert knowledge on how to tackle threats.  
The question of how problems of urban violence, crime, urban fragility and 
instability are understood in historical and geographically specific moments is 
crucial to be able to understand the working of power, rather than the 
working of politics and the role of political actors, within security provision. As 
security problems are defined by authorities and experts, these problems 
become governmental categories, or issues that demand governmental 
intervention and action. The process of defining security problems in 
consequence has profound implications for the way authorities design 
responses to them and for how these are implemented and assessed. It 
defines for example whether security problems are seen as an issue 
requiring military and police action, or interventions that involve other fields of 
social governance, such as urban planning, community development and 
social welfare, etc.  
It is only when we question the formulations of the problems and the 
presuppositions about their nature and causes and also how certain groups 
are seen in relation to those problems, that we can recognise security 
provision as constitutive of forms of government; as a process by which 
power is exercised in a particular way and for particular purposes. This leads 
to questions regarding the working of power which remain underexplored 
within predominant analytical approaches. For example how are urban 
violence and instability being governed in a particular context? What are the 
imaginaries that lead those in power to choose particular strategies? How 
are those imaginaries influenced by neoliberal and non-neoliberal fostered 
processes and by political, economic, social and cultural changes? How do 
particular understandings of urban problems lead to different forms of 
controlling, managing or preventing violence? And what implications these 
have for the kind of security that gets delivered on the ground? 
Within current analytical approaches of urban security in the global South, 
security tends not to be regarded as a contested object of analysis and this 
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facilitates neglecting this type of questions (an exception is Rodgers 200634). 
However, security responses have important governmental implications as it 
has been demonstrated by criminological studies in the north (for example 
Stenson 2008). They are results and reproducers of socio-political relations 
of power and not only technical processes of containing violence and 
strengthening the state, or consequences of the urbanisation of capital. 
Security practices are the result of political processes and lead to particular 
ways of exercising power in our societies. They also impact on social 
relations and political orders (Nunes 2012).  
In order to overcome these limitations we need analytical approaches that 
enable a more comprehensive understanding of how power is embedded in 
the provision of security and affects the way security gets delivered in 
different contexts. An analysis of urban security which takes into account 
power dynamics provides a better understanding of the way power works 
through security responses to achieve certain goals, the way this power is 
legitimised and how people become subjects of it when they are 
beneficiaries, or not, of security policies.   
Security provision involves the definition of what is to be secured, against 
whom, for what purposes and by which means; in that way security also 
implicates particular conceptions of self and others and produces identities 
(Hultin 2010). As feminist contributions to security thinking in international 
relations have already highlighted, security discourses and practices, 
contribute to the crafting of identities and subjectivities (Stern and Wibben 
ND). Being able to explore the way security responses help construct 
particular subjectivities is ever more important in contexts of marginalization 
and exclusion, such as the ones that characterise the urban existence of 
millions of residents of cities in the global South. As certain sectors of the 
population are associated with urban violence and instability as victims, or 
                                                          
34 Rodgers’ analysis of state responses to violence in Metropolitan Managua in the late 20th 
and early 21st century shows how the elite-captured Nicaraguan State used ‘biopolitical 
forms of governmentality’ and states of exception to build a protected exclusionary ‘fortified 
network’ across the city for the elites, while offering security in the form of violent raids and 
state interventions characterised by arbitrary power, for the poor (Rodgers 2006). 
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perpetrators, or at risk groups; security responses shape the way these 
groups are being governed by the state. Analyses of urban security in fragile 
urban contexts need in consequence, to be better attuned to the way security 
impacts not only on living conditions, but also on experiences of citizenship 
among different sectors of populations. 
As illustrated by the previous analysis, predominant analytical approaches to 
urban security do not particular engage with empirical explorations of what 
kind of security gets delivered on the ground, from the perspective of those 
who are targeted by security initiatives and programmes. Urban security 
research and thinking continue to be developed within policy focused, state-
centred and top-down approaches which lack methodological tools suitable 
to explore security as it is daily experienced at the grass root levels. 
Making use of qualitative methodologies, ethnographic fieldwork and 
participatory research methods, scholars from different disciplines in the 
social sciences have made important contributions to our understanding of 
the way violence and insecurity are daily experienced (for example, Auyero 
et al 2015; Moser and McIlwaine 2004; Hume 2009; Orjuela 2010). Urban 
security research can benefit greatly from these contributions and from 
dialogue among disciplines which value empirical explorations of peoples’ 
experiences, especially those who are more affected by insecurity and 
violence.   
The emerging field of urban security and security thinking in general, need 
methodological innovation in order to get closer and grasp local realities 
(Hönke and Muller 2012; Lemanski 2012; Orjuela 2010; Ackerly et al 2006; 
Abello Colak and Pearce 2009, 2015)35. Recognising the voices and 
experiences of those who are increasingly subject to different forms of 
security provision in the global South, not only provides a better 
understanding of what kind of security is being produced in different 
contexts, but it also contributes to produce knowledge that is relevant to 
                                                          
35 Some methodological innovations have been made within critical security thinking with 
scholars’ turning to ethnography, discourse analysis and analyses of fields of practice, of the 
body and of objects in their explorations of security (Salter and Mutlu 2013). 
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policy design (Abello Colak and Pearce 2015). In this regard the use of 
interpretative ethnography is particularly relevant. As Hönke and Muller 
(2012) suggest, it certainly allows security studies to overcome the limitations 
emanating from the almost exclusive use of statistical surveys, ‘abstract 
formal models’ and secondary data. 
Conclusion  
This chapter offered a critical review of current public responses to urban 
insecurity in the global South and especially of the way these tend to be 
studied within the emerging field of urban security. It highlighted the need for 
an alternative and critical approach to security research, and showed that 
dominant analytical approaches to the study of urban security, especially in 
fragile cities of the global South, have concentrated on the relationship 
between security provision and state-building processes, on security 
institutions and policy performance, and on neoliberal processes as 
determinant of contemporary security governance. These are important 
contributions. However, within dominant analytical approaches, the role of 
power and the way it is exercised on different subjects remains neglected. As 
a result, mainstream urban security thinking is unable to engage empirically 
with the flow and workings of power through the process of providing 
security. This limits our understanding of the way security provision is 
shaped not only by powerful actors and their interests and agendas, but also 
by their understanding of what power is for and how they use it to govern 
certain populations.  
By highlighting the strengths and limitations of policy-oriented, state-centred 
and neoliberal-concerned analyses of security, this chapter suggests that a 
new approach that re-focuses on power and that resorts to alternative 
methods of exploration can be better equipped to fill important gaps in our 
current understanding of security provision in the global South, especially 
regarding the implications of the exercise of power on the lives of people. 
This is important given the growing interest in and emphasis on improving 
security management in cities experiencing chronic levels of violence and 
insecurity. While security policies’ impact and results are increasingly 
assessed against a number of measurable indicators, the profound impact 
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that security provision has on the meaning of citizenship itself and on the 
type of state-society relations that are in the process of configuration in the 
global South remain unexplored.  
Dominant analytical approaches, as the chapter suggested, are unable to 
capture important aspects of security provision, partly due to methodological 
choices. Mainstream security research is not concerned with understanding 
security provision as it is experienced on the ground, especially by the most 
vulnerable. Articulating an alternative analytical approach is, in consequence, 
key to moving the academic and the policy debates on security forward. To 
move urban security thinking beyond the state, policy assessments and the 
boundaries of neoliberal processes, new conceptual and methodological 
tools are needed. In the next chapter, I suggested a new way of exploring 
security provision which aims at filling these gaps and enabling a better 
understanding of how security provision is crafted, delivered and 
experienced in the most insecure contexts. 
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Chapter 2 
Developing an Alternative Critical Approach: Governmentality as a 
Lens to Theorise Security Provision in Fragile Cities 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I present an alternative approach to study urban security 
which could be applied to different urban contexts. The approach aims to 
overcome the limitations of existing frameworks within the urban security 
literature in grasping the interface between security provision and governing 
processes in fragile cities. In this chapter, I suggest that Foucault’s work on 
power, and, in particular, his notion of governmentality offers analytical and 
conceptual tools that enable the exploration of the governmental 
consequences of security provision in fragile cities. I also argue that it is 
necessary to undertake empirical explorations of the kind of security 
provision that gets delivered on the ground and suggest the use of 
ethnographic informed methodologies in order to do it from the perspective of 
those who are most vulnerable to urban violence and insecurity. The chapter 
begins with an overview of Foucault’s work and of what is known as the 
‘governmentality approach’. It then analyses what the use of governmentality 
as a lens offers in the study of urban security. The chapter finally describes 
the analytical approach that I develop based on Foucault’s contributions and 
how it was used to research the case of Medellin.  
Foucault’s work on Governmentality  
In his Lectures on Security, Territory and Population at the Collège de 
France (1977-1978) Foucault analysed some of the problems and processes 
that arose with the emergence of towns in Europe in the early modern 
period, such as the planning of spatial distributions, scarcity of grain, and 
contagion and risk of small pox epidemics (Foucault 2007). He centred his 
analysis on the general frameworks that were used to think about these 
urban problems and the actions and techniques used to deal with them in 
this particular context. These lectures were a continuation of Foucault’s 
interest on historical and empirical studies of power relations in the west and 
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in particular, on the complex processes and techniques involved in the 
management of European society.  
Foucault’s work and especially his ‘governmentality lectures’, as they are 
commonly known, have been especially influential in at least two ways. On 
one hand, they provided a new perspective on state building processes and 
shed new light on the workings of economic liberalism in Europe. And, on the 
other hand, they laid out the foundations for an innovative approach for the 
study of power, government and authority, which as Saar argues, should ‘not 
be read as a radical refutation or replacement of intellectual political history, 
but as a radical methodological challenge to it’(Saar 2011:6).  
Foucault’s notion of governmentality, which he used in his later works to 
describe the way of thinking about and exercising power that emerged in 
Europe in the late 18th century in response to ‘specific economic and political 
problems posed by the expansion of urban areas in Europe’ (Foucault 
2007:98-110) constitutes a key contribution to the study of government. This 
new ‘art of government’ which Foucault saw as a ‘major mutation...in the 
history of human societies’ (Foucault 2007:64), constituted a way of 
regulating society that was different from the ones used during medieval 
times and during most of the early modern period. Governmentality in the 
late 18th century focused on governing populations, not on exercising power 
or imposing laws on subjects of the state as a way of guaranteeing the 
sovereign’s control over the territory, as it was the case during medieval 
times. It also involved the use of what Foucault called ‘apparatuses of 
security’ to govern populations. These apparatuses included not only armies 
and police forces but also health, welfare and education systems, and 
differed from the disciplining techniques prevalent during the 17th century 
which focused on shaping the conduct of people in schools, workhouses, 
armies and hospitals. The main objective of governing populations in this 
way was to ensure the optimal functioning of economic and social processes 
and constituted the birth of ‘biopolitics’ or ‘power over life’ (Foucault 
2007:369) which Foucault recognised as a key factor in the formation of the 
modern European state.  
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In Foucault’s words, this new rationality of government -or governmentality, 
was the ‘ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and 
reflections, calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very 
specific and complex power that has the population as its target, political 
economy as its major form of knowledge and apparatuses of security as its 
essential technical instruments’ (Foucault 2007:108-9). This definition 
highlights the importance Foucault ascribed to theoretical and discursive 
articulations and to forms of knowledge in the configuration of forms of 
political and social government. It also shows his relational notion of power 
which focuses on processes by which power is exercised on individuals. 
Foucault’s notion of governmentality became the foundation for a compelling 
analytical framework used and developed by a wide range of scholars across 
various disciplines. As it will be argued below this framework offers 
advantage points for undertaking security research and in particular, for 
studying the sort of security interventions that are being implemented in cities 
of the global South to arrest chronic levels of insecurity and violence. 
Governmentality as an Analytical Approach  
Since the late 1970s ‘governmentality’ has been developing as an analytical 
framework used by those interested in the multiple ways in which power is 
exercised in our societies. Governmentality can be understood as a set of 
analytical tools, rather than a theory (Walters 2012). Inspired by Foucault’s 
methodological strategy of studying power through an observation of its 
rationalities, techniques, programmes and knowledge fields; political 
scientists, sociologists, philosophers, social workers, anthropologists and 
criminologists have used governmentality as a lens to analyse a wide range 
of socio-political phenomena in the context of changing economic and social 
relations and political structures in the global North. Their work encompasses 
what is now known today as governmentality studies. Under this umbrella a 
wide range of issues have been studied, such as public policy, statehood, 
citizenship, education, welfare policies, community safety and crime control, 
among others.  
Governmentality has become a useful approach to study relations of power 
and government practices in contemporary societies at different levels. The 
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approach departs from the assertion that government, is an attempt to 
shape, regulate or control human conduct undertaken by multiple actors 
(authorities and agencies) using different techniques and forms of knowledge 
in the search of particular ends (Bröckling et al 2011; Burchell et al 1991; 
Dean 2010). Whether power is exercised on individuals, groups, populations, 
a corporation or ourselves, it is guided by a rationality, or a ‘form of thinking 
which strives to be relatively clear, systematic and explicit about (...) how 
things are or how they ought to be’ (Dean 2010:18-9). A rationality in other 
words is a system of thinking that defines who can govern; what governing 
is; what or who is governed and for what purposes.  
Those who use the governmentality analytical framework assume that it is 
possible to empirically study rationalities to make them intelligible by looking 
at the working of the technologies that make government possible, of 
programmes or plans that guide interventions according to particular 
objectives, and of the identities that are used and produced by a particular 
rationality. Along these lines, governmentality can be understood as the 
study of rationalities of government, or the study of how in a particular 
context and moment in history, authorities and those involved in practices of 
government have reasoned or thought about, calculated and responded in a 
more or less systematic way to a particular problem (Dean 2010:24).  
Rationalities give rise to and are underpinned by discourses and forms of 
knowledge or expertise.  Governmentality studies are, as a result, concerned 
with uncovering the way institutional practices and programmes are based 
on theories, concepts and ideas emerging from fields of expertise -such as 
economics, geopolitics, psychology, epidemiology, etc. By revealing how 
particular forms of knowledge provide those involved in governing with 
discursive and material tools to construct taken for granted truths regarding 
who needs to be governed, how and for what purposes; the governmentality 
framework helps to uncover the way knowledge supports the exercise of 
power. 
In any given society there are multiple rationalities at work guiding the way 
we are governed and the way we govern ourselves. These rationalities can 
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intersect, compete with or support each other. Moreover they require 
different institutions that together make institutional systems, such as the 
justice, criminal or health system, to work in a joint manner. However the 
focus of the governmentality approach is not on the working of such systems 
or of particular institutions, but on the rationale guiding their practices, 
programs and responses to specific problems. And also on how rationalities 
change or are maintained under certain circumstances. In order to unpack 
the rationalities behind practices of government, it is key to examine their 
elements, to understand the processes and relations that they rely on, to 
identify the particular forms of knowledge that assemble their elements 
together, and to analyse the characteristics of the institutions, techniques 
and mechanisms they use to achieve specific goals. 
This approach is also concerned with exploring what happens when a 
rationality or way of governing is exercised in the search of constructing a 
particular type of society or community. For example it is of special interest 
for those using the governmentality approach, to analyse what identities and 
subjectivities are formed in the process for governing. Rationalities not only 
presume particular attributes and capacities on those who govern 
(politicians, bureaucrats, professionals, police officers), but also 
problematisations of certain aspects of the conduct of those to be governed 
and seen as in need of being regulated, controlled or shaped (workers, 
pupils, criminals) (Dean 2010).   
Governmentality as an analytical approach suggests a methodological 
challenge to traditional studies of power and government practices, which 
tend to focus on the functioning of institutions or on the legitimacy of those 
who exercise power and authority. Inspired by Foucault’s approach to 
historical analysis (Foucault 1972, 1994, 2007, 2008), the governmentality 
approach proposes an exploration of the genealogy of relations of power. In 
other words, governmentality enables analysts to undertake what Dean calls 
a critical genealogy of our present (Dean 2010). Among the potential 
advantages of using this approach are the possibility of (i) undertaking critical 
analyses of power, (ii) acknowledging the complexity immanent in social and 
political phenomena, (iii) recognising points of resistance to the exercise of 
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power and (iv) exploring the form and consequences of governing processes 
at different levels of analysis.  
The critical edge of the governmentality analytical framework derives from 
the possibility of revealing taken for granted ways of thinking about and doing 
things. By unpacking the assumptions and discourses that underpin 
governing processes, analysts using this approach can not only reveal the 
limits and implications of such ways of governing, but also question whether 
there might be alternative ways of framing and acting upon the social 
phenomena being targeted by governing processes. Governmentality also 
provides tools to uncover the dissonance between the stated objectives of 
programmes, polices and interventions and the governing logic.  
The governmentality approach is informed by two related analytical tools 
used by Foucault for the examination of ways of governing societies, which 
can be applied to different levels of analysis. The first one is what he called 
‘eventalization’ and the second is the ‘multiplication of analytical ‘salients’’ 
(Foucault 1994:226-7). The first tool refers to the process of treating as an 
‘event’ ways of governing that might otherwise be regarded as expected and 
evident. Eventalization is the process of making visible the singularity of 
ways of thinking and acting that are assumed as natural or that tend to be 
regarded as ‘a historical constant, an immediate anthropological trait, or an 
obviousness’ (Foucault 1991:226). Foucault provides examples of how 
‘eventalization’ allowed him to ‘breach’ the tendency in historical and political 
analysis to assume self-evidences, by showing that the fact that ´mad people 
came to be regarded as mentally ill (...), or that the only thing to be done with 
a criminal was to lock him up (...), or that the causes of illness were to be 
sought through the individual examination of bodies’ was not self-evident 
(ibid). By questioning the self-evidence of things that support our knowledge 
and practices and by ‘rediscovering the connections, encounters, supports, 
blockages, plays of forces, strategies, and so on,  that at a given moment 
establish what subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal and 
necessary’, this analytical tool enables the critical potential of the 
governmentality approach.  
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The second tool used by Foucault refers to the process of ‘analysing an 
event according to the multiple processes that constitute it’ (Foucault 
1994:227) and further breaking down those processes. This progressive  
method of breaking down the ‘event’ under investigation into the processes 
that constitute it is what Foucault calls the multiplication of analytical 
‘salients’, as if the analyst was building a ‘polyhedron’. This process is 
intended to help make the elements that are brought together, the relations 
and the domains of reference that are involved in a particular ‘event’ (ibid 
228) visible. Foucault saw this analytical way of exploring governing 
processes as critical for questioning the inevitability that is commonly 
ascribed to and assumed of socio-political phenomena. This analytical 
strategy is also useful to grasp the complex interconnection of factors 
shaping power relations in a particular moment and context. 
This approach helps to construct a more complex picture of what activities 
like educating, managing, punishing, protecting, governing or providing 
security might actually entail in contemporary societies. This is the case 
because it shifts the attention away from the workings of particular 
institutions involved in governing processes and their stated functions and 
focuses instead on the assemblage of procedures, analyses, fields of 
practices, knowledges, institutions, calculations and techniques involved in 
the exercise of power. It is through this type of analytical focus that 
governmentality as an approach also allows us to recognise different forms 
of power and how they might be used in the pursuit of different objectives. 
Based on Foucault’s analysis of conceptions and practices of government in 
Europe, the governmentality approach has helped scholars distinguish 
between sovereign and bio-political power for example. While the first one is 
the repressive, prohibitive and disciplining form of power traditionally 
exercised by rulers over subjects’ life, the second is the form of power that is 
exercised on and through the administration of processes that are seen as 
vital for the life of populations. According to Foucault bio-power is a form of 
power concerned with the administration of the way the population live which 
has been exercised since the eighteen century; this means administrating 
the social, cultural, environmental and economic conditions under which 
62 
 
humans live and die (Foucault 2008; Dean 2010:119). Bio-political 
interventions target the living and working conditions, lifestyle, urban 
environment, housing and health and education levels of different 
populations.     
An additional advantage of using the governmentality lens for the study of 
processes by which power is exercised, is that it does not circumscribe the 
analysis to the strategies of those who govern, but it also prompts the 
identification of those moments and forms by which the governed resist 
power, as it is exercised on them. Foucault’s notion of resistance suggests 
that resistance is connected with the processes of subjectification produced 
by power (Foucault 1980). As power is exercised it constructs particular 
forms of subjectivity, it creates for example disciplined, rational and 
productive subjects, but in response to the imposition of such particular 
forms of subjectivity there is always some resistance (Pickett 1996). In 
consequence as Dean highlights, the analysis of governmentality is 
inseparable from analysis of corresponding forms of resistance or counter-
conducts (Dean 2010).  
The governmentality approach offers an alternative set of tools that can be 
used to explore security provision in different contexts. In the next sections I 
analyse some of the advantages and implications of using this framework to 
pursue security research and thinking. I also provide details of how it is used 
in this thesis to articulate an alternative critical approach which helps to fill 
existing gaps in our knowledge about security responses implemented in 
response to chronic levels of violence and instability in cities of the global 
South. 
Governmentality as a Lens to the Study of Urban Security  
Given the global patterns of urbanisation and insecurity, the study of security 
provision requires approaches that can work at different levels of analysis; 
including the urban local level. The governmentality approach is suitable for 
carrying out empirical studies of security at multiple sites, including at local 
and community levels. Anthropologists, criminologists, political scientists and 
social workers for example, have used analytical and conceptual tools from 
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the governmentality approach to explore social ordering practices and 
processes in modern cities of the North. Their analyses have uncovered 
important shifts in local governance and community safety (Stenson 2008 for 
example) and the emergence of ‘spatial forms of governmentality’ in these 
cities (Perry 2000; Engle 2001). This form of governmentality was found to 
target spaces rather than persons and to focus on excluding dangerous or 
undesired behaviours and regulating access to particular spaces in order to 
create urban areas that appear safe36.  
The use of the governmentality approach to investigate security responses in 
the global South is however very limited, although few scholars from different 
disciplines have confirmed its usefulness to unpack different forms of 
regulation in urban contexts. For instance Rodger’s analysis of 
governmentality in Nicaragua revealed the nature and logic of state violence 
and social ordering at the urban level (Rodgers 2006). Others have used this 
approach to unpack the role of religion in governance and social order in 
urban Brazil (Garmany 2010), and the effects of new technologies, such as 
surveillance cameras, used to govern urban populations (Kanashiro 2008). 
These studies confirm the suitability of the governmentality approach to 
undertake analyses of governing processes and responses to insecurity and 
violence in southern urban areas.  
As argued in the previous chapter urban security studies require the use of 
analytical approaches that do not neglect issues of power, but that on the 
contrary are able to provide tools to better understand the way insecurity 
factors and security governance are embedded in particular social, political 
and economic processes and shaped by power relations. The 
governmentality approach enables studies of (in)security that uncover the 
political dimensions of security provision. Through the notion of 
governmentality security policies can be studied not as pseudo technical 
responses to violence, crime and insecurity; but as components of 
                                                          
36 Scholars have associated the use of architectural design and security devices which are 
used for the regulation of urban spaces (Shields 1989) and changes in policing techniques 
for the management of risk (Ericson and Haggerty 1997) to the emergence of spatial forms 
of governmentality, especially but not exclusively in cities in the north. 
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assemblages of government in our societies. This approach highlights the 
fact that security policies play a key role in the daily exercise of power as part 
of the authorities´ attempt to reduce criminality and urban violence. Security 
responses imply the use of techniques that aim at controlling or shaping the 
conduct of a wide range of actors (potential or actual criminals, communities, 
particular groups, victims, etc.) and in the process they shape their 
subjectivities and identities. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, studies of security provision in fragile 
cities have tended to reduce security provision to a functional process of 
containing or preventing violence or dealing with security threats. Analyses of 
security provision in the global South have also focused on the state´s 
institutional capacities and performance as a way to explore the limitations or 
potentialities of security responses. By using governmentality as an 
analytical framework it is possible to look beyond institutional issues to 
include the role of power relations in the analysis. Hence, governmentality 
offers the opportunity to answer the question of how are violence and 
instability being governed in a particular urban context.  
Using the governmentality approach to study security provision in fragile 
cities enables us to use our reflexive capacity not to evaluate the positive or 
negative aspects of security policies or the working of state security 
institutions, but to better understand how power relations shape security 
provision and how power is exercised through the implementation of security 
policies; on whom, through which instruments, for what purposes and under 
which assumptions. It also helps us uncover the role that security provision 
plays in the exercise of power in society and to make more the rationality of 
broader processes of governing cities in the global South more intelligible.   
Another important contribution of the use of the governmentality approach for 
the study of security provision in the global South is the fact that it calls into 
question the role played by knowledge production in the configuration of 
particular responses to insecurity and violence. As Foucault argued, forms of 
knowledge can affect modes of exercising political power because they 
define the objectives that must be attained in the process of governing 
65 
 
populations and also the way to achieve them. In other words, fields of 
knowledge help to define who and what is to be governed and how they must 
be governed. His analysis showed for example how the enlargement and 
increased scope of a new science of the state known as ‘statistics’ and of 
political economy as a field of expertise, played a key role in the 
configuration of new forms of governing the population in Europe (Foucault 
2007). By the same token, governmentality can help security analysts to 
question the forms of knowledge that are implicated in exercising authority 
through security policies and programmes and to analyse how particular 
fields of knowledge affect the visibility and framing of certain issues and 
actors within urban security agendas.  
It is important to bear in mind that the relation between knowledge and 
governing processes is often reciprocal. As Dean suggests, the problems 
raised by government practices can also give rise to theoretical and expert 
knowledges that are in turn used to refine such practices (Dean 2010). This 
is relevant to the recent expansion of expert fields such as crime and 
violence prevention and military urbanism, which has accompanied the 
increase in levels of violence in some urban areas in the global South. These 
expert knowledges are not only prompted and reproduced by the limitations 
of the existing security arrangements in such contexts, but they also help to 
shape forms of governing especially in fragile cities.        
This thesis argues that governmentality contains analytical tools that help us 
unpack the theoretical, conceptual and discursive articulations within 
contemporary responses to urban security problems. This framework helps 
to respond questions such as: How are security problems defined, and the 
areas and strategies for intervention identified? Which actors (whether civil, 
private, institutional, community, local, national or international) shape 
security agendas and practices in a particular context and which actors are 
ignored? What forms of knowledge and expertises are involved in the 
implementation of urban security policies? How are particular ways of 
understanding urban violence and fragility translated into techniques for 
addressing these problems?  
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Using governmentality as an analytical lens, we can explore how security 
problems are constantly re-imagined and re-constituted as fields for action. 
Also how historically and geographically specific understandings of security 
and insecurity lead authorities to govern in different ways and in relation to 
different objectives. I argue that this type of analysis can reveal important 
insights regarding the way states are attempting to consolidate their authority 
in the global South.   
Security Provision and State Building through the Governmentality 
Lens  
As analysed in the previous chapter, the consolidation of the state is a major 
concern within studies of security provision in the global South. A 
predominant analytical approach within the urban security literature regards 
security provision as a determinant of the state’s capacity to achieve its key 
core functions: legitimacy, monopoly of violence and territorial control. I 
argue that this type of approach limits our understanding of the particularities 
of state configurations in the global South and that governmentality provides 
conceptual tools that enable analyses of urban security in relation to the 
state from a better perspective.  
Through the governmentality lens, security provision is considered part of the 
assemblages of power, or part of the processes by which power and 
authority are exercised. This means that we can study security policies not 
as effective or ineffective instruments used to achieve an ideal type of state, 
but as integral parts of rationalities of government that are specific to a 
particular moment in history and unique to empirical realities. The unpacking 
and understanding of those rationalities allows us to reveal key aspects of 
state building and state consolidation processes in particular contexts.  
Analyses inspired by Foucault’s work do not neglect the issue of the state; 
however they depart from examinations of the microphysics of power and not 
from the state itself. Foucault suggested that the study of power should begin 
from below, by exploring the mechanisms and the specific forms of 
exercising power as they take place in different institutional sites and then 
move upwards through the analysis to explore whether these forms are 
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linked to the production of broader societal configurations (Foucault 2007, 
1994). Governmentality thus opens an opportunity for innovation in security 
thinking by first examining the working of power relations and governing 
processes as they take place at locally, and from there moving upwards to 
analyses of statehood in particular contexts. 
The governmentality approach does not imply or impose a particular view on 
how authority should be exercised, or on how security should be delivered, 
because it is not founded on a static or normative notion of state. On the 
contrary, the governmentality concept was used by Foucault to denote that 
states are ‘ever-changing formation(s)’, that they are not an ‘eternal identity’ 
but the ‘mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities’’ (Foucault 
2007:382; Foucault 2008:77). From a Foucauldian perspective, the state’s 
nature, attributes, organisation and activities are shaped by continuous 
reconfigurations of forms of exercising power through a multiplicity of 
“institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics” 
(Foucault 2007:108) which are guided by governmental rationalities. With 
this perspective Foucault challenged the traditional focus of state analyses 
that looked at its functions and institutions and refocused the analysis on 
how relations of power are formed, developed, multiplied and transformed by 
multiple processes creating different types of state forms. 
The Foucauldian state notion allows us to overcome the limitations of 
prevalent definitions that regard the state as a unified and primary material 
actor. Within traditional security studies for example, the state is often 
considered a unique and centralised actor capable of central decision 
making. However the state is not a coherent unitary actor, but a set of 
institutions in pursuit of multiple and often conflicting objectives. As a number 
of scholars have argued the state is also a mix of multiple layers of social 
structures embedded in power relations (Hunt and Wickham 1994). 
Additionally, the state it is not only defined by the materiality of its institutions, 
but also by institutionalised symbolic, ideological and discursive processes 
and by condensations of social relations (Holsti 1996:84; Muller 2012; 
Jessop 2001, 2008; Migdal 2001).   
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Governmentality studies are concerned with constructing genealogies of 
power. This means uncovering the rationalities that bring together and grant 
logic to the processes and relations that give shape to the state. By looking 
at the procedures and practices involved in the emergence, reproduction or 
demise of particular forms of exercising power in fragile cities; 
governmentality based analyses of security provision can provide important 
insights into contemporary state formations. This approach is compatible with 
the move towards ‘processes-centred’ analyses of statehood that according 
to a number of scholars (Muller 2012; Migdal and Schlichte 2005;14) uncover 
the multiple routes and processes by which states in the global South 
attempt to centralise and exercise authority and that do not necessarily 
always follow the patterns of western democracies.  
In this context, one last advantage of using governmentality as an analytical 
lens to analyse security practices in fragile cities of the global South, is that it 
offers the opportunity not only to unpack the complex relation between 
security provision and ongoing processes of state building in the global 
South, but also to drive our understanding of the nature and characteristics 
of state configurations there further. The possibility of researching issues of 
statehood from an urban perspective also represents an opportunity to 
expand the critical security studies agenda. As Muller suggests, these issues 
as well as those regarding state-society relations are rarely analysed at the 
urban level by security scholars (Muller 2012:25).  
Constructing a Critical Approach to the Study of Urban Security   
In the previous chapter I argued that predominant analytical approaches to 
study urban security in the global South have been unsuccessful in engaging 
with the way power works within security governance arrangements. 
Moreover they have provided a very limited overview of the economic, social 
and institutional processes that affect the configuration of security responses 
in particular contexts, by restricting the analysis to the influence of 
neoliberalism. I argue that the conceptual and analytical repertoire of the 
governmentality approach can be used to construct an alternative way of 
studying urban security which addresses these limitations in existing 
approaches. 
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Governmentality can be used to explore how practices of government 
emerge. This means that it can be used to study which processes affect 
ways of thinking about security problems. In addition to how authorities’ 
understandings of urban problems may lead to particular security strategies 
and practices of power. Looking into these issues requires a research 
process focused on critically examining the way state authorities and security 
experts articulate and justify new forms of state intervention. Following 
Foucault, governmentality studies normally rely on analyses of texts and 
discourse analysis as a way of researching ensembles of ways of thinking 
and techniques of power.  
As a step in the process of developing an alternative analytical approach I 
suggest using discourse analysis to uncover the assumptions and the way in 
which expert fields of knowledge and language frame the choices and 
practices of policy makers and security authorities. As Foucault argued, 
policy objectives, principles and procedures are established according to 
‘truth discourses’ which also lead to calculations and reflections (Foucault 
2007:238). In exploring discursive practices involved in the provision of 
security I argue that it is possible to undertake a critical analysis of urban 
security which takes into account the way power works and is exercised 
through the implementation of security responses. 
I also suggest using the analytical strategies used by Foucault to try to 
‘rediscover the connections, encounters, supports, blockages, plays of 
forces, strategies’ and the multiple processes that lead to new ways of 
responding to violence and urban fragility. By using his ‘multiplication of 
analytical ‘salients’ in particular, we can move beyond generalizing critiques 
of neoliberalism as the only shaping force behind changes in the way 
authorities are responding to urban insecurity in these contexts. By looking at 
processes that affect the way policy makers and security experts understand 
and re-imagine urban insecurity in a particular context, we can recognize a 
wider range of social, political, institutional and economic factors that might 
have led to changes in security strategies. 
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I also highlight in the previous chapter that existing analyses have neglected 
empirical explorations of realities and experiences of security provision on 
the ground, especially from the perspective of those who are targeted by 
security responses. In order to be able to understand how those targeted by 
security policies and programmes experience them, and what kind of security 
is delivered on the ground through particular techniques of power, I suggest 
the use of methods inspired by ethnographic approaches, such as participant 
observation. I argue that ethnographic methodologies provide urban security 
researchers tools that can allow them to observe social relations and local 
realities in ways that deepen our understanding of the meaning and daily 
experiences of security provision on the ground. Through immersive 
research and long-term engagement with those who are at the receiving end 
of state security interventions in contexts of chronic violence, it is possible to 
access aspects of community life and personal experiences that would 
otherwise remain undisclosed or obscured. The focus of ethnographic 
fieldwork on ´listening for the unsaid, looking for the visually unmarked, 
sensing the unrepresented, and thus seeking for connections among parts of 
the obvious which locally remain unstated´ (Dresch and James 2000: 23)  
makes it a great tool to explore security provision and its uncharted 
governmental consequences. The use of ethnographic informed methods 
can also help addresses valid criticisms to governmentality studies, which 
have been accused of becoming repetitive, too focused on the discourse 
analysis of programmatic texts and not sufficiently engaged with ‘the real’ 
and with ‘contestation and politics’ (Rose et al 2006). 
Ethnographic methodologies have been more widely used in the examination 
of violence in fragile urban contexts in the global South (Auyero et al 2015; 
Hume 2009, Jaffe 2009 for example), producing important contributions to 
our understandings of its multiple manifestations, of complex dynamics 
involved in its reproduction and of how people experience it. However 
ethnography has been rarely used in the study of security provision in fragile 
urban contexts (an important and recent exception is the work of Auyero et al 
2014). The advantages of using ethnography to study security are multiple, 
as some critical security scholars (Shepherd 2013) and anthropologists 
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(Goldstein 2010) have recently begun to recognise. On the one hand, 
ethnography allows to ‘humanise the research on security by bringing 
people’s stories and emotions in (Wilkinson 2013, Salter and Mutlu 2013) 
and on the other, as Goldstein argues, a critical ethnography of security can 
facilitate explorations of the different ways in which security is configured and 
deployed by a wide range of actors (states, communities, groups and 
individuals) and can ‘reveal not only the ways in which global discourses are 
situated and manipulated in the face-to-face contexts of ethnography—it can 
transform the way security itself is conceptualized as a historical and 
contemporary global reality’ (Goldstein 2010). 
Convinced that governmentality offers its best potential, as an analytical 
approach to undertake critical analyses of urban security, if accompanied by 
a methodology which allows the combination of methods, I suggest using 
both critical discourse analysis and participant observation. As Hönke and 
Muller suggest, combining ‘discourse approaches in the empirical research 
traditions of a Foucauldian analytics of governing with a methodological 
‘practice turn’ that directs attention to competing rationalities of governing 
(in)security and to everyday forms of practice and local agency’ (Hönke and 
Muller 2012), is one of the strategies that could help improve contemporary 
security studies scholarship. 
The use of governmentality as a lens and the combination of critical 
discourse analysis and ethnographic informed methods intend to achieve a 
two-fold aim: to be able to build genealogies of governmental rationalities for 
the government of urban insecurity in different contexts, and to study their 
impact on those who are targeted by such governing processes. The former 
method serves to unpack the rationality of security policies and programmes, 
while participant observation can be used to unravel the impact of security 
provision on people, as well as forms of resistance that might emerge in 
response to state initiatives. I argue that this mixed approach leads to a 
better understanding of the interface between security provision and 
governing processes in particular contexts, as well as of state consolidation 
processes. 
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The critical analytical approach I suggest here to put security provision under 
the microscope of power dynamics and people’s experiences can be used in 
different urban contexts by following a three step analytical process: 
1. The first step is to identify political, social and economic processes 
that might have generated changes in the way security problems are 
framed and understood.  
2. The second step is to analyse governmental responses to those 
security problems using critical discourse analysis to look at how 
those problems are understood and justified by authorities and how 
these lead to the use of particular techniques.  
3. The final step is to use ethnographic methods to analyse what kind 
of security these understandings and techniques lead to, from the 
perspective of those who become subjects of state intervention. 
 
This analytical strategy aims at enabling critical studies of security provision 
in fragile cities. Before I explain how I put this strategy to work in the analysis 
of a particular case, I need to make explicit the influence that Critical Security 
Studies and Peace Studies have had on my understanding of what a critical 
approach should aim at. The critical edge of this approach is deeply 
influenced by critical security studies’ commitment to challenging the 
assumptions of traditional security thinking and to revealing the way notions, 
studies and practices of security are imbued with ‘politics’ (Booth 2005, 2007, 
Salter and Mutlu 2013, Shepherd 2013). It is also informed by the principles 
of peace studies research. Although there is no consensus regarding what a 
‘peace research approach’ is, peace scholarship at the University of Bradford 
has developed under general principles. These principles have informed my 
analytical and methodological choices and could be seen as the source of a 
‘multidisciplinary approach to research, that is critical, rigorous and oriented 
towards practice; guided by a normative framework that intentionally seeks to 
generate knowledge that contributes to finding ways of action, organisation 
and interaction…that can make less recurrent and viable the use of violence 
and enable positive social change’ (Abello Colak 2013:48).  
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Using the Critical Analytical Approach to the Study of the Medellin 
Case   
In order to demonstrate the importance of bringing in these new dimensions 
to the study of urban security through an alternative analytical approach, I 
used the analytical strategy presented above to explore urban security in 
Medellin between 2002 and 2012. The recent history of security provision in 
Medellin presented what could be called, following Foucault, a 
problematization. According to Foucault there are ´domains of acts, practices 
and thoughts that seem (…) to pose problems for politics´ and these can be 
examined (Foucault 1998:112). In other words, in a specific situation and 
context, governing can be called into question, with various actors posing the 
question of how to govern a particular problem (Dean 2010:38). In Medellin, 
at the beginning of the 21st century, national, regional and local authorities 
were faced with very high levels of urban violence and unrest and felt 
compelled to articulate new strategies to deal with insecurity and violence.  
The security responses they implemented through the 2000s included the 
largest military intervention ever undertaken in a Colombian city, expansion 
of security infrastructure in city’s peripheral communities, socio economic 
programmes targeting vulnerable groups, a DDR programme, improved 
delivery of basic services such as education and health, participatory forms 
of governance, community policing strategies, and massive infrastructural 
investments and large scale works. All of these targeted areas fragmentally 
controlled by illegal arms groups and inhabited by some of the poorest 
residents. In an attempt to make the city ‘governable’ and competitive 
(Alcaldia de Medellin 2004), these diverse programmes and interventions 
intended to allow the state regain control of historically neglected areas 
(Felbab-Brown 2011), address extreme poverty and inequality (Echeverri 
2008; Devlin 2010) and reduce endemic levels of violence (Maclean 2015).   
The implementation of these state initiatives resulted in the physical 
renovation of key urban spaces, in some marginalised areas as well as in 
other economically important areas of the city. It also coincided with an 
impressive reduction of homicides rates (Giraldo 2008) and with some 
improvements in indicators of quality of life for residents (Alcaldia de Medellin 
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ND). These achievements led to the international recognition of this city as a 
laboratory of good practices in 2009 (Alcaldia de Medellin 2008-2011). The 
combination of programmes and security responses implemented in this city 
has been presented as a model of urban development responsible for a 
miraculous transformation of Medellin (Maclean 2015, Bahl 2012). With the 
support of development agencies and donors (such as IADB, UNDP, World 
Bank, OAS and cooperation agencies) the city’s authorities have been able 
to marketise what is now known as the ‘Medellin Model’, and to position the 
city globally as a test-bed for urban innovations and as model Latin American 
city (The Guardian 2012).  
As I conduct a more detailed analysis in chapter four, the 2002 -2012 period 
represents indeed a turning point in the history of security provision in this 
city. During this period not only did the type of strategies and programmes 
aimed at tackling violence and insecurity in the city changed, but also a new 
way of understanding the problem, its causes and its effects for the 
economic future of the city emerged. Through the critical approach that I 
developed, I aimed at analyzing the configuration and effects of security 
discourses and practices during this period, as a way to better understand 
the logic of government targeting marginalized urban communities living at 
the periphery of the city.  Through the lens of governmentality and the 
combination of discourse analysis and ethnographic methods, the study 
looked at assumptions, calculations and forms of knowledge that led to new 
practices, programs and tactics.  
This study of urban security in Medellin focused on the transformation of 
strategies, calculations, objects, subjects and technologies of power, and not 
on an assessment of security institutions’ performance, or on policy 
evaluation. In other words, I intended to undertake research on the logic or 
rationale of new governing processes that began to be used in Medellin 
since 2002, and that are being portrayed as a promising new way of dealing 
with urban fragility. Although the so-called Medellin model has been 
advertised and promoted through systematizations, international events and 
knowledge exchange among policy and practitioners circles in the region and 
beyond, few academic studies have focused on the particularities of the 
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security approach used as part of the Medellin Model37. Most of the 
contemporary analyses available of Medellín’s experience focus on the 
‘social urbanism’ component (Davila 2012, Brand 2013, Echeverri and Orsini 
2010), and on policy aspects and implementation processes (Bahl 2012) 
rather than on outcomes and impacts. This is despite the fact that the 
security strategy in this city was implemented not only for the purpose of 
containing violence and improving security, but with broader aspirations of 
fostering socio cultural transformations, and as the Mayor of Medellin stated, 
with the aim of changing the social contract in the city (Coupe et al 2012).  
Using a state-centred approach, some analysts have argued that Medellin’s 
experience has led to the construction of the local state (Leyva 2010), while 
others have argued that what happened in Medellin represents the 
entrenchment of a neoliberal project (Hylton 2007). Within existing analyses 
of the Medellin case, the way power was exercised through the 
implementation of security initiatives and the experiences of those who are 
most vulnerable of such initiatives, remain neglected. Although some studies 
have recently attempted to unpack some of the political aspects of the 
Medellin model (Moncada 2013b, Maclean 2014,2015), no studies have 
focused particularly on the interface between security practices and 
governing processes in this context. This research offers a new perspective 
on the so-called ‘Medellin Model’ by focusing on such unexplored 
dimensions.  
The use of the alternative analytical approach allowed me to explore the 
recent history of security provision in Medellin by looking not only at factors 
and processes that made this security approach, and its rationality possible, 
but also to use empirical observations to understand the way these 
interventions were experienced by targeted communities. By looking at the 
security strategy and its actual manifestation on the ground, this research 
contributes to our understanding of the way the state exercised power and 
attempted to construct authority in this context. It also helps to expose some 
of the contradictions of security provision in Medellin. 
                                                          
37 There is a short case study report on the security strategy used in Medellin commissioned 
by a private sector initiative in Central America (see Mejia-Restrepo 2013). 
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Conclusion 
This chapter presented an alternative approach to study urban security which 
uses the Foucauldian notion of governmentality and a combination of 
methods of data collection and analysis as a means to overcome the 
limitations of dominant analytical approaches. The critical approach designed 
here uses a three-step analytical strategy to enable studies of public security 
strategies in different urban contexts. The chapter suggested that this 
approach allowed us, first, to unpack the complex processes (political, social, 
institutional and economic) that affect the way security problems are framed 
and understood by those in power; second, to deconstruct security 
responses in order to understand how particular imaginaries of urban 
problems lead to specific policy strategies; and, finally, to re-focus the 
analysis on the impact of security initiatives from the perspective of those 
who are particularly vulnerable to urban insecurity.  
The chapter emphasised the innovative edge of this analytical approach as it 
opened the possibility of investigating the governmental consequences of 
security provision. By looking at security policies as part of processes 
through which power is exercised on people, the analytical approach 
suggested here offers the opportunity to uncover the way in which certain 
communities and groups are governed in the process of dealing with urban 
violence and insecurity, and what this means for people’s lives.  
Inspired by Foucault’s work, and using critical discourse analysis and 
ethnographic methods, I intended to place power and people’s differentiated 
experiences of security provision at the very heart of the empirical study of 
security in the global South. This is important because in cities struggling 
with high or chronic levels of violence, where efforts are being made to deal 
with the problem, security policies and state responses have the potential to 
affect not only homicide rates and the incidence of crime, but also the type of 
relation that states establish with citizens and communities as well as the 
nature of state authority and its legitimacy. Moreover, in an increasingly 
urbanised world, the configuration of statehood and identities, and the 
exercise of citizenship and of forms of resistance to power, are increasingly 
determined by city-level dynamics. In this context, analysing the broad 
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governmental implications of security provision is crucial. In the next chapter, 
I explain in more detail how the alternative analytical approach suggested in 
this thesis, which focuses on these processes, was used to study security 
provision in Medellin between 2002 and 2012.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
78 
 
Chapter 3 
Research Strategy to the Study of Urban Security in Medellin through 
an Alternative Critical Approach 
 
Introduction  
In this chapter I present the research strategy used to investigate urban 
security in Medellin through an analytical approach focused on the 
governmental consequences of security provision. Here I describe the 
rationale for the combination of discourse analysis and participant 
observation as the main methods of enquiry and the way I analysed a 
resulting multiple sourced data set. The chapter also offers an analysis of 
some of the main challenges I faced during the implementation of this 
research methodology in an urban context characterized by high levels of 
violence and insecurity. The chapter particularly focuses on the way I dealt 
with concerns regarding my own safety and that of the research participants, 
on how I negotiated different parts of my identity during the research process 
and finally, on the unexpected way in which my role might have affected the 
dynamics and relations regarding the researched context.    
Research Strategy 
Following the analytical strategy developed in this thesis, I was interested in 
unpacking the logic guiding the multifaceted security strategy in Medellin and 
its impact, from the perspective of the residents of these communities. In 
order to construct a genealogy of the government of urban insecurity in 
Medellin in the decade between 2002 and 2012, using the governmentality 
approach, it was necessary to undertake empirical and analytical 
examinations of the rationality of security provision in this city. I used a 
combination of discourse analysis and a set of methods informed by 
ethnographic approaches (mainly participant observation, semi structured 
interviews and focus groups) in order to undertake micro-level analyses of 
the working of this rationality. I was particularly interested in its assemblages 
(these include institutions, procedures, techniques, reflections, calculations 
and tactics), its targets, the forms of knowledge that support it, the 
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apparatuses it used to exercise of power and people´s experiences of such 
type of rationality.  
I carried out participant observation in Comuna 1, a particularly relevant 
urban community in Medellin. This area encompasses 12 neighbourhoods in 
the north east of the city and is inhabited by approximately 116,312 
residents. This comuna has one of the lowest indicators of quality of life and 
human development in the city and exhibited the typical symptoms of urban 
fragility. I selected this area as the main site for the observational part of the 
research because it has been historically one of the most violent districts of 
the city, with strong presence of armed actors, but also because in the 2000s 
it became an epicentre for some of the most iconic governmental 
programmes implemented in Medellin aiming at integrating marginalised 
neighbourhoods to the rest of the city and addressing urban violence. 
Using Medellin’s security response (from 2002 to 2012) as the unit of 
analysis of research and comuna 1 as a strategic area of the city to observe 
the impact of security provision on community dynamics and people´s lives, I 
was able to examine the interface between socio-political relations and 
security provision at the level of everyday practices. Inspired by Foucault’s 
work, this analysis of a contemporary governmental rationality regarding the 
control of urban violence in a particular renowned fragile city was carried out 
through an examination of its discourses and its materialities. In this section I 
provide details of the research strategy.  
A Multiple Sourced Data Set 
As analysed in Chapter 1 initiatives to control and prevent violence in the 
global south increasingly rely on multifaceted security responses. In the 
decade between 2002 and 2012, Medellin became an emblematic example 
of how this type of responses could be used in marginalised urban 
communities that demonstrated symptoms of fragility, in order to integrate 
them to the city proper and to transform the city and promote its 
internationalisation. Public interventions by national and local authorities 
concentrated resources and a wide range of state programmes in such 
marginalised urban areas which had historically been neglected by the state. 
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These coercive, preventive and socio spatial initiatives were recognised 
abroad as an innovative approach and portrayed by local authorities as 
successful at containing incredible high levels of violence and transforming 
the city into an ‘urban miracle’. This led me to ask the questions: how did this 
particular way of approaching urban insecurity in this city emerge?  What are 
the calculations and assumptions justifying new forms of engaging with 
marginalised communities? And what are its outcomes from the perspective 
of the residents of these communities? In order to respond to these 
questions different sets of data were collected in Medellin between 
November 2009 and August 2013. 
Empirical data was collected through participant observation, but also using 
focus groups and semi-structured interviews. I carried out fieldwork 
observations of social relations at community level in Comuna 1, in particular 
of interactions between residents and between state agents (such as police 
officers and civil servants) and residents. Participant observation was 
conducted in this urban community, as follows. In 2010, I spent four months 
working as a full time volunteer at Con-Vivamos38, a community organisation 
focused in the promotion of community development, popular education, 
gender equality and political participation across the northeaster 
neighbourhoods of the city.  Additionally in 2009, and between 2011 and 
2013, I travelled to Medellin as part of the academic team of the Observatory 
of Human Security of Medellin (OSHM), a civil society initiative that 
undertakes action oriented research on human security at the city level. Each 
of these yearly trips lasted between one and two months and allowed me to 
carry out follow up meetings with research participants, some of whom had 
been previously interviewed or participated in focus groups. While my work 
as a volunteer at a local community organisation constituted the main part of 
the observational part of the data collection process for this research, during 
my yearly trips to the city I undertook follow up field visits to comuna 1. 
These enabled me to mantain close interaction with members of Con-
Vivamos and with other residents of Comuna 1 with whom I also became 
                                                          
38 Lets Live Together (in English)  http://www.Con--‐Vivamos.org/ 
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friends. Through regular contact with research participants during the last 5 
years and yearly visits to the community, I have been able to keep track of 
developments in the security situation in the community and in some of my 
research participants´ lives.  
This research was not carried out as a traditional ethnography. My level of 
immersion in community life was limited by the restricted amount of 
uninterrupted time I spent in Comuna 1 and by the fact that I was unable to 
live in the community, for reasons that will be explained later on in this 
chapter. However I drew heavily on ethnographic methodologies and used 
participant observation and informal conversations as the main method to 
access insights on residents’ experiences of public security. This involved 
building long lasting and meaningful relationships with the research 
participants, which allowed me to establish a close rapport with some 
residents of comuna 1 and build enduring relationships with members of 
community organisations in the area. These relations eventually shaped the 
information exchanged during the daily interactions, as well as in interviews 
and focus groups.  
As will be analysed later in this chapter, my long-term engagement with the 
research participants enabled me to gain access to the residents’ 
experiences and aspects of daily life in this community that would have been 
otherwise disregarded or kept undisclosed through other methods of enquiry.  
Knowing of my research participants’ backgrounds, ambitions and concerns 
helped to make the focus groups discussions and semi-structured interviews 
possible and much richer and produced deeper, more nuanced data. 
Moreover, my job as a volunteer at Con-Vivamos allowed me to play a role in 
the community that residents recognised as legitimate and familiar. At the 
same time, being an outsider also opened some doors; once people knew 
they could trust me they felt comfortable talking to someone who knew life in 
the community, but was not part of it. In this way our conversations became 
safe spaces to express grievances and to disclose information that 
participants knew would not fall into the wrong hands. As this research 
shows, this type of ethnographic oriented approach to data collection which 
is quite unfamiliar within the scope of security studies proves an invaluable 
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tool for producing deep and meaningful data on urban security in fragile 
cities. 
During the research process Con-Vivamos and the Observatory of Human 
Security (OSHM), became the key sites where I developed two sets of social 
networks that allowed me to access insights regarding the way residents of 
marginalised communities experienced and talked about different aspects of 
state intervention, and the way state intervention was portrayed by and 
discussed within policy and security expert circles. Con-Vivamos was located 
in Comuna 1 and had a long record of work in the most violence affected 
neighbourhoods of the city. It had built a reputation at community and city 
levels for their 20 years of work on issues regarding violence prevention, 
community development, political participation and social mobilisation. I 
contacted this organisation in 2009 through a research colleague at Bradford 
University who had worked with them before and provided good references. 
During an initial exploratory research visit to Medellin and after carrying out a 
number of interviews with some of its members, as well as members of other 
civil society organisations and academics in the city, I decided to ask Con-
Vivamos for a placement as a self-funded volunteer to which they accepted 
immediately. In this organisation I had the opportunity to support the work of 
experienced and professional staff that developed programmes for 
community residents. Some programmes were self-funded while others were 
funded through public resources and support from international aid agencies.  
The other organisation, the OSHM was created in 2009 through the support 
of the University of Antioquia, a local NGO called IPC and the Personeria de 
Medellin39. The team included human rights activists and academics from 
various disciplines with a long record of work on human rights and security. 
When I contacted this organisation in 2009 with the help of my supervisor 
Prof. Pearce, they were developing a research agenda for overseeing the 
security situation in Medellin from the perspective of Human Security and for 
promoting a human rights based security agenda in the city. I joined their 
                                                          
39 This is the local public institution in charge of overseeing the human rights situation in the 
city. 
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team that year and later became a researcher for a project on community 
level security.  This project was implemented in four of the most vulnerable 
urban communities of the city, including Comuna 1, and relied on a 
methodology to co-produce knowledge with residents.   
These two organisations with high recognition among residents, city level 
authorities and civil society organisations facilitated my access to Comuna 1 
and other urban communities with similar socio economic and security 
problems. They also facilitated my access to privileged spaces where 
security experts and public servants in the city discussed the best ways to 
address security problems. These two organisations also became my key 
sources of support and advice during my field work in Medellin.  
The observational research carried out in Comuna 1 entailed intensive 
involvement in a wide range of community activities, supporting violence 
prevention and community building activities designed by Con-Vivamos, 
supporting participatory and action oriented research activities by OSHM 
involving residents from Comunas 1, 6, 8 and 13 and observing daily 
interactions of community leaders and residents promoting local 
development initiatives in Comuna1. Working as a volunteer within the most 
prominent and respected community organization in the neighbourhood 
allowed me to gain insight into the kind of interactions taking place between 
residents, local officials and gang members. My work with these two 
organisations also allowed me to interact with community leaders and social 
workers working in other urban communities.  
My observations on the ground were recorded in a field diary and were 
complemented by observations of and participation in everyday life in 
Medellin which provided a broader framework for the study. Notes containing 
descriptions of what I observed and my own interpretations were normally 
written every day or right after important events had taken place. These 
observations intended to allow me to gain a better understanding of the way 
people experienced state intervention. In particular, these enabled me to 
better understand the way in which they interacted with state actors and how 
state presence and security oriented programmes influenced their perception 
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and experience of insecurity, their relation with the state and their notions of 
citizenship. 
The data collection process also included 45 semi-structured interviews from 
which twenty four (24) interviews were undertaken with residents of comuna 
140 , eight (8) with members of civil society organisations41, nine (9) with local 
government officials and security experts and four (4) with police officers. I 
also carried out eight (8) focus groups with residents of comuna 1, 6 and 13.  
The rationale for the selection of interviewees responded to the questions 
guiding this research. The first set of questions intended to unpack the 
rationality of the mixed security approach used in Medellin since 2002 and 
the calculations guiding security policy. The second intended to gain insights 
into how new forms of state engagement were experienced by residents of 
these communities. The interviews with government officials and police 
officers were, together with the documentary evidence described below, the 
key sources for my investigation of the calculation and thinking behind the 
implementation of security programmes. Interviews with members of civil 
society organisations provided important insights into the urban context as 
well as the history and dynamics of violence in the city which facilitated my 
understanding of the continuities and discontinuities in the history of security 
provision in the city.  
Moreover, the interviews and focus groups carried out with residents of 
comunas 1, 6 and 13 were used to deepen my understanding of the impact 
of security programmes on residents’ lives, from their own perspective. The 
evidence collected through these interviews and focus groups provided vital 
insights into people’s experience of state presence and personal notions of 
changes and continuities in their lives in the face of state interventions in 
these areas. These interviewees and focus groups also served to clarify 
aspects, highlight issues that were obscured in my observations of daily 
                                                          
40 8 women and 16 men 
41 Interviewees were members of human rights and democracy advocacy organisations and 
local academic institutions. 
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interactions and confirm my views or debunk my beliefs surrounding such 
interactions. Through semi-structured interviews and focus groups the 
research participants were able to describe their own views of reality and this 
enabled me to better understand the actions and interactions I was observing 
through participant observation.  
As will be explained later, the participants in this research were selected and 
contacted with the help of members of the two organisations I worked with. A 
significant number of the residents I interviewed (13 of them) were either 
community leaders or actively involved in community activities. Although they 
had key knowledge of the community and the security situation in the area, 
they certainly were not representative of the majority of the residents of 
Comuna 1 who did not participate so intensively in community development 
oriented activities. As will be analysed further, it was necessary for me to 
contact potential participants for this research through trustable gatekeepers 
and informants, many of whom worked with me at Con-Vivamos. This meant 
that many people I interviewed had some relation with the organisation. I was 
able to interview residents who were not directly involved in any community 
work (11 of them), but they had indirect contact with the organisation I 
worked with. Some for example would be occasional participants in cultural 
activities organised by the organisation, or had their children attending the 
free activities and workshops offered by the organisation in the area. This did 
not represent a particular bias in my selection of participants for the 
research, but was rather the result of the difficulties I encountered while 
undertaking research on security in a very volatile and unsafe urban context 
where residents were wary and feared speaking about security with people 
they were not completely sure they could trust. That trust, as will be 
explained later on, took me time and effort to build. 
The relationship that some of the participants had with the organisations I 
worked with did not, in my judgment, affect their experiences and views 
regarding state security programmes. Additionally, the interviews and focus 
groups with residents were analysed together with my own observations of 
community dynamics. The combination of data sources served as a means 
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to triangulate key evidence collected. This helped to enhance the quality of 
the data in terms of finding converging ideas and testing my findings.  
Most of the interviews and some of the focus groups were digitally recorded 
and transcribed. However a significant number of residents chose not to be 
recorded for the whole, or segments of the interview. They were concerned 
with the potential risks associated with discussing security issues that 
involved local armed actors and corrupt state agents. In these cases I took 
notes during and after the interview had taken place. Furthermore, all the 
participants in this research, except for public officials who gave their 
consent for their names to be used in this research, or whose quotes were 
taken from public addresses, had their names changed. Anonymity in 
transcripts and in the reporting of findings was necessary to protect the 
identity of the participants who disclosed sensitive information that if made 
public, would put them in danger, and also to protect the participants´ 
privacy.  
Regarding the interviews carried out, it is worth highlighting that the number 
of interviews with police officers was much lower than I had initially 
envisaged. The reason became evident to me over the course of the 
fieldwork. As analysed in Chapter five, the levels of distrust and constant 
suspicion of police officers being co-opted by local armed groups were very 
high in this community.  The more I collected evidence, the clearer it became 
that contacting and interviewing police officers working in this community 
would endanger my relationship and the trust that I was slowly building with 
the residents. Being associated in any way with police officers in the 
community, would also have also been detrimental to my own safety and that 
of the participants I had already spoken with, given that local armed actors 
were increasingly suspicious of anyone who could be providing the 
authorities with information. Their willingness to impose harsh punishments 
on residents, including death, for such activities was well known. In this 
context, I decided to try to contact police officers working in other areas of 
the city through highly trusted contacts. My previous participation in an 
exchange programme with police officers from Medellin and Bradford 
organised by Prof. Pearce few years before was key for that purpose. 
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Through this programme I was able to stay in contact with a number of police 
officers that my supervisor and I trusted and who were very helpful in 
introducing me to community police officers working in other communities 
with a very similar security context as the one in Comuna 1. Finally, the data 
set also included a wide range of documentary data, including the official 
security strategies implemented by each local government in Medellin since 
1990; publicly available reports on state programmes’ implementation, 
neighbourhood security plans for comunas 1, 8 and 1342, reports on the 
security situation published by state institutions and civil society 
organisations; minutes of meetings and of public events organised by civil 
society organisations and public institutions where  security experts 
discussed the security situation in the city and public responses to it; minutes 
of the City Council sessions in which security issues were discussed, official 
publications that attempted to systematize policy initiatives and numerous 
academic publications on the dynamics of urban violence and security issues 
in Medellin, and on the history of the city and the marginalised urban 
communities of the city. 
Data Analysis and Reporting of Findings 
As Foucault suggested, the study of power should start in those points where 
it is exercised. Studying security provision in Medellin, using governmentality 
as analytical approach and a combination of methods, meant exploring 
power relations and the rationality of security responses in this city as well as 
their impact on residents of an urban community specially targeted by a wide 
range of state initiatives. This analysis aimed at an exploration of the 
discursive and material features of security provision in Medellin ‘from 
below’. It intended to serve as an empirically informed analysis of a 
renowned approach to urban security which included the voice and 
experiences of those who are most vulnerable to urban insecurity. The 
research methodology used in this critical study of security governance in 
Medellin from 2002 and 2012 facilitated the task of locating the voice and 
experiences of those who are targeted by security discourses and practices, 
                                                          
42 These are called ‘Planes Locales de Seguridad y Convivencia’ in Spanish. 
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right at the centre of the process of knowledge production regarding urban 
security.  
The process of analysing the documentary and empirical evidence collected 
in Medellin was conducted in different stages. One stage of the process 
involved carrying out discourse analysis not only of official texts and 
documents containing depictions of security strategies implemented by local 
and national tiers of government and descriptions of security initiatives and 
programmes, but also of transcripts of interviews and minutes of meetings 
and conversations with public officials, police officers and security experts. 
All the public officials I was able to interview worked directly in the design 
and implementation of security policies and programmes at the Mayor´s 
Office, some of them at the highest level. The security experts had also been 
advisors to the Mayor´s office on the design of citizen security programmes.  
These data were considered as containing the statements that constituted a 
particular discourse on security and were analysed following the key 
principles of Foucauldian discourse analysis.  This type of discourse analysis 
commonly involves an identification of the object or area of knowledge that is 
discursively produced, of the logic that guides the construction of the 
terminology used, who authorises it and the goals that are being pursued in 
the discourse (Diaz-Bone et al 2007, Graham 2005). Additionally, key to 
Foucauldian discourse analysis is the process of tracking the development of 
such discourse over time, and identifying the social, economic and political 
context which promotes its development.  
Through this approach a first step in the analysis of the data collected, was 
to recognize the discursive process that justified the implementation of 
different state programs and interventions in Medellin’s marginalised areas. 
This step also involved identifying some of the key social institutional and 
economic processes that enabled the configuration of a mixed security 
strategy that supposed a different type of engagement with these 
communities. This stage in the analysis allowed me to capture the 
contingency and contextual particularities of the security response in 
Medellin. As analysed in Chapter five I identified three particularly influential 
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dynamics that fostered changes in the security discourse in the 2000s: (i) the 
neoliberal turn in urban governance in the city since the 1990s, (ii) the 
implementation of a national led strategy called ‘democratic security’ 
throughout the decade in question, and (iii) the consolidation of forms of 
community and civil organisation and participation that created opportunities 
to influence the local agenda.   
Another step in the analysis process was to look at the constitutive elements 
of the security discourse in the city. This meant examining the statements 
made in official documents and reports, in interviews with state officials and 
police officers and in their public accounts, in search for the explanation of 
the problem, the construction of truths, the formation of objects and subjects 
of power produced, the knowledge /power configurations that supported and 
reproduced the official truths, and finally, any challenges to those truths.  The 
use of Foucauldian discourse analysis was useful to tease out the 
articulations of power contained in discursive constructions of security in the 
city. The official descriptions of the problem of violence and lack of 
governance in the city and their assumptions regarding particularly 
marginalised urban communities, as well as the role played by particular 
population groups in such problems, allowed me to see the subjectification 
process of such communities as ‘ungoverned spaces’, and the logic that 
justified the implementation of a wide range of state programmes.  
Using this type of analysis, in Chapter five, I was able to make the rationality 
behind the security discourse in Medellin since 2002 intelligible. The 
discourse analysis revealed that residents of these areas were seen as 
special citizens in need of state control, pacification, government and 
transformation and that security oriented initiatives and programmes made 
them subject to demands and incentives to become passive, loyal and 
pacified citizens. To illustrate the findings I selected the passages and 
quotes from policy makers, security experts and police officers that in my 
judgment better articulated and illustrated their commonly held assumptions, 
calculations and justification for the implementation of coercive, preventive, 
social and physical interventions in marginalised communities.  
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The next stage in the analysis process focused on exploring my observations 
of neighbourhood level dynamics in Comuna 1, in order to understand the 
residents’ experiences of state presence and multifaceted interventions there 
since 2002. The analysis of interviews and focus groups carried out with 
residents, as well as of the empirical data collected through participant 
observation, was guided by my desire to understand the residents´ 
perceptions and experiences of insecurity, violence and state presence. I 
was particularly interested in how people interacted with state actors such as 
police officers and in their perceptions of public programmes aimed at 
tackling violence. In Chapter six, I develop this analysis taking into account 
the views of different population groups (children, young people and women 
for example). During the reporting of my findings I deliberately made the 
decision to highlight the experiences of these population groups not only 
because, as in the case of young people, they were seen as key subjects of 
policy intervention within the security discourse, but also because these 
groups’ particular experiences of insecurity and views on security tend to be 
ignored within debates on public security.  
The analysis also focused on tracking the implications for residents of 
different programmes and state initiatives, and finally on identifying 
alternative views, if any, to those held by state officials. Following Foucault’s 
work, I called these alternative articulations, points of resistance to the 
security governing processes.    
The analysis and reporting of the findings of the ethnographic oriented work 
undertaken in comuna 1 did not focus so much on the self-depiction of my 
own experiences and my cultural encounter with the local context, like 
traditional ethnographic accounts tend to do, but on the experiences of the 
residents. My participant observations included self-reflection of my 
encounter with the community´s reality, but the focus of my analysis was on 
how residents who lived in urban communities subject to new forms of state 
intervention experienced and witnessed the presence of the state in its 
multiple forms and on the way they interacted with, perceived and talked 
about state intervention. My own experience was crucial to the research 
process. For instance, it allowed me to gain a better understanding of young 
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women’s daily experiences of insecurity, and of the power and influence of 
local armed actors in this community. However, I deliberately chose to 
privilege the voice of the residents that are often underrepresented within 
security research and public debate.  
In Chapter six where I analyse the residents´ narratives, I chose the 
passages from my field diary and quotes from interviews and focus groups 
that better illustrated people’s most common experiences. Since the data 
collected was originally in Spanish I translated those passages and quotes 
into English myself and with the help of a professional translator in those 
cases in which I was not sure of the equivalent expression in English. This 
type of analysis allowed me to shed light on their perception of (in)security, 
and on the unexpected implications of coercive and preventive security 
initiatives, for people living in what public officials saw as ‘ungoverned 
spaces’. 
Facing Some Challenges  
As is common to research undertaken in the field of peace studies, this study 
on urban security was not exempt from ethical, methodological and logistical 
challenges. These emerged as a result not only of the high levels of violence 
and insecurity in the city at the time the fieldwork was carried out, but also 
due to the subject under investigation itself.  The following section analyses 
some of these challenges in detail:  
Safety Concerns  
Studying security provision in a fragile city like Medellin was particularly 
challenging. My field work coincided with a particularly difficult time for the 
city in terms of the security situation. As is explained in detail in Chapter 3, 
after a period of relative tranquillity characterised by an impressive reduction 
in the levels of homicidal violence in the city (from 2002 to 2008) which had 
reinforced the perception that Medellin had overcome its historical and 
dramatic problems of urban violence and instability, by the end on 2008 the 
security situation started to rapidly deteriorate. The extradition to the United 
States of a key figure within the criminal underworld led to fierce competition 
between criminal factions for control of illegal economies and 
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neighbourhoods. This translated into deadly gang battles in many 
neighbourhoods of the poorest communities of the city, with many fatal 
victims including bystanders, and tight controls to the movement of residents 
across their communities. There was also an increase in forced and 
voluntary recruitment of children and young people by criminal fractions, and 
forced displacements and threats to residents. The situation in Comuna 1, 
where I carried out most of the observational research, was particularly 
difficult. Access to many neighbourhoods was restricted for outsiders. The 
risks were very high, both for residents and outsiders, due to armed clashes 
and the risk of harm, or even death for crossing borders imposed by gangs 
or for not complying with their imposed curfews.  
After my first exploratory visit to Medellin in 2009, I became very conscious 
of the risks involved in undertaking ethnographic research in Comuna 1 and 
other communities located on the side hills of the city. It was clear that the 
safest way to gain access and in depth knowledge of residents’ experiences 
and community life was with the backing and support of the most respected 
community organisation in the area. Luckily I was able to get in touch with 
the OSHM and with Con-Vivamos fairly quickly, and in 2010 I was accepted 
by the latter, as a volunteer. Their members had in depth knowledge of local 
dynamics and recognition among residents and local officials. This was 
important in terms of building contextual knowledge which allowed me to 
take better decisions regarding my safety and that of the research 
participants. Building strong relations with my colleagues at Con-Vivamos 
and then at the OSHM allowed me to have deeper knowledge of the 
community and to be able to make risk evaluations of the context. They 
became key gatekeepers and informants and helped me to understand the 
situation on the ground, to map relevant actors and to have an idea of the 
potential for armed confrontations. In addition to weekly meetings at these 
organisations, which included analyses of the security situation in different 
areas, my colleagues in both organisations were always keen on advising 
me on any developments in the situation that would require particular 
precautions. 
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In these organisations I met people I trusted and on whom I could rely if I 
needed help. It was always difficult to predict and plan how every situation 
would unfold, but asking for their advice helped me to avoid risks. My 
colleagues with whom I quickly built a friendship, were very much aware of 
the risks to my safety and were always keen to help me stay safe. During 
activities for example it was common that a colleague would take their cap 
with the institutional logo of the community organisation and asked me to 
wear it to make sure everyone would associate me with their team 
(eventually I even got my own t-shirt). They would also offer to walk with me 
numerous times, if I needed to go to a place they thought might be unfamiliar 
to me.    
 
Working at Con-Vivamos as a volunteer was particularly significant in terms 
of having privileged access to comuna 1 in a role that provided me with the 
opportunity to develop some basic protection mechanisms. My job as a 
volunteer at this organisation, allowed me to visit different neighbourhoods in 
relatively safer conditions, than if I had been on my own. This job gave me 
opportunity to undertake participant observation; however I needed to be 
able to talk with people about issues that people did not normally talk about 
during daily interactions. ‘Talking about security’ was nonetheless very 
dangerous. One of the protection mechanisms people had developed to 
survive in this volatile context characterised by intermittent urban conflicts 
was not to discuss or not to be seen discussing issues regarding the security 
situation. That meant that creating spaces where residents were safe and felt 
safe took time, support from the two organisations I was working with and 
long term engagement and careful consideration on my part. 
 
The first obstacle I faced was trying to invite people to interviews and focus 
groups. This was difficult not only because people were so fearful of talking 
about security in this context, but also because it was dangerous for me to 
ask residents informally if they wanted to participate in the research. As it is 
better analysed in chapter six, the intelligence gathering activities carried out 
by security agents in the area and the competition between gangs meant that 
local armed actors were very distrustful of unfamiliar faces and of anyone 
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asking questions about security issues. In this regard armed actors´ strong 
social ties with the community meant they were informed very quickly by 
relatives, friends or neighbours if anyone was asking ‘suspicious’ questions.  
In this context describing the object of my research became a challenging 
process requiring the utmost care. I needed to describe the purpose of my 
study in a way that I would not be regarded as collecting intelligence. I also 
had to invite people to interviews and focus groups through trusted 
informants and gain research participants’ trusts and confidence.  
 
My daily work as volunteer43 was very useful because it allowed me to 
interact with residents and to slowly gain their trust. My presence at many of 
the organisation’s activities made my face familiar among people in the 
neighbourhood, including relatives of armed actors. At the beginning I 
noticed people would not be too keen to talk to me (even starting casual 
conversations was hard at times, despite the talkative and welcoming spirit of 
paisas (people form Medellin).However the more people associated me with 
Con-Vivamos and the more time I spent in the area beyond working hours, 
the more people would feel comfortable and relaxed talking to me about their 
lives. Later on, some of them would invite me to their house. This was a clear 
sign that they trusted me. In order to contact and invite residents to 
interviews I relied on the help of key informants from Con-Vivamos and the 
OSHM.  
 
Keeping participants safe was a key concern so in most cases the interviews 
would take place in a room at the community organisation where I worked. I 
would explain to the participant the aim of the research and ask for their 
consent to participate reassuring confidentiality and asking their permission 
to record. In many cases during the interviews people would request the 
recorder to be stopped before discussing something they thought was 
especially sensitive. Residents who accepted the invitation to the interview or 
focus group would normally feel safe to talk to me in this space, but they 
                                                          
43 Helping to organise events, supporting the logistical aspects of community activities and 
demonstrations, collaborating with the communications strategy of the organisation, helping 
to write reports and to design activities for children and young people. 
95 
 
would still take precautions so as to not label our ‘conversations’ in front of 
other residents, as an interview about security or security policies in the 
community. I noticed this a number of times when someone would knock on 
the door or ask us what our meeting was about, and the participant would 
rush to explain that I was interviewing them about their community work, or 
the history of community, etc. I understood their well funded fear of being 
associated with a research on security and did everything to avoid putting 
them in danger. This included protecting the data I collected by saving it in 
an external drive I would not carry with me, deleting the audio files from the 
recorder so it would not pose a risk if stolen or lost and anonymising the 
transcripts. 
 
Informal interactions outside spaces and activities related to Con-Vivamos 
were at the beginning difficult due to the volatile and dangerous security 
situation. However, during occasional gang truces, such as the one armed 
actors established during the Christmas period of 2010, I was able move 
around more freely and interact more spontaneously with the residents. 
 
My safety was a key concern during the University’s ethical approval process 
for my research. In this respect the committee made the approval subject to 
my commitment to take certain precautions, including that I would not live in 
the community and that I would not spend time there at night. These 
restrictions created challenges for undertaking the observational part of the 
research, especially given the level of immersion required for ethnographic 
approaches. At some point I felt  that having to leave the community before 
night hours was reducing my capacity to develop strong relations with 
residents and colleagues at Con-Vivamos, something that in this context was 
important to access insights regarding community life, but also crucial to 
enhance my own safety. 
 Attending and participating in social events and activities that took place at 
night was very important to be accepted.  Additionally, with the support of 
community organisations sometimes residents organised community 
activities that had the explicit aim of challenging the restrictions imposed on 
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them. These events strengthen a sense of community and also provided 
incredible opportunities to get to know the way residents, state 
representatives and armed groups interacted. In this context and taking into 
account the University´s advice on always taking precautions to preserve my 
safety, I decided to occasionally stay in the community after my working 
hours if I felt this was needed so that I could take part in activities and 
socialise with residents at nights. In these occasions I always assessed the 
risks involved and informed people I trusted of my whereabouts, making sure 
that I would have someone I could contact in case I needed help.  
This decision allowed me to build stronger relations and trust with my 
colleagues and some residents. The local and organisational culture meant 
that boundaries between professional life and friendship were much less 
demarcated. I also felt that social ties developed even faster in a community 
organisation that promoted values of solidarity and community spirit. And 
they often developed during social interactions that took place beyond 
working hours. The community centre, a three storey house in the middle of 
one of the very steep roads, was opened for most of the day so that 
residents could use the space.  This was one of the few safe spaces many 
children and young people had in the community, at the time, given strict 
boundaries and restrictions in movements and in the use of public space, as 
imposed by armed actors. This meant that many of the staff spent most of 
the day there. Additionally people working at Con-Vivamos were also 
residents of the community. These were highly committed  people who saw 
the activities and projects not only as their job, but as efforts to help make 
peoples’ lives more dignified, including that of their children, neighbours and 
friends. I think this influenced the fact that staff would often stay late to work 
on or deal with residents’ issues.  
Negotiating my Identity  
As highlighted by some researchers, social structural factors such as the 
researcher’s age, socioeconomic position and gender can deeply influence 
the research process, by affecting the course of the data collection process 
and the content of interviews for example (Manderson et al 2006; Razon and 
Ross 2012; Hume 2007b). During my research I also became aware of the 
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way my identity (being simultaneously a young woman, a Colombian national 
born in the capital to a family who had just climbed to a middle income 
status, a foreign student, a volunteer, an academic researcher, and a 
naturalised British national) was influencing the data collection and the 
knowledge production in a context characterised by high levels of violence 
and insecurity.  
What Razon and Ross call the fluid identity of the researcher (2012) clearly 
manifested itself in certain moments during this research. I found myself 
negotiating different parts of my identity, sometimes highlighting or 
discarding different parts of my identity in particular moments of the 
research. During interviews, as it will be described below, I found myself 
negotiating my Colombian identity or distancing myself from my own 
Colombian background, often in response to the positive reaction I received 
from research participants to my identity as a researcher from a British 
university and also in response to my intuition that by distancing myself from 
my Colombian background residents would feel safer talking to me. 
During interviews with policy makers and police officers, I noticed how my 
academic credentials as a researcher from a European University not only 
facilitated their disposition to describe their view on the local authorities’ 
responses to violence, but it also played a role in their effort to highlight the 
positive aspects and outcomes of such state interventions as if politically 
defending their approach. Being aware of how my identity was understood by 
participants as ‘foreign’, despite the fact that I am Colombian, and as 
someone with access to academic debates, and the way this could drive 
interviewees to highlight certain aspects and conceal others, or to portray 
certain interventions in particular ways, was highly relevant and also 
informative. It was telling of the way ‘the Medellin Model’ was eagerly 
portrayed in policy, academic and practitioner circles as a successful and 
innovative model of urban transformation. The analytical approach used in 
this research was very useful to be able to keep a critical lens in the face 
official accounts of security policies implemented in the city during the 
2000s.As explained above, the research approach provided tools to 
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understand how the construction of ‘truths’ and the creation of knowledge 
supported particular forms of power.  
My identity played a different role during my interactions and interviews with 
residents. While many of them initially meet me as a volunteer at Con-
Vivamos and then (from 2011 onwards) as member of the OSHM, once I 
explained to them that I was also a student abroad undertaking a research 
on security in the city and interested in their views and experiences of the 
wide range of programmes and interventions the state carried out in their 
community in the process of reducing violence, people saw me as someone 
with an international reach and this created some expectations. Participants 
started to see me as someone who could, as one of the participants in a 
focus group put it, ‘go out there and tell the world the truth of what we are 
living here’ (Focus group with Older adults 16/11/2009).  
Dealing with participants’ expectations that might emerge from their 
participation in the research in a responsible way is an important aspect of 
an ethical research process. In this case, I felt that among the participants in 
the research, particularly the residents of the communities I visited, there 
was a sense that I could make the problems they faced and their needs in 
terms of security visible. In their view, this could help improve their lives by 
bringing the issues to the state authorities´ attention. As analysed in Chapter 
six some of them felt their community was often portrayed as the example of 
a successful urban intervention, although they endured daily hardships and 
acute security problems. This sense of invisibility and the disparities in the 
narratives of public officials and residents regarding the state intervention in 
marginalised communities was critically analysed through the methodological 
and analytical strategy I developed. The fact that I was committed to analyse 
security responses from the perspective of residents was reassuring for both 
participants and me.  
Additionally, as part of my commitment to critical research that is relevant to 
efforts to reduce violence, I plan to make the findings of this study accessible 
to the research participants. For this, I intend to have a summary version of 
this thesis translated, so that I can then share it with the participants, and 
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with both Con-Vivamos and the OSHM. It is my intention that through these 
organisations, especially through the OSHM, the findings of the research will 
be shared and debated with the participants and a wider audience.  
As mentioned before, at the time most of the fieldwork was carried out, 
competition between criminal factions for the control of different areas of the 
community produced violent confrontations and many risks and movement 
restrictions for residents, especially for young men. As a young woman in 
this context, I was confronted with particular risks, as discussed in chapter 
five, but in some occasions being a woman allowed me to access certain 
spaces with slightly lower levels of risk and danger. As one of my colleagues 
commented one day before passing in front of a group of young men sat at a 
local shop: 
‘those are the actores (members of the local gang) in this area, but don’t be 
afraid, relax, just walk, they won’t ask us questions, you could be my cousin 
or a relative...you are a woman they won’t feel so threatened,  it would be 
different if you were a man’ (field diary note 17/12/2015) 
This event, which took place during a walk across the neighbourhood on the 
days prior to Christmas, when an informal truce between gangs in the area 
was still in place, as well as my interactions with young people in the area, 
made me realise that my gender favoured the observational part of the 
research. 
Affecting the Context 
There were two particularly challenging moments during the field work that 
are worth highlighting. One of them is analysed in detail in chapter six and 
took place during a participatory activity with children living in one of the most 
deprived neighbourhoods of Comuna 1. These events illustrate the 
convergence of issues I mentioned before and the limitations researchers 
face in dangerous contexts, despite their efforts to avoid risks. These events 
also made me aware of the impact that we, as researchers, have on the 
particular contexts and people we are academically interested in and our 
responsibility as researchers.  
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Early on during the fieldwork I had managed to arrange a visit to another 
community with notoriously high levels of violence44. With the support of 
different local state institutions and the Mayor’s office, a group of community 
police officers was trying to reduce violence in this community through 
negotiation processes and truces between gangs. Through another police 
officer I trusted, the community police officers agreed to meet me and show 
me their work. Given the risks involved in accessing the area the key 
informant who had helped me arrange this meeting and the police officers 
said I would have to come to the meeting in a police van. I initially hesitated 
due to the risks of confrontations between gangs and police units and the 
troubled relationship between residents and police officers, but I eventually 
accepted because I trusted the advice of my informant. On our way to the 
meeting, the police officers accompanying me gave me more details: we 
would be attending a meeting between gang members who had just agreed 
a ceasefire and the police officers. At that point, I decided I would be a non-
intrusive observant of the meeting, to which they agreed. When we arrived 
the atmosphere was very tense. The absence of one of the gang’s leaders 
had caused serious anger on the other side and threats were being made. 
Suddenly, the community police officers trying to deescalate the tension 
decided to turn the young men’s attention to my presence instead. They 
introduced me as a foreign professional on peace and conflict resolution who 
had come to see the outcomes of their efforts to deescalate violence and 
asked the men in the room to explain to me the process that had led them to 
agree to a truce with the opposing group and their expectations regarding the 
process. With no control on the situation, I unexpectedly ended up having to 
play a central role in this meeting which I had not prepared for. I had an 
incredible opportunity at this meeting to see the interaction between police 
officers and gang members, to hear these young men’s ideas about the 
problems in their community and their role and expectations, although this 
was certainly not the type of interview or focus group I had prepared for. The 
meeting ended with an agreement between the two groups to keep the 
                                                          
44 This community became famous after a documentary depicting the lives of young men 
and women from this community was released. The documentary ‘La Sierra’ was very 
explicit in terms of the levels of violence in the area. 
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ceasefire and to meet again a week later. I did not attend the next meeting, 
and few weeks later I learnt that a subsequent meeting had ended with the 
killing of one of the gang leaders, something that reignited armed 
confrontations. This made me realise just how dangerous the situation had 
been.   
This experience proved that despite risk assessments, protection plans and 
mechanisms, it would be unrealistic to believe that I could always anticipate 
how things would turn out. Also, it revealed that despite researchers’ efforts 
to play a non intrusive role, we do affect dynamics and relations on the 
ground even in ways that are difficult to predict. Based on my experience, 
this must be recognised in order to be able to undertake an ethical research 
process. Once our impact is recognised we can then try to make sure such 
impact causes no harm to research participants or to other actors.  
Conclusion  
This chapter described the research strategy used to study the particularly 
interesting mix of initiatives used in Medellin between 2002 and 2012 which 
were aimed at dealing with high levels of violence and insecurity. The 
chapter also presented an analysis of the main challenges I faced during the 
implementation of the research methodology, especially when collecting data 
and using participant observation as a main method of enquiry.  
I suggested in this thesis that it is important to understand how security 
policies take shape in particular contexts and in particular historical 
moments, and also that we need to investigate the implementation of 
security responses and their implications for people’s lives beyond 
quantitative indicators. This chapter showed that it is possible to do this 
through an alternative approach that uses a combination of methods.  
The detailed description and analysis of the process that was followed in 
order to put this approach into action in Medellin also demonstrated that 
studying urban security empirically and critically in contexts of chronic 
violence is not a straightforward process. It demands flexibility, problem-
solving skills, ethical awareness and patience from the side of the 
researcher, as well as support from a diverse set of institutional and local 
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actors. These are all crucial to dealing with the many ethical, methodological 
and logistical challenges emerging in the research process. In the next 
chapter, I present the context of the case studied, focusing on the history of 
security provision in Medellin. This section allows the reader to locate the 
importance of the chronological period under investigation (2002-2012) and 
the complex context in which the research methodology developed was 
implemented.  
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Chapter 4 
The Recent History of Security Provision in Medellin 
 
In this chapter I provide the context for the application of an alternative 
analytical approach to investigate the case of Medellin. The chapter analyses 
the trajectory of security policies and public responses in Medellin to contain 
high levels of violence since the late 1980s, and argues that the 2002 to 
2012 period constitutes an important shift in the history of security provision 
in this city. The chapter reviews the dynamics and mutations of urban 
violence in the city and the diagnoses that led to the implementation of 
particular state responses in the last two decades. It then concentrates on 
the particularities of the mixed approach to security provision that took shape 
during the 2000s as part of what has come to be known as the ‘Medellin 
Model’.  
Medellin’s Violent Crises 
In Colombia violence has been extensively studied as a political 
phenomenon and usually associated to the internal conflict concentrated 
mainly in the rural areas of the country (Gutierrez Sanin and Sanchez 2006). 
However, in the late 1980’s, urban violence started to attract the attention of 
local academics and policymakers as a particular problem demanding not 
only study but particular policies of control and repression. By the end of this 
decade, the largest number of violent deaths in the country was taking place 
in the main cities and as a consequence of a wide range of kinds of social 
violence rather than political violence, including socioeconomic violence, 
socio-cultural violence and violence on territories (Comision de Estudios 
Sobre Violencia 1987 in Restrepo et al. 2012a:16). From the three main 
Colombian cities with the highest levels of urban violence, Medellin, the 
second biggest, became by far the most violent of the country and in 1991, of 
the world.  
Notwithstanding a long term decline in the homicide rates since the critical 
levels reached in the early 1990s and specific fluctuations in the city’s levels 
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of violence during the following two decades, Medellin’s tendency to 
concentrate the highest rate of violent deaths in the country continued, 
stimulating the implementation of a wide range of security policies and 
programs by national and local governments. The diversity of public and civil 
initiatives attempted in Medellin in the last two decades, with the intention of 
reducing chronic levels of urban violence, makes this city’s recent history of 
security provision one of the richest and most interesting in the region. 
Since the 1980s, the security responses implemented in this city by the 
different tiers of the state have been shaped by prevalent diagnoses 
articulated by state actors and other influential actors (such as the private 
sector and civil society organisations) regarding the nature of the problem of 
violence and the causes of the urban violence crises in the city; as well as by 
the availability of resources, institutional capacities and leadership of national 
and local governments at particular moments; and, as it will be discussed 
later in this thesis, by wider socio-economic and political processes.  
It is important to consider the trajectory and mutations of violence in this city 
since it attracted the attention of powerful political and social actors in the 
late 1980s, but most important, the way the problem of urban violence was 
understood and the type of responses it motivated prior to the period under 
study. 
The First Crisis (mid 1980s to early 1990s) 
This period was perceived as an exceptional moment in the history of the 
city. In one decade homicide went from being the 8th cause of death to the 
first one (Camacho and Guzman 1990; Restrepo et al 1997). In the 1980s 
the simultaneous decrease in the number of non lethal assaults and the 
increase in the number of homicides reflected a rapid escalation of violence 
taking place in the city. The number of homicides became the most visible 
indicator of the crisis, with initial studies undertaken showing lethal violence 
dramatically affecting young and adult men between 15 and 44 from the 
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poorest and most populous neighbourhoods45 located at the city’s northeast 
(especially zones 1 y 2), centre-east and north-western areas . Given the 
profile of the victims and perpetrators, and the fact that most of the 
homicides took place in these areas as well as in the city centre, violence 
was consequently associated with the marginalised young men, who were 
increasingly involved in more organised forms of violence and delinquency.  
On one hand, the expansion and consolidation of the drug trafficking industry 
led the Medellin cartel to support the establishment of youth gangs and 
groups of paid assassins serving their needs for security and conflict 
management among mafia affiliates. And on the other, the guerrillas’ 
incursion in the city facilitated the transformation of self-defence groups 
providing protection from criminality to communities where the state was 
absent, into urban militias with an insurgent agenda and military training. 
Together with the criminal organisations fuelled by the Medellin cartel, these 
militias became opportunities for social mobility and paid work for young men 
struggling to find jobs in the local economy, which was experiencing a 
massive contraction of its emblematic manufacture and textile industries, and 
the consequences of neoliberal reforms and the economic liberalization of 
the Colombian economy.  
Confrontations between these groups for the control of the marginalised 
neighbourhoods, the emergence of death squads targeting marginalised 
social actors, The Medellin Cartel’s war on the state and the declaration of 
war against drug trafficking by the national government, led to the escalation 
of violence that in the early 1990s positioned Medellin as the capital of 
murder with 381 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (in 1991). The use of 
terrorism and the targeting of influential sectors of society such as politicians, 
judges, journalists and police officers by the Medellin cartel in its 
confrontation with the state, increased pressure for public responses to the 
crisis. In response, the national government focused the police and 
intelligence capacity of the security forces on dismantling this cartel. With the 
                                                          
45These neighbourhoods had been rapidly expanding since the mid 1960s in the adjacent 
hillsides of the city with an influx of people escaping from political violence and poverty in the 
countryside. 
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obscure help of Pablo Escobar’s rival drug lords46, leaders of paramilitary 
groups47, and the United States, the objective was accomplished. With the 
killing of Pablo Escobar and of many of his close associates in 1993 the most 
powerful cartel was dismantled. Terrorist attacks and the most visible 
indicators of violence started to recede. However, what followed was the 
reorganisation of the illegal industry into smaller units working as networks. 
The new mafia bosses, many of whom were Pablo’s former enemies, were 
able to consolidate uncontested control of the underworld and of a wider 
range of illegal economies in the city during the 1990s and most of the 
following decade.   
In response to the guerrilla activity in the country, in 1988 the national 
government launched a peace initiative to negotiate a peace agreement with 
insurgent groups, as well as to reform the constitution. This initiative that led 
to the demobilization of five guerrilla groups48 in 1990 and 1991 and their 
incorporation into the political system also created a favourable context for 
negotiations with the militias that had consolidated their control of 
marginalised urban communities in Medellin. These negotiations produced 
the demobilisation of 843 militia members and the creation of a cooperative 
run by them in 1994, for the provision of security in those neighbourhoods 
under their control and influence49. This cooperative was created with the 
aim of providing security to residents with the acquiescence of the state, in 
association with the state security forces and using public resources and 
equipment delivered through contracts with the Municipality. It meant the 
delegation of security provision in marginalised urban communities to a 
private actor, a practice that continued the state’s traditional approach 
                                                          
46 The PEPES group and the Cali cartel for example. 
47The Castaño brothers who later became the Commanders of the ‘United Self-Defence 
Forces of Colombia’ (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia- AUC), an association of right-wing 
paramilitary forces  created in 1997 and with fronts across the country. 
48 In March 1990 the M-19 group successfully demobilised. This allowed their members 
political participation and created a favourable context for the later demobilization of other 
guerrilla groups. 
49Cooperative for Security and Community Service (Cooperativa de Seguridad y Servicio a 
la Comunidad- Coosercom) 
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towards security provision in these areas since their appearance (Giraldo  
and Mesa 2013).  
Within months of the demobilization process having taken place in Medellin, 
it was clear that the demobilization process had failed. 22,2% of the 
demobilised militia members were killed (187 in total) due to internal clashes 
and confrontations with the state security forces and with criminal bands50. 
Residents also reported they were victims of abuses and indiscriminate 
violence committed by members of this security cooperative (Alonso-Espinal 
et al 2012; Angarita Cañas et al 2008). Despite a slow reduction in the 
number of homicides since 1992 (see graphic 1) multiple forms of violence 
and insecurity continued to affect marginalised urban communities. 
Additionally, the number of armed actors with social, coercive and territorial 
control in these communities was increasing.  
Diagnostics and Responses in the 1990s 
There was confusion among different state institutions regarding the cause of 
the escalating violence that took place in Medellin from the mid 1980s to the 
early 1990s. For the Metropolitan Security Fund (Fondo Metropolitano de 
Seguridad), violence was the result of a culture of death and violence 
associated to historical processes and which had become prevalent among 
society. Meanwhile, for the army and the police the key factor was the 
consolidation of drug traffickers in the city’s social and political spheres. As 
evidence, the Commander of the police argued that 90% of the homicides in 
Medellin were linked to drug trafficking (Alonso-Espinal 2012). 
Despite these disagreements, during the 1990s consensus was slowly built 
around a broad diagnosis of the problem of violence in the city which 
recognised different structural and immediate causal factors (Velez Rendon 
2012). The development plans designed by the different municipal 
administrations in office from 1988 to 2002 and a strategic plan for the long 
term development of the city designed during this decade (Plan Estrategico 
de Medellin y el Area Metropolitana 2015) suggested that the causes of the 
                                                          
50 Ministry of Justice, Transitional Justice Office in Giraldo and Mesa 2013:225 
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crisis were linked to long term processes such as unplanned and unbalanced 
urbanisation, fast population growth that surpassed municipal capacities, 
precarious employment, as well as limited access to basic services and 
utilities for a large proportion of the population. In addition to these structural 
factors, the official diagnoses recognised other key precursors of the crisis: 
the state’s incompetence in the provision of justice and security51, a social 
tendency towards vigilantism, a crisis in citizen values and ethic codes, and 
the weakening of institutions necessary for adequate socialization, such as 
family and school. In this context, according to the prevalent official 
diagnoses during the 1990s, drug trafficking played a catalysing role for 
urban violence and made the case of Medellin distinct from those of other 
cities in the country (Velez Rendon 2012:70) 
Based on this diagnosis, a series of programs and initiatives were 
implemented in Medellin by the national and local administrations. The 
national government sought to improve the state’s coercive power to combat 
drug trafficking and to capture Medellin cartel’s members by creating special 
police units. It also fostered peace negotiations with some of the guerrilla 
groups in the country and created an ad hoc entity to respond to the crisis in 
Medellin called the Presidential Advisory Council for Medellin (Consejería 
Presidencial para Medellín) (1990-1995). This institution served to channel 
resources for the implementation of programs aimed at reducing and 
preventing violence in the city. In order to be able to deliver public investment 
in poor neighbourhoods controlled at the time by local armed actors, the 
national government had to liaise with grassroots civil organisations. This 
unprecedented coalition attempted a policy response to urban violence that 
included addressing structural factors that maintained wide sectors of the 
population socially excluded and marginalised from the city’s local 
governance. Many of these programmes focused on vulnerable youth and 
children, while other initiatives focused on housing formalization, 
                                                          
51 high levels of impunity and a deep crisis in the police were seen as evidence of such 
incompetence 
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neighbourhood improvement52, legalization of tenure, and on supporting 
community organization and participation. As Moncada’s research suggests, 
this reformist project was met with strong opposition by the local government 
and by the city’s powerful industrial sector (Moncada 2013b).  Despite these 
obstacles a wide range of private, civil, community and international actors 
continued to mobilise in favour of the implementation of violence prevention 
initiatives in the city. An example of these efforts was a loan for 15 million 
dollars granted to the city by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) 
for the development of a Plan to improve Citizen Coexistence. This loan was 
secured by the ascending financial sector in the city and reflected the private 
sector’s interest in addressing the problem of violence in ways that could 
help transform the city’s violent reputation (Ibid).    
 
In terms of local governance, the crisis led to processes of dialogue between 
national and local institutions and between the state and a variety of 
community, civil and international actors53. Administrative and political 
decentralization and participatory mechanisms introduced by the Constitution 
of 1991 created a favourable environment for strengthening not only 
institutional capacities, but also those of local and community actors, who 
actively participated in making diagnoses of the acute problems in the city 
and in identifying key areas and processes of intervention focusing on youth 
and the marginalised communities of the city.  
 
Notwithstanding the emergence of forms of coordination between local and 
national governments for the implementation of violence prevention 
programs, during the 1990s urban security polices remained highly 
                                                          
52Such as the ‘Integral Programme for the Improvement of  Neighbourhoods’ PRIMED 
(Programa Integral de Mejoramiento de Barrios Subnormales) . 
53Through community meetings across the city policymakers, grassroots organisations, the 
private sector and the civil society discussed problems and potential solutions for a wide 
range of issues (for example unemployment, housing problems, participation and citizen 
security). With inputs from these public discussions 40 entities from diverse sectors built a 
city plan to integrate efforts by the local administration, the public sector and civil society 
called Strategic Plan for Medellin and its Metropolitan Area (Plan Estratégico de Medellin y 
su Area Metropolitana 1997). 
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fragmented (Restrepo et al 2012b). The national government efforts and 
most of the public resources were allocated to ‘security’ initiatives. These 
were understood mainly as coercive and police responses against the 
growing power of armed groups linked to drug trafficking and the guerrilla 
groups that refused to demobilise. On the other side, local governments 
focused on ‘coexistence’ (convivencia) initiatives, which referred to the 
promotion of peaceful resolution of conflicts, citizen values and violence 
prevention. These programmes were, however, considered secondary 
objectives within the city’s security agenda. 
 
In addition to the small budgets and weak spending capacity, local 
administrations justified their less active role in security policy design and 
implementation by arguing that security provision was the responsibility of 
the national government and national level institutions, such as the Police 
and the judicial system. They also argued that national rather than local 
processes were the causes of the problem of violence in the city (Giraldo 
2010). Based on this understanding of the competences of the different 
levels of government and the perceived causes of the problem, the municipal 
administrations in office from 1988 to 2003 focused public intervention on:  
 
-Promoting the peaceful resolution of conflicts: The local administrations 
supported mediation efforts to solve conflicts in the communities and from 
the mid 1990s they fostered negotiations with militias and ‘non- aggression 
pacts and truces’ involving members of gangs, criminal bands and un-
demobilised militias. Sometimes these agreements included handing in arms 
in exchange for programmes to improve employment opportunities and 
training, and social investment in urban communities54. By July 1999 
mediation processes and pacts had been fostered in 86 neighbourhoods, 
involving 160 armed groups and approximately 3000 people (Velez Rendon 
2012:282).  
 
                                                          
54 These measures were promoted by the local administration in the mid 1990s through the 
Office of Peace and Coexistence until the end of 2000. 
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- Encouraging citizens’ participation in efforts to improve security: Citizens 
were encouraged to participate in tackling the problems fuelling violence, 
even though security policy design remained highly concentrated in the 
hands of representatives of national security institutions, such as the 
Commanders of the IV brigade and the Police, the director of the 
Administrative Department of Security (DAS), and of special commissions 
made up of members of the Municipal Council (concejo municipal) and local 
security experts (Ibid:74). Through systems of neighbourhood resistance to 
social indiscipline and control, residents of marginalised communities were 
encouraged to get involved in policing activities in their neighbourhoods, to 
report crimes to the authorities and to undertake state functions (Ibid).  
 
The following table summarises some of the most salient initiatives 
implemented at local level (see Table 2): 
 
Table 2. State Initiatives Implemented in the 1990s at Local Level 
Local 
Administration 
Key Violence Reduction and Prevention Initiatives 
Omar Florez (1990-
1992) 
Together with the Presidential Council the Programme for 
Peaceful Coexistence in Medellin was implemented. The 
emphasis was social investment, increasing education 
opportunities, generating youth employment, improving 
urban space in marginalised neighbourhoods, granting 
support to civil organizations , generating processes for 
the recognition of identity and strengthening justice and 
security (Restrepo et al 2012b). 20 thousand million pesos 
were invested in infrastructure with social impact and in 
citizen participation processes. 
Luis Alfredo Ramos  
(1992-1994) 
Creation of Peace and Coexistence Office in 1993 
(Oficina de Paz y Convivencia). This agency served as 
advisory to the Municipality and facilitated dialogues and 
negotiations with gangs and militias in the city. It also 
promoted peaceful citizen culture.  
In 1994 Councils for Citizen Coexistence were created. 
These bodies were managed by police inspectors and 
commanders of local police stations and served as a 
means for citizens to report security problems and for the 
authorities to report on their progress.    
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Sergio Naranjo  
(1995-1997) 
Processes of dialogue and negotiation with armed groups 
took place. The local authorities promoted the use of 
mediation and non aggression pacts as a means to 
reduce violence. They also supported the implementation 
of a participatory budgeting programme.  
Juan Gomez Martinez 
(1998-2000) 
Continuation of previous administrations’ policies and 
implementation of the Citizen Coexistence Programme 
(Programa de Convivencia Ciudadana) with the support of 
the Inter-American Development Bank and the private 
sector. 
Luis Perez  
(2001-2003) 
This administration cancelled the previous government´s 
programmes, including the internationally funded Citizen 
Coexistence Programme.  The local authorities launched 
coercive measures in response to violence, including a 
military operation coordinated with the national 
government. It also launched a programme called ‘I buy 
the war’ (Compro la Guerra) that intended to disarm and 
reintegrate members of armed groups by offering them 
job opportunities. This programme was not implemented. 
 
It was during the 1990s that planned interventions to reduce violence were 
for the first time attempted in the city. The state efforts focused on dealing 
with a violent crisis and the skyrocketing number of homicides in the city. 
This dramatic sign of urban violence became the key measure of success for 
interventions in the city and a tool to identify population groups and areas to 
be targeted by security policies. Although homicide rates were incapable of 
capturing the complexity of residents’ experience of violence and insecurity 
in marginalised urban communities; they served to declare short-term 
victories once homicidal violence started to decrease in the mid 1990s (Velez 
Rendon 2012:82). Furthermore, during this decade the state looked for new 
interlocutors and mechanisms to reduce violence. However, the idea that 
marginalised urban communities needed to collaborate in the security effort 
led to the delegation of security provision and conflict resolution tasks in 
these areas to non-state actors that often resorted to violence.  
 
By the end of the 1990s, when a new cycle of violence started, there was 
growing consensus among security experts, academics and public 
policymakers that the municipal responses to violence relied on what Uribe 
de Hincapie called the ‘negotiation of disorder’ through precarious 
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agreements and pacts (Uribe de Hincapie 1997). Leaving the management 
of conflict and insecurity in marginalised areas to communities and local 
armed groups made the state incapable of imposing a republican order and 
produced the privatization of security in ways that reproduced violence. This 
decade ended with the conviction that the state’s renunciation to exercise 
monopoly of violence in marginalised areas and to be the primary provider of 
services such as security and justice had led to a trap. The state initiatives 
had not addressed structural problems facilitating the consolidation of armed 
actors in the city, nor provided sustainable relief to people's security needs. 
On the contrary, they created more incentives for the violent competition to 
provide 'security' in the communities and reinforced the 'porosity' of the state 
by allowing competitive, parasitic and mutualistic relations between these 
organizations and state institutions (Gutierrez Sanin and Jaramillo 2004). 
According to local experts this led to the diversification of armed actors in the 
periphery of the city and the entrenchment of paramilitary groups (Restrepo 
et al 2012b:231; Giraldo 2008). 
 
The second Crisis (late 1990s to early 2000s): The Urbanization of 
Conflict and the Consolidation of Criminal Actors 
 
The universe of armed actors in Medellin diversified with the failure of the 
demobilization of militia groups, the consolidation of criminal structures at the 
hands of a new mafia boss called Don Berna after the dismantling of the 
Medellin cartel, and the incursion of paramilitary forces with a counter-
insurgent agenda in 1997. Guerrilla groups that had not participated in the 
demobilization (mainly ELN and FARC) consolidated their influence in the 
marginalised but strategic areas of the city. Capitalizing on the military 
training provided by guerrilla groups and the Medellin cartel, new youth 
gangs locally known as combos had also multiplied. These worked in small 
groups, were in control of particular territories and offered services to bigger 
criminal actors55. In this context, when the dominant paramilitary association 
                                                          
55 By 2004 there were 201 combos with 6,030 members according to official estimates. 
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in the country, the AUC, decided to launch a military campaign to eliminate 
the guerrilla presence in the city, it decided to use many of these groups and 
the criminal structures in the city to combat the militias.  
The outcome was an urban conflict of serious proportions with militias and 
paramilitary fronts competing for the control of neighbourhoods located at the 
periphery of the city but of strategic importance. The number of homicides, 
disappearances, threats, indiscriminate shootouts, intimidations and forced 
displacements increased in the most vulnerable areas (Angarita et al 2008). 
Paramilitary forces progressively challenged militias’ control of territories, 
which was already in decline. Given their abuses and an arbitrary use of 
violence, militias had started to lose their legitimacy as the dominant social 
ordering force in marginalised communities. 
In 2001, a particular paramilitary front called Bloque Cacique Nutibara gained 
prominence. It managed to congregate drug trafficking networks, members of 
criminal organizations and paramilitary members in the pursuit of the same 
objective: to eliminate militias and to achieve the social and territorial control 
of key areas in the city that would grant them monopoly of violent protection 
markets (Bedoya 2009), simplify the protection of their illegal economies, 
increase the possibility of investing in legal activities and allow them to 
exercise control of communities56. They succeeded, and by 2002 this group 
had achieved the control of 70% of the neighbourhoods in the city (Alonso-
Espinal et al 2012). 
The state was entirely incapable of exercising sovereignty in marginalised 
urban communities. These territories controlled by urban militias of guerrilla 
groups with national reach, had become no-go areas for the state authorities. 
The armed attack on the car transporting the Mayor of Medellin through 
                                                          
56 For further analysis of how violent protection became a productive source of wealth for 
many type of groups in Medellin and how they became enterprises which not only used it as 
a way of waging war and protecting the narcotics industry, but also of controlling other 
activities like wholesales markets, gambling, liquor distribution, electronics contraband, and 
making profitable the 'protection' of residents, retail business and transport companies, see 
Bedoya 2009. 
115 
 
Comuna 1357 in 2002, was a clear demonstration of the power achieved by 
these groups, especially the FARC. In this context, the newly elected 
president Uribe decided to launch a series of military campaigns to allow the 
security forces to take control of this area and defeat of militia groups.  
 
The use of heavy weaponry in a densely populated area created uncertainty 
and fear among the local population, who experienced the heavy exchange 
of fire for days, saw their houses raided, and had at least 40 civilians injured 
and around 308 detained. These military interventions were carried out with 
the support of illegal paramilitary groups58 that used extreme means of 
violence to defeat remaining militia members or those regarded as their 
collaborators59. In consequence, at the same time that these military 
interventions marked the beginning of the state’s attempt to establish 
permanent presence in historically marginalised areas of the city, they also 
allowed the consolidation of paramilitary control of these areas (Angarita et al 
2008). Paradoxically the military interventions were regarded as a success 
by some residents, by the wider public and by the government, given that it 
put an end to fierce urban battles, produced the defeat of urban militias in the 
city and an immediate reduction in the number of homicides (see Figure 1).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
57 This is a strategic area of the city with a population of around 135,000 people and 
comprising 19 neighbourhoods located at the western part of the city. 
58 It was revealed later on that the Army Chief and the Commander in Chief of the 
Metropolitan Police of the time had signed an agreement with Don Berna, a mafia boss and 
later commander of the urban paramilitary front, to jointly implement the military intervention 
in Comuna 13 . 
59 Paramilitary members confessed the existence of mass graves in the high part of the 
comuna with victims of the paramilitary takeover. The commander of Bloque 'Cacique 
Nutibara', Diego Fernando Murillo, known as 'Don Berna', confessed that there were more 
than 100 mass graves in Comuna 13. It is also estimated that  between 150 and 300 people 
were victims of forced disappearances (Verdad Abierta 2012) 
http://www.verdadabierta.com/nunca-mas/39-desaparecidos/568-la-gran-exhumacion-en-la-
comuna-13-de-medellin  
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Figure 1- Evolution of Homicide Rates in Medellin 
 
Figure 1. Graphic produced by the author using data from: National Institute 
of Legal Medicine (INML), Technical Investigation Team (CTI), Information 
System for Security and Coexistence (SISC) and Secretary of Government 
of Medellin. 
 
In addition to the coercive interventions in Comuna 13, another initiative 
which contributed to the further reduction of homicide rates in 
neighbourhoods with strong paramilitary presence (see Figure 1), was the 
national demobilization of paramilitary forces that began in 2003 (Giraldo 
Ramirez 2008;). The national government undertook negotiations with the 
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia- AUC, a group comprising paramilitary 
fronts across the country which led to the demobilisation of the Bloque 
Cacique Nutibara in Medellin, in December 2003.  
 
The process was initially regarded as a success (Palau and Llorente 2009). 
However the DDR did not stop the consolidation of a network of criminal 
organizations involving ex-combatants (Rozema 2008) lead by Don Berna, 
the commander of the demobilised Bloque Cacique Nutibara. Residents, 
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local leaders and members of community-based organizations and NGOs 
increasingly reported that some ex-combatants were still involved in criminal 
activities and exerting violence in the communities. Although they avoided 
killing people, they continued to use other forms of violence to discipline or 
punish individuals, and they intimidated and threatened members of the 
community who challenged their authority.  
 
Demobilised members of the paramilitary fronts in the city had become the 
new regulators of criminal transactions in the city. They also participated in 
local politics and legal activities and had access to and control of institutions 
and forms of community participation which allowed them to play as 
intermediaries between communities and the local administration, using their 
status as ex-combatants (Alonso-Espinal et al 2012). They also started to 
create their own civil and community organizations60, which increased the 
perception that local institutions and civil spaces were still being co-opted by 
violent actors. 
As seen in figure 1, the reduction in the number of homicides continued from 
2003 until 2008. The rates registered during this period were the lowest the 
city had seen in two decades, which gave confidence to local analysts, 
government officials and international agencies that a structural change had 
taken place in the dynamic of violence in the city (Giraldo 2012; Giraldo 
Ramirez 2008 ; Alcaldia de Medellin 2088-2011). It is during this period that 
Medellin started to attract the attention of urban planners, development 
agencies, local government officials, police forces and security experts from 
across the world, as a as a successful story of urban renaissance.  
The trajectory of the homicide rates in Medellin, shown in figure 1, certainly 
illustrates the fluctuations and the general descending levels of lethal 
violence in the city. However, it alone cannot be considered a true depiction 
of the security situation as there are important issues regarding its reliability. 
Different institutions report slightly different numbers of homicides, and even 
more importantly, the homicide rates do not capture the acute problem of 
                                                          
60 Such as ‘Corporacion Democracia’. 
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forced disappearances. The reported number of victims of disappearances 
has remained high even in periods when homicides descend, as well as 
other forms of non lethal violence, such as forced inter and intra urban 
displacement and extortion, which have increased exponentially since 2008 
and 2005 respectively.  
Furthermore, the homicide rates do not capture other forms of violence that 
are inherent to the problem of violence and insecurity in the city, which need 
to be taken into account. The high levels of sexual violence and exploitation 
and recruitment of children by armed groups in the city are examples of other 
serious security problems that tend to be overlooked within security analysis 
that rely on homicides rates as the main indicator of the situation in the city. It 
is worth highlighting that Medellin´s local authorities have indeed allocated 
important efforts to improve the capacity of the Municipality to collect and 
analyse data regarding security problems including lethal and not lethal 
violence, as well as crimes against property, but policy design and public 
debate about security tend to be dominated by the fluctuations in homicides 
rates. This is even more problematic given the fact that some temporary 
declines in the number of homicides rates have resulted from legal or illegal 
pacts between armed actors or by reduced violent competition between 
criminal actors when one of them defeats its opponents and achieves 
undisputed territorial, and social control of communities.  
 
The third crisis (2008-2011): Disorganization of crime and continuity of 
chronic insecurity 
Notwithstanding the reduction of homicides rates and some improvements in 
levels of quality of life in some of the marginalised areas of the city during the 
2000s61, structural factors facilitating the reproduction of multiple forms of 
violence in the city remained unaddressed, making conditions still ripe for a 
                                                          
61 Poverty levels reduced during the 2000s. In 2012, 17,7% of Medellin's residents lived in 
poverty and 3,5% in extreme poverty. Access to primary education reached 80% of the 
population, the coverage of public health around 96% of the population and access to public 
utilities was 100% according to the Municipality the same year.  
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new cycle of violence in 2008. The type of urban war between armed groups 
that marginalised communities had endured at the beginning of this century, 
reignited that year after Don Berna and the main paramilitary leaders in the 
city were extradited to the United States. They were in control of the criminal 
structures and networks in the city at the time and their departure created a 
vacuum of power that triggered violent clashes between competing criminal 
factions. The restructuring of the criminal world produced fierce 
confrontations between local gangs allied with two opposing criminal bands 
who competed for the control of territories and of a lucrative portfolio of 
criminal activities. This included violent protection enterprises around drug 
trafficking activities62 (Bedoya 2009), but also the control of other activities 
like wholesales markets, gambling, liquor distribution, electronics 
contraband, theft and the extortion to residents, retail businesses, taxi and 
bus drivers and transport companies.  
In the attempt to guarantee the control of strategic areas, local armed groups 
tightened their social and territorial control of local populations63. Many 
residents were forced to leave their houses64 due to indiscriminate shootouts 
and threats. Local gangs re-established illegal curfews and ‘invisible 
frontiers’ (fronteras invisibles) to limit residents’ movements across 
neighbourhoods under the threat of death. In 4 years, from 2008 to 2011, 
armed confrontations between local gangs took place in 52 neighbourhoods 
across the city leaving 6905 people killed65, 10612 reported victims of intra-
urban displacement, undetermined number of forced disappearances, high 
                                                          
62 Drug trafficking within the city border alone produces approximately 5,055,611.7290 USD 
a month. 
63 There is no consensus regarding the number of armed groups in the city. In June 2009, 
according to the Commander of the Police in the City, there were 123 identified groups with 
approximately 3.600 members, while in early 2010, according to the Public Ministry, the 
number of gangs and criminal groups was 343.  In 2012 the local authorities recognised 10 
criminal organised groups (bandas), 201 youth gangs (combos) and 5 militia groups in the 
city. Altogether these added up to approximately 6000 members. 
64  4.375 people were forced to leave their houses in 2009 (Personería de Medellín. Human 
Rights Report 2009). 
65 From 2008 to 2009 the homicide rate increased 107% (Medellin Como Vamos 2009)  
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levels of desertion at local schools66 and the intensification of recruitment of 
children and young people by these groups67. 
 
This last crisis was a reminder that criminal actors linked to drug trafficking 
and benefiting from expanding illegal economies had continued to mutate 
and adapt in the context of Medellin’s urban development and of changing 
forms of community governance, while retaining their social, economic and 
political standing (Abello Colak and Guarneros Meza 2014) and increasing 
their coercive power over communities. The exponential increase in the 
number of homicides also demonstrated that the city was still vulnerable to 
new cycles of armed violence and insecurity produced by confrontations 
among armed actors interested in the control of illegal economies and 
strategic areas of the city.  
 
Although there was a slight reduction in the number of homicides in 2011 
and 2012, resulting from fragile pacts between leaders of local gangs in 
some areas and the weakening of one of the criminal factions at war, ten 
years after the implementation of coercive and preventive measures, some 
urban communities still endured chronic levels of violence and insecurity that 
require humanitarian assistance (Bernal Franco and Navas Caputo 2013). 
Illegal armed actors continued to exert territorial control in order to benefit 
from illegal economies (OSHM 2012), and sporadic armed confrontations, 
forced displacement of residents68, targeted killings and threats also 
occurred as a consequence of their continued competition. In March 2013 
the Ombudsman’s Office estimated that around 95000 people living in 
                                                          
66 Many parents stopped sending their children to schools due to the violent confrontations, 
which happened anytime during the day or night, or to the fact that gangs were forcing or 
persuading children and young people to join them. (Instituto Popular de Capacitación-IPC 
2010b; Corporación Con-Vivamos 2010)) 
67 In some neighbourhoods, people reported that these groups recruit children as young as 
9 years old. They use them to carry arms and drugs and in some cases, to commit more 
serious crimes. (informal conversations with residents 2010) 
68 Intra-urban displacement continued to grow from 2009 to 2012. The public institution 
overseeing human rights violations in the city received reports of  forced displacement cases 
involving at least 9,941 victims in 2012 (Quality of Life Report, Medellin Como Vamos 2013). 
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neighbourhoods across the city and the metropolitan area were at risk of 
threats, extortion, limitations to their movement across neighbourhoods, 
recruitment, armed confrontations, forced displacement, violence and sexual 
exploitation by armed actors in dispute for territorial control of these areas. In 
addition to the expansion of multiple forms of extortion across the city and 
the special vulnerability of young girls, women, social and community 
leaders, human rights defenders, displaced population, business owners, 
public transport drivers and people involved in social work in these 
communities, the report highlighted that around 18500 children and young 
men between 10 and 19 years old were at risk of being recruited and used 
by local gangs (Defensoria del Pueblo 2013. 
 
Medellin has become a regional pole of attraction for investment and is 
regarded as an example of urban transformation (Navarrete 2014; EDU and 
BID 2014; Hermelin et al 2010; Cerda et al 2012; The Guardian 2012). 
Reductions in the number of homicides in the city69 have contributed to the 
positive image of the city internationally. However multiple forms of violence 
persist in the city and the current security situation depends more on the 
fragile arrangements between powerful criminal organisations than on state 
policies. Various factors call for caution in the assessment of Medellin’s 
security future, among them: the ongoing expansion of illegal economies, 
attempts by powerful criminal groups that emerged from the failure of the 
AUC demobilisation70 to control them, the hardships endured by big portions 
of the population who find it  hard to become part of the legal economy of this 
globalising city, high levels of corruption within security and justice 
institutions, the city's key location in the Colombian internal conflict and the 
legacy of three decades of violence.  Despite the permanence of these 
factors the city’s authorities continue to capitalise on the interventions that 
                                                          
69 Homicide rates reduced 67% between 2010 and 2014 (Citizen Council for Public Security 
and Criminal Justice 2014) 
70 ‘Los Urabenos’ for example, is a group made up of demobilised paramilitary combatants 
and members of the paramilitary groups who did not demobilised. This group already 
achieved the control of key drug trafficking routes and areas across the country and is 
consolidating its power in Medellin. 
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were implemented during the 2000s in Medellin, by portraying them as a 
successful model of urban transformation and a reason to invest in the city.   
 
State Security Initiatives from 2002 to 2012: The configuration of the 
‘Medellin Model’ 
Medellin had attracted national and international attention since the early 
1990s as the world’s capital of drug trafficking and violence, but the sudden 
and impressive reduction in the number of homicides which took place from 
2002 to 2007 not only transformed the city’s reputation, but it inspired a new 
wave of interest on the kind of initiatives implemented in the city during this 
period. Medellin not only seemed to be finding its way out of chronic levels of 
urban violence at a time when violence and fear of violence across Latin 
American cities were on the rise, but it was also experiencing a visible 
physical transformation and implementing new forms of state intervention in 
marginalized urban areas as part of what the administrations of Sergio 
Fajardo (2004-2007) and Alonso Salazar (2008- 2011) called a model of 
integral social development (Salazar 2011). 
  
With the support of international organizations, these local administrations 
made Medellin’s transformation during the 2000s known worldwide. The 
international recognition of Medellin’s renaissance came through 
international awards to the city 71 and through increased interest in it by 
national and foreign investors, academics from different disciplines and 
urban planners72. The notion of a successful ‘Medellin model’ for public 
intervention from which lessons could be learnt, rapidly took hold with the 
visits of policy makers from other cities, such as the visit of Cabral the 
governor of Rio to Medellin, which partly inspired him to create the 
pacification initiatives in Rio.  
                                                          
71Medellin received the ‘Habitat Honor’ award in 2010 by the UN-Habitat. It was also 
chosen the most innovative city in the world by The Wall Street Journal and Citigroup in 
2013.  
72 See for example the ESRC funded project ‘Local governance, urban mobility and poverty 
reduction. Lessons from Medellin, Colombia’ http://www.esrc.ac.uk/my-esrc/grants/RES-
167-25-0562/read  
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Big events, such as the 50th assembly of BID in March 2009, have also been 
used as a platform to exhibit the Medellin model73. Many more visitors have 
come to Medellin to this day to attend training courses provided by local 
academic institutions that promote the notion of the Medellin model. The 
dissemination of Medellin’s achievements at international forums, the naming 
of some programs implemented as ‘successful practices’ and efforts to 
systematize the policies with the aim of extracting lessons for other contexts 
through publications and even a website supported by the BID, are evidence 
of the recognition and interest in the city as a source of successful and 
transferable practices for other cities in the global south.  
 
The prominence achieved by the interventions implemented in Medellin and 
their resemblance with those used in other cities in the last decade, makes 
the analysis of security provision in Medellin in the last decade a strategic 
platform for a critical examination of the kind of responses to urban insecurity 
that seem to be in configuration in the global South, as well as of their 
unintended effects.   
 
A Mixed Approach to Security Provision 
 
As a way to contain urban violence and insecurity in Medellin, national and 
local governments opted during the last decade for a combination of urban 
pacification techniques, followed by an effort to entrench community policing 
approaches, increase state presence and service delivery in marginalised 
urban areas, as well as socio-economic interventions and urban upgrading 
projects. These policies are in tune with changes seen in other lower and 
middle income cities since the 1990s regarding the way governments have 
started to engage with slums in the process of reducing and preventing 
violence and promoting urban security. In order to characterise such a 
                                                          
73Such as the exhibition 'Medellin: A City Transformation' (Medellin: Transformacion de una 
Ciudad) 
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complex mix of public security initiatives implemented in Medellin between 
2002 and 2012 I have broadly classified them into four clusters. 
 
Components of the Mixed Approach to Security Provision in Medellin 
(2002-2011) 
 
Cluster 1: Coercive Initiatives to Reclaim Territorial Control and 
Establish State Authority 
 
The first emblematic step in the configuration of a new form of security 
provision in Medellin was the implementation of major military and police 
operations in 2002, which aimed at allowing the state forces to take control of 
areas dominated by non-state actors. Among those interventions Operacion 
Mariscal (in 21 May 2002) and Operacion Orion (in 16-18 October 2002) 
were the biggest military interventions ever undertaken in any Colombian 
city.  These were carried out in Comuna 13, an urban community at the 
centre-west of the city and involved joint operations, more than a thousand 
units from the army, the police, the air force, the administrative department of 
security (DAS) and the prosecution office. 
 
 This type of operation, which sought to concentrate the monopoly of 
violence on the state forces and to physically retake urban territory in which 
the state had little or no presence, has also been used in other cities. In Rio 
de Janeiro they were used to take control of the Alemao and Rocinha favelas 
(in 2010 and 2011 respectively), in Kingston, in the form of a major raid 
against drug lord Christopher ‘Dudus’ Coke, and in Tijuana and Ciudad 
Juarez with military operations against drug trafficking groups  (Felbab-
Brown 2011). Once these interventions allow state forces to enter urban 
spaces and challenge adverse non-state actors, they are followed by 
measures that seek to permanently establish state authority in these areas.  
 
In Medellin, the military and police operations implemented at the beginning 
of the decade aimed at challenging the dominance of militia groups in 
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strategic areas of the city. After 2009 these interventions have also been 
used in a smaller scale to dismantle criminal bands and suppress local 
gangs that consolidated after the failed demobilisation of paramilitary forces 
in the city. A particularity of these coercive interventions, which in the case of 
Medellin produced a sharp decrease in the number of homicides between 
2002 and 2008, is their emphasis on the physical occupation of urban 
communities by state forces. In contrast to previous sporadic interventions, 
these pacification operations were followed by the construction of new police 
stations, the reinforcement of military bases and the deployment of an 
important number of police and military personnel to targeted areas, in the 
attempt to guarantee state’s permanent presence there.  
 
The emphasis on the physical exercise of sovereignty by the state, led to an 
increase in the number of police officers in Medellin in the last decade. While 
there were little more than 4,000 policemen in the city in 2001, between 2002 
and 2008 the number increased to a minimum of 5,000 and a maximum of 
5,600 men (Alcaldia de Medellin 2009:3). This has lead to the militarization of 
some of the marginalised urban communities in the city, which tend to 
concentrate a higher number of police and military personnel compared to 
better off communities. The number of security forces rapidly increases even 
further in these areas when outbreaks of violence take place, as special units 
and reinforcements are sent to respond to particular crises.  
 
These interventions aimed at weakening powerful non-state actors demand a 
great deal of intelligence gathering efforts. In the case of the military 
operations targeting militias carried out in 2002, most of the intelligence and 
even military support to the state’s security forces was provided by 
paramilitary forces and local criminal groups. This allowed the state to 
successfully defeat and expel militias from the city but it also allowed new 
armed and criminal actors to consolidate their power in these areas.  
 
By the end of the decade, the state has increasingly put more emphasis on 
collecting intelligence with the help of local residents and the use of security 
technology. In 2009 for example, in the midst of violent confrontations 
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between local gangs, police and local authorities demanded information that 
could assist in their fight against gang members, from residents of urban 
communities affected by urban battles. Community meetings and public 
assemblies that had served as spaces of deliberation on local development 
issues were used by the local authorities to demand residents’ collaboration 
in the security effort. In this line, in 2010 the national government of Alvaro 
Uribe also suggested the implementation of a programme to employ students 
in networks of informants established by the army to gather intelligence in 
their fight against insurgent groups across the country. The initiative intended 
to pay economic rewards to students in exchange for information that could 
be used to capture criminals in Medellin’s problematic areas. Although the 
local government did not support the implementation of such problematic 
programmes, economic rewards are widely used to encourage citizens’ 
participation in the fight against criminal actors, especially in response to 
outbreaks of violence that continue to take place in the city. As an example, 
in the attempt to weaken the criminal bands and local gangs involved in the 
armed confrontations that took place since 2008, the Police offered rewards 
to citizens in exchange for information regarding the location of criminals or 
arms74. 
 
Coercive interventions to regain control of urban communities in Medellin 
were first implemented by the Uribe government as part of its national 
security strategy. However the city’s local governments (2004-2011) also 
strongly supported the strengthening of the security forces’ capacity to 
combat armed groups and to remain in these areas as a key and powerful 
actor. An important component of their local development plans and of their 
security plans for the city and the metropolitan area was to support the 
modernization of the security and justice agencies. 
 
                                                          
74In 2012 the police offered around 5 thousand dollars (10 million pesos) for information on 
the location of high level criminals and arms. People could get paid around 400 dollars 
(800.000 pesos) if they give information that allows police to confiscate a rifle, 260 dollars 
(500.000) for a pistol, 52 dollars (100.000) for a grenade and 26 dollars (50.000) for 
ammunition. 
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The local governments invested important resources in improving and 
building  security infrastructure in marginalised areas (police stations and 
Centres of Immediate Attention –CAIs), on transport and communication 
equipment for the police forces, on technological and logistical support and 
on their training too (Alcaldia de Medellin 2009). In order to facilitate 
coordination among security institutions, in 2008 the city’s government also 
created the System of Information for Security and Coexistence –SISC, an 
institution which focuses on the collection, organization and analysis of 
information regarding insecurity factors such as the evolution of urban 
conflict, homicides and high impact crimes, the functioning of the justice 
system and domestic violence. These efforts led to important increases in 
the level of public spending on citizen security in the last decade and 
demonstrate the local governments’ commitment to invest larger proportions 
of the city’s budget in supporting the exercise of territorial control by the state 
in contested urban areas. From 1,29% of the local budget allocated in 2003 
to security, the percentage increased to an average of 3,6% between 2004 
and 2009 (Giraldo Ramirez 2010: 321) and to 3,9 in 2012 with the arrival of 
Anibal Gaviria’s new government (Medellin Como Vamos 2013).  
 
Coercive interventions to retake territorial control rely on establishing 
different security priorities and using different tactics in different localities. 
With the resurgence of armed confrontations in 2009, involving local armed 
groups in marginalised communities, the tendency towards the 
implementation of special interventions in areas that concentrate higher 
levels of violence, led to the identification of differentiated security provision 
across the city, as a guiding principle for security policies in Medellin. The 
influence of armed actors in marginalised communities, their military power 
and their capacity to bring to a halt those communities, not only served as a 
justification for the implementation of special security measures there, such 
as curfews for young people and increments in the number of police officers 
and special units, but also for the reformulation of the local security policy in 
2009.  
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The new citizen security and coexistence policy called 'Safer Medellin: 
Together We Can' (‘Medellin mas Segura: Juntos si Podemos’), sought to 
preserve the presence and authority of the state in these areas by allocating 
security and justice institutions’ resources and institutional efforts across the 
city, according to the specific security problems and the incidence of violence 
in each community.  The new security policy, highlighted by the IADB, UN-
HABITAT and the Municipality of Medellin as key in the urban transformation 
of Medellin (Alcaldia de Medellin 2011), relied on the characterisation of 
urban localities according to their security problems, social fabric and 
socioeconomic conditions, and the design of different local security plans for 
particular areas. Using mapping tools the municipality classified urban areas 
across the city as either: safe communities, safe zones, sensitive zones or 
critical points. The first two were residential, commercial and industrial areas 
with better socioeconomic conditions affected mostly by crimes against 
property and social indiscipline. In these localities the municipality focused 
on encouraging residents and the private sector to co-fund and co-manage 
security with the authorities. This meant the creation of public-private 
alliances, social networks and committees to make diagnostics of the 
security situation in these areas and to implement local security plans with 
public and private funding and with the participation of private security 
companies (Angarita Cañas 2012; Alcaldia de Medellin 2011).   
 
In the case of sensitive areas and critical points, areas highly affected by 
urban violence, inhabited by marginalised sectors of the population and 
characterised by the presence of criminal actors exerting territorial control, 
the security strategy focused on implementing zero tolerance measures 
against delinquency, promoting residents’ collaboration with the security 
institutions in the fight against criminal actors by reporting crimes and 
providing intelligence, and implementing social programmes targeting poor 
youth in risk of being recruited by armed actors. As the Secretary of 
Government during the Salazar administration described: 
 
 ‘given that there are different problems in different communities, the 
best way to describe what we (the local state) do is: in safe 
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communities we shake hands with people, in sensitive areas we use a 
clenched fist and in critical areas we hit hard’  
(Interview Former Secretary of Government, 4/11/2009).  
 
This local security policy which sought to mobilise citizen support and private 
resources for the modernization of public provision of security, characterises 
a global tendency towards the territorialisation of security interventions, the 
focalisation of resources on key areas and the promotion of citizen 
participation in security programs under the principle of co-responsibility. 
While the security effort demanded from the most vulnerable segments of 
society a risky involvement in intelligence gathering activities aimed at 
increasing the state’s capacity to challenge non-state actors, residents of 
better off neighbourhoods and influential segments, such as the productive 
and entrepreneurial sector, were consulted on security tactics that suit their 
needs and were asked to partner with the local state through economic 
contributions and investments on logistical and technological security 
infrastructure in their areas.   
 
By the end of the decade, local efforts to guarantee the state´s presence and 
authority in marginalised communities have increasingly focused on 
improving the security institutions’ capacity to combat criminal actors. An 
important amount of the resources invested in security issues are now 
allocated to the dismantling and attack on criminal organizations75. The local 
governments’ efforts to territorialise security provision and to improve 
intelligence gathering and technological, logistical and legal capacities of 
security institutions during the last decade have also been embraced by the 
national government of President Santos. In 2010 for the first time the 
Colombian government launched a national policy on Coexistence and 
Citizen Security and a new police strategy across the country called ‘National 
Plan for Community Surveillance by Quadrants’. In 2011 the new Colombian 
government also appointed a high presidential advisory entity on citizen 
                                                          
75  In 2012 around 48% of the local budget on security was allocated to dismantling criminal 
organisations 
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security and coexistence and obtained approval by the congress on a new 
Citizen Security Law. 
 
The law sought to offer new legal tools for the security institutions to respond 
to criminality in the cities, emphasizing that security provision is the main 
responsibility of the security forces, the National Penitentiary institute –
INPEC and the justice system. This law demonstrated the national 
government and the Congress’s move towards a punitive approach to urban 
security that resembles what criminologist denote as penal populism 
(Basombrio and Dammert 2013). The law expanded the list of offences by 
including new types, increased sentences for existing offences, it also 
reformed the code ruling underage citizens in conflict with the law by 
increasing sentences for crimes committed by those between 14 and 18 
years old and it finally widened the police’s role when dealing with detained 
youth.  
 
On the other side, the national police strategy launched by the new 
government sought to reorganise and focus the operative capacity of the 
police around quadrants. These are geographical sectors in which cities are 
divided according to their social, demographic and geographical 
characteristics and that receive different types of police service that range 
from preventive initiatives and citizen education on security and coexistence 
issues, to deterrence and crime control programmes (Policia Nacional 
2010:24). The main objectives of this police strategy, which resembles 
community oriented policing strategies used in other cities, is to improve 
police service through the allocation of responsibilities and resources to 
specific territorial segments, to improve the capacity of police officers 
assigned to those quadrants to collect intelligence regarding insecurity 
factors and actors and to support police work with use of technological tools.  
 
By 2012, the last year included in this research, the increasing importance 
assigned by municipal and national authorities to the use of technology was 
evident in the fight against crime and the exercise of state authority in 
marginalised areas with high presence of armed groups. Proof of such 
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emphasis on the use of technology is the decision of the Colombian 
President and the Ministry of Defence to make the Police’s Central 
Intelligence agency (DIPOL), the leading institution in implementation of the 
country’s new citizen security strategy, as well as to create the most modern 
hub of information for combating crime in Latin America. For this purpose a 
highly sophisticated complex was built for the collection and processing of 
information which allows the central intelligence agency to coordinate urban 
operations based on the results provided by a system inspired by those used 
by Europol, the New York Police and the US Department (Semana 2013). 
Behind this decision there is a clear intention to use the experience and skills 
security institutions in the country have accumulated in the long fight against 
guerrilla groups and drug trafficking cartels, in a new declared war against 
urban criminality.  
 
At the local level, the increased use of cameras and the approval in August 
2012 of the first Metropolitan Plan on Security and Coexistence for the 
Aburra Valley, confirms the authorities’ hope that the use of technology and 
multilevel institutional coordination will help improve urban security. The plan 
signed by 10 municipalities of Medellin’s Metropolitan area, the Ministry of 
Interior and the security forces foresee the investment of 104 thousand 
million pesos on technological tools, as well as the training of community 
leaders on security issues and the creation of an elite force within the 
security forces that will focus on high value targets (Cano 2012).  
 
The move since 2009 towards national and local security strategies and 
interventions focused on weakening and attacking criminal actors, is being 
reinforced by the perception that a potential post-conflict context in the 
country will create big security challenges in Colombian cities.  In that 
context, as much attention is being paid now to the state’s capacity to retain 
territorial control and authority in urban areas, as in the early 2000s when 
militias and paramilitary groups dominated entire communities. At the 
beginning of the second decade of the XXI century and despite the security 
interventions described above, criminal organizations have consolidated their 
capacity to exert territorial, social and economic control of urban 
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communities in order to benefit from profitable illegal economies and also 
from the arrival of public resources to marginalised communities (OSHM 
2012; Abello Colak and Guarneros-Meza 2014; Bedoya 2010)76 . 
 
Cluster 2: Increased Institutional Presence in Marginalised 
Communities  
 
An important aspect of the security strategy used in Medellin was the 
establishment of institutional referents of the state in marginalised 
communities which had been controlled by illegal armed actors. As in other 
cases across the region, pacification operations in these areas pursued the 
interrelated objectives of establishing the state’s presence in contested 
territories and realigning the allegiance of the population to the State 
(Felbab-Brown 2011). In the particular case of Medellin, the heavily-armed 
military and police interventions used to physically control urban communities 
were complemented with efforts to increase citizens´ trust in the State 
through their closer contact with security and justice institutions.  
 
The action plan to improve citizen security and coexistence designed by the 
local government in Medellin in 2008, for example, contained programmes 
and initiatives to bring security and justice provision closer to residents of 
marginalised communities. It is with this intention that the local government 
continued to invest not only in communication and transport equipment for 
the police forces, but it also planned the construction of 5 new police 
stations, 5 substations, 2 forts for the mounted police, 9 police centres for 
immediate response in strategic areas (CAI periferico-Centro de atencion 
imediata) and 5 mobile police centres for immediate response, as well an 
increased number of community police officers in 500 more men (Alcaldia de 
Medellin 2009).  
 
                                                          
76This issue will be discussed further in chapter six of this thesis. 
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The security infrastructure built in marginalised areas was meant to improve 
the physical environment in these communities while at the same time 
allowing the police to respond faster to criminal groups and activities. Prior to 
the interventions in these communities in 2002, police were only stationed at 
the centre of the city and this, according to them, diminished their 
responsiveness to incidents occurring at the side hills of the city. As an 
innovative approach to this problem, centres for immediate response were 
specifically built in strategic areas at the margins of the city (CAIs 
perifericos). Located in the highest geographical points of the peripheral 
communities and with special light systems, these types of security buildings 
became strategic surveillance posts with panoramic views of the 
communities for the police forces (see photos below). 
 
CAI Periferico 1  
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Photos: CAI Periférico Medellín / EDU 03 feb 2012. Plataforma Arquitectura. 
<http://www.plataformaarquitectura.cl/cl/02-135902/cai-periferico-medellin-
edu> 
 
 
The following map shows the distribution of these and other security and 
justice offices across the city in 2009, with an important concentration of 
security infrastructure in neighbourhoods with historically higher levels of 
violence (at the centre-west, centre and northeast of the city). 
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Alcaldia de Medellin 2009 
 
The construction of these institutional spaces and others, such as schools, 
libraries and parks, complemented the coercive measures used by the State 
to try to achieve the monopoly of violence and were also an attempt by the 
local government to create physical benchmarks of the State’s presence in 
the communities. The establishment of these physical and institutional 
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symbols sought to make the State a recognizable, capable, trustable and 
effective actor in these communities (Alcaldia de Medellin 2009:19).  
 
Regarding the access to these security and justice institutions by residents of 
marginalised areas, the local government decided to concentrate human, 
logistical and technical resources in particular locations so that citizens could 
find easier access to police inspections, family commissaries, local 
prosecution and ombudsman’s offices, justice houses and conciliation 
centres offering access to mechanisms for alternative conflict resolution. The 
local authorities were willing to recognise the security needs of women and 
launched in 2008 a Strategy for Public Security for Women (Estrategia de 
Seguridad Publica para las Mujeres). This strategy designed with the support 
and input of the social movements promoting gender equality in the city and 
cooperation agencies, established principles, guidelines and actions to 
improve women’s security situation and perception (Alcaldia de Medellin 
2008-2011). 
 
Although the police and the judicial apparatus remained under the national 
government's control and guidance, the local governments also tried to 
establish a closer relation with the local Commander of the Police. They also 
created entities for coordination between security, administrative and justice 
institutions at local level, such as Local Government Committees (Comités 
Locales de Gobierno) in which police and civil local authorities could 
coordinate the state intervention in each area and interact with the 
community. These committees organized Citizen Coexistence Councils 
(Consejos de Convivencia Ciudadana) to discuss security issues with the 
communities77 and were in charge of making diagnostics of security 
problems, articulating and coordinating local plans and programs 
implemented by the local administration in each comuna and legitimizing the 
state presence in these territories. Another important institutional innovation 
was the creation of a permanent unit for the oversight of Human Rights at the 
city level. 
                                                          
77 858 Councils were organised from 2004 to 2008 in 33% of all neighbourhoods in the city. 
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Other deliberative spaces created in the communities for participation on 
issues related to local planning also became spaces for the peaceful 
resolution of conflicts at the local level. These served to support the creation 
of community discussion spaces focusing on security problems at local level 
called Human Rights and Coexistence Tables (Mesas de Derechos 
Humanos y Convivencia). 
 
The stated objective of the increased institutional presence was to make the 
State the only provider of security and justice in these areas where those 
services have historically been in the hands of a diversity of armed actors. 
However, criminal actors still play a key role in the provision of violent forms 
of protection, security, private justice and conflict resolution at community 
level, as well as in offering means for survival to residents struggling with 
high levels of poverty. 
  
After a decade of efforts to establish State authority in these communities, 
the permanence and power of criminal actors in these communities and 
especially the effects of their violent competitions for territorial control since 
2008 have changed the focus of the institutional presence of police and the 
justice authorities in marginalised urban communities. Rather than improving 
the capacity of these institutions to respond to the multiplicity of problems 
residents face on a daily basis, the police strategy and the justice system’s 
efforts are concentrating on combating local armed groups and capturing 
their leaders. This normally produces more violence in urban communities, 
due to increasing competition within the criminal organizations to fill the 
power vacuums. After the last violent crisis between 2008 and 2011, it 
seems that the State presence in marginalised communities is becoming less 
concerned with making the State capable of social and community 
regulation, than with winning an almost impossible war against criminal 
networks which are being fuelled by drug trafficking and expanding illegal 
economies. 
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Cluster 3: Prioritised Attention to Youth with Emphasis on those 
Directly Involved in Urban Violence 
 
An important characteristic of the Medellin Model that started to give shape 
to a particular form of public service delivery in marginalised communities 
since 2002, was its emphasis on implementing programmes targeting young 
people, especially those living in marginalised communities. Since the 1990s 
this population group had been stigmatised as the main generator of high 
levels of violence in the city, and in consequence many civil society and 
public initiatives undertaken in the city targeted this group. The growing 
interest in the situation of youth in the city had led to an important civil 
mobilisation and the articulation of networks of civil society actors working on 
youth issues. With the participation of young people they designed a 
strategic plan78 for the improvement of public policies concerning young 
people in the city. Sergio Fajardo (2004-2007), the first mayor representing 
an independent and civic movement in the local government and his 
successor Alonso Salazar (2008-2011), sought to incorporate many of the 
projects´ initiatives from that plan into their development projects, which 
increased the public offer and programmes available to young people in the 
city. 
 
Many of the initiatives focused on improving access to education, creating 
spaces for the cultural initiatives of young people, promoting youth 
participation in democratic processes, and promoting coexistence in the city. 
These two local administrations stated their commitment to facilitating the 
incorporation of young population to the city’s project, as a crucial 
requirement for sustained governability and security in the city. In that line 
they implemented projects providing subsidies and loans to young people 
from families with low incomes so that they could access university79 and 
                                                          
78 The 'Strategic Plan for Youth Development  2003 – 2013'  
79Such as the scholarship programme funded by the EPM Fund which started in 2007 and  
the 'Youth with Future' Programme (Jovenes con Futuro) which offered support to initiate or 
continue university studies to people from 16 to 29 years old from poor backgrounds 
(estratos 1,2 y 3)  
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supported the work of public entities working on youth issues such as the 
Observatory of Youth (Observatorio de Juventud). However, the most 
important of these interventions in the city were those aimed at sending a 
clear message to those young people who had been involved in criminal 
activities and those who had not, that legality was an option, in other words 
that ‘it paid to be good’.    
 
At the heart of the local strategies aimed at improving security in the city 
were programmes for those young people who had been directly involved in 
the urban conflict such as members of local gangs and paramilitary groups, 
youth in penitentiary centres and what the local government classified as 
youth at high risk of being recruited by criminal organizations.  Taking 
advantage of the reduction in the levels of violence that the military 
interventions and the demobilisation of paramilitary forces had produced in 
the city until 2008, the local governments decided to include in the security 
strategy for the city a more preventive approach to urban crime and violence 
targeting these population groups. They saw in the demobilization and 
reintegration of members of paramilitary fronts, an opportunity to end the 
presence and dominance or armed groups in urban communities and to 
prevent the involvement of young people in criminality.  In that line, they 
decided to invest in an ambitious programme called ‘Peace and 
Reconciliation: Return to Legality’ (Paz y Reconciliacion: Regreso a la 
Legalidad).  
 
The programme started during the Fajardo administration in 2004 and it was 
continued by his successor. It aimed at supporting the reintegration of 
demobilising members of armed groups but also at fostering processes of 
reconciliation with victims and creating conditions for the construction of a 
more inclusive and democratic society by preventing the involvement of 
civilians in  the conflict (Alcaldia de Medellin 2011:37). Within the framework 
of the negotiation between the Uribe government and the AUC, and with the 
support of the private sector and international organizations like the 
Organization of American States (OAS) and the International Organisation 
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for Migrations (OIM), which played an oversight and monitoring role80, this 
local programme aimed at supporting the disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration (DDR) process led by the national government.  
 
The programme was designed to provide the beneficiaries with psychosocial 
support, income, education and training tailored to their needs and juridical 
advice. This integral approach to the reintegration of combatants gave this 
programme national and international recognition as an innovative model of 
intervention to deal with situations of complex violence81. By 2010 the 
number of beneficiaries had reached 5564 former combatants (Alcaldia de 
Medellin 2011: 45), the equivalent of around 13% of the total number of 
demobilising combatants in the country. However, after 6 years of 
implementation, only 129 of them had completed the programme which 
made them socially and economically reintegrated, according to the 
programme standards. At the same time, 294 participants had either been 
expelled or were in process of being withdrawn from the programme.  
 
The use of this type of programme, which gave exceptional benefits to young 
people from poor neighbourhoods who had been involved in criminal 
activities, as an instrument to discourage illegality and reduce violence, was 
given a new push when violence increased again in 2008. In combination 
with restrictive and coercive measures implemented by the police, such as a 
legal curfew for underage people, restrictions to carry arms and to transport 
passengers in motorcycles, establishing road blocks and stop and frisk 
practices targeting young people in the poorest neighbourhoods, the local 
government responded to the last crisis by expanding a programme called 
Young Force (Fuerza Joven). The local government decided to design a 
                                                          
80Other international actors supporting this initiative were European Union, the Embassy of 
the Netherlands, Presencia Colombo-Suiza and Technological Institute of Monterrey 
(Instituto Tecnológico de Monterrey). 
81The Colombian government suggested the design of a model transferable to other regions 
in the country based on the experience in Medellin. Also the programme was highlighted as 
a distinguished practice in the Dubai International Award for Best Practices to Improve the 
Living Environment (DIABP). 
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security plan to (i) strengthen the security institutions' reactive capacity, (ii) 
increase the number and access to social, educational and training programs 
available to the youth and (iii) encourage an active citizen mobilization 
against violence. As it was done in the past, the municipality also supported 
small-scale pacts and agreements between gangs to stop the killings. In 
order to carry out the second component, the Fuerza Joven initiative followed 
the same approach of the reintegration programme and required the 
investment of important institutional and public resources.  
 
Fuerza Joven included 3 different programs for young people between the 
ages of 14 and 29. One program called Crime Doesn`t Pay Off (Delinquir no 
Paga) directed to 15000 young students from high schools, one programme 
called Youth at high risk, which involved 3000 young people who were 
considered at risk of being recruited by criminal organizations, and another 
called Social Intervention in Jails, for more than 2000 young people who had 
already come in contact with the judicial system and were either in prison or 
in the process of demobilization (Ibid 75). In total, Fuerza Joven directly 
involved 20000 young people, whom the administration classified as at risk 
of exercising violence or becoming involved in criminal activities.  
 
The programme was expected to help reduce crime levels in the city by 
offering young people alternatives to criminal activities and incentives not to 
ally with armed groups. It was awarded the second place in an international 
contest of Good Practices in Crime Prevention organised by the 
Interamerican Development Bank, also recognised as a promising 
intervention and included in the bank of good practices for the prevention of 
crime in Latin America and the Caribbean. From the three programmes, the 
one that gained most attention in the urban communities was the one for 
young people at risk. The official campaign presented the programme as an 
opportunity for young people living in the poorest communities, where the 
presence of criminal groups was stronger, to access a generous subsidy 
(half as a voucher and the other half in cash) and admission to education, 
training, cultural, sportive and social activities. However, the key requirement 
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to be accepted as beneficiary of this generous program was to be a member 
of a youth gang or a group connected to an armed group. 
 
The emphasis on targeting the young portion of the population, especially the 
one in marginalised communities, with state initiatives and programmes, 
remained as a constant over the last decade. However, as in other countries, 
the national and local State resorted to the combination of preventive 
approaches and repressive measures in order to tackle insecurity and 
violence. Despite the emphasis on socio-economic prevention and 
programmes recognising young people in these contexts as active agents of 
positive change in their communities, when urban violence increased in 
marginalised communities as a result of violent competitions between local 
gangs that the demobilization was not able to dismantle, the state increased 
the dose of coercion and restrictive security measures targeting the 
underprivileged youth. These measures were still highly institutionalized, 
massively supported by the public and continuously reinforced by the 
international discourse of the war on drugs and on organized crime. Although 
the curfew imposed on young people from affected neighbourhoods82 as a 
way to reduce violence was not sustained, the approval of the new Citizen 
Security Law aimed at combating crime, suggested by the national 
government of President Santos to the Congress, reinforced the long 
established assumption that the main problem of security in Colombian cities 
was the lack of control and a weak system of punishments for young people 
who committed crimes.  
For some external observers of the situation in marginalised communities 
(such as residents of other areas of the city as well as some politicians and 
public servants), the fact that the local state had invested in improving the 
                                                          
82 The measure was implemented with the intention of forcing young people living in the 
neighbourhoods where violence was high to stay indoors between 6pm and 5am. The 
measure had been used before in times of crises and had the support of some 
sectors of the population. It was strongly criticized by civil society, community 
organizations and groups of young people. According to these groups it stigmatised young 
people from these communities as the cause of the outbreak of violence, it also ignored 
structural factors causing insecurity and the immediate causes of this outbreak of violence.  
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provision of services in these communities and increased the number of 
programmes offering opportunities to young people from these areas, and 
that violence could so easily erupt there despite such institutional effort, 
demonstrated that the problem was not related to the socio-economic 
conditions of young people in and of these communities, but to the weakness 
of the security system to deal with a problematic sector of society that 
needed to be controlled83.  
Finally, it is worth highlighting here that the implementation of programmes 
for young people, especially those that were executed with the intention of 
reducing violence and insecurity in the city, required not only an important 
amount of public resources but also high levels of inter-institutional 
coordination. Different state agencies at local level needed to establish 
mechanisms to work together in order to implement such programmes, just 
as national and local tiers of government had to coordinate their actions. An 
important aspect of the mixed approach to security provision that was 
configured in Medellin in the last decade is its emphasis on institutional 
development, especially at local level. The implementation of integrated 
approaches to deal with identified vulnerable groups, such as young people 
at risk, demobilised ex-combatants, displaced populations, women, minority 
groups, etc., as well as the process of establishing state presence for the first 
time in areas of the city previously neglected, led to the creation of new 
entities and mechanisms at local level in the last decade, that suggest an 
increasing bureaucratization and sophistication of the local state. The 
implementation of a combined approach to urban security, as the case of 
Medellin illustrates, implies not only the redirection of public resources, but 
also increasingly complex and more sophisticated institutional processes.  
Cluster 4: Urban Upgrading: Social Urbanism and Social Investment in 
Marginalised Areas   
 
                                                          
83 These views were expressed during informal conversations, as well as in public debates 
concerning the security situation in the city.  
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Fajardo and Salazar’s administrations represented a civic and independent 
movement that claimed that the city needed a new administrative model 
focused on the social inclusion of the most marginalized sectors of society.  
In consequence, their periods in government were characterised by attempts 
to 'bring the State back' to those deprived areas not only through security 
forces and equipment, but also in the form of public services and 
programmes aimed at reducing the massive social debt and the inequalities 
accumulated for decades in the city. 
During eight years, the local governments made important investments to 
expand and improve service delivery in marginalised areas, especially public 
education, health, access to public transport and basic utilities.  Programmes 
to reduce poverty and to assist vulnerable populations groups like the Good 
Start Programme (Programa Buen Comienzo)84 targeting children up to 5 
years old, or Solidary Medellin (Medellin Solidaria)85, as well as the reduction 
in the levels of violence the city experienced from 2002 to 2007, led to 
improvements in the Human Development (HDI) and Quality of Life (ICV) 
Indexes in the city (Alcaldia de Medellin ND). 
These programmes that constituted a key aspect of the city’s new social 
policy were also regarded by the two administrations as an important 
component of an integral strategy for improving urban security (Alcaldia de 
Medellin 2009:17). In Medellin, as in other cities struggling with the urban 
marginalization of important sectors of the population and growing urban 
insecurity, there was a growing assumption that poverty alleviation 
programmes in informal settlements and slum upgrading could stimulate 
transformations in urban safety and security.  
At the heart of slum upgrading interventions to improve urban safety, there 
was a combination of public investment, alliances with the private and civil 
society sectors and improved service delivery and the transformation of 
                                                          
84 This offers resources and services to children and their families during the first 5 years of 
life, especially if they come from disadvantaged communities.  
85 This offers support to people living in extreme poverty and it consists of 118 programmes 
administered either by public institutions or through alliances with the private sector. 
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urban space in marginalised areas as a way to alter the conditions that 
produced violence. Examples of this kind of scheme aimed at improving 
living conditions and transforming urban space while affecting security could 
be found in Rio de Janeiro (Favela Bairro (FB) project and Morar Carioca 
Project), in Cape Town (Urban Upgrading Programme (VPPU) by Cape 
Metropolitan Council, in Caracas (Consejo nacional de la vivienda (CONAVI) 
and in Ciudad Juarez (Todos Somos Juarez) (Muggah 2012, 2014b; UN-
Habitat 2011; Samper 2011). In Medellin urban upgrading took the form of 
what the municipality called Integral Urban Projects (PUI). 
In addition to the construction of mayor infrastructural projects across the city 
that aimed at making a city competitive and attractive for tourism, for hosting 
big events86 and for investors, the Municipality implemented these Integral 
Urban Projects in areas of the city characterised by high levels of violence 
and low levels of human development (Neighbourhoods in the Northeast, 
Northwest and Centre-east of the city). These projects aimed at physical, 
social and institutional improvements in these communities. 
The implementation of Integral Urban Projects emphasised what the local 
administrations called ‘social urbanism’: their effort to build the best quality 
infrastructure in the most deprived areas of the city as a first step in 
achieving social inclusion, reducing inequality and violence and improving 
peaceful coexistence. The Municipality’s emphasis on urban upgrading in 
marginalised areas also resulted in the construction of quality schools 
(Colegios de calidad), nurseries, library-parks, medical centres, extensions to 
the public transport system in order to connect communities at the hillsides 
with the rest of the city called Metrocable (an aerial-cable propelled system 
of transport) and other solutions to improve resident’s mobility, such as the 
construction of an electric escalator in Comuna 13 (see photos below).                                           
                                                          
86 For example the 2010 South American Games and the 50th Assembly of the Inter-
American Development Bank (2009) 
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' España Library' (Biblioteca España)- Comuna 1 (Northeast area)                                                                                                                                                   
'Las Independencias School', Comuna 13 San Javier                                                                                                                                                                                   
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Electric Escalator, Comuna 13   
 
With interventions inspired by social urbanism, the local administrations also 
aimed at solidifying the state’s institutional capacity to penetrate the daily life 
of citizens in marginalised communities. Not only did the visibility of 
infrastructure act as symbols of state presence in marginalised communities, 
but for the local administration, the use of public space by citizens facilitated 
by these infrastructural improvements was also a sign of the state’s capacity 
to reclaim control of urban areas. According to Salazar, within his and his 
predecessor´s strategy, urban planning and urbanism were crucial to 
improve governance of the territory because they helped to improve security 
which resulted from the social construction of coexistence (Salazar 2011) In 
their view, improving infrastructure and transforming urban spaces could 
decrease delinquency and get citizens involved in preventing anti-social 
behaviours and social indiscipline.  
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The efforts to create safer urban spaces that promote peaceful social 
interaction, a key part of the projects inspired by social urbanism in Medellin 
during the last decade, were highly influenced by the planning model 
promoted by the Safer Cities Programme and the Campaign on Urban 
Governance by the UN-HABITAT. Attempts like this to reduce and prevent 
urban violence and crime through situational prevention87 and environmental 
design (CPTED)88 complete the picture of the kind of security provision that 
characterised the Medellin Model. At the beginning of the second decade of 
this century however, security provision in marginalised communities seems 
to be moving towards the use of security technology and community policing 
approaches that seek to increase the capacity of security institutions to 
combat organised crime. 
Although there is evidence that the two key drivers of the massive and rapid 
reduction in the levels of violence in the city were produced by the defeat of 
militia groups achieved by the military interventions in 2002 and the 
demobilization of paramilitary forces in the city under the undisputed 
hegemony of a powerful criminal organization, the local authorities and some 
experts have claimed that the integral transformation in urban space in 
marginalised communities produced the temporary reduction in homicides 
rates which made the city an emblematic case (Perez Salazar 2010). 
The urban uplifting of marginalised areas in Medellin was accompanied by 
public policies and a management model which promoted deliberation and 
negotiation with communities and a transparent and more efficient 
management of public resources. This allowed the local government to resort 
to highly participatory methodologies for local planning and project design 
(Ibid), and to use participatory mechanisms such as the participatory budget 
programme (PB) guaranteed in the constitution, to give voice to citizens and 
                                                          
87creating physical areas that increase urban safety, investor’s trust and that also 
strengthen social and cultural interaction 
88This is a model that aims at reducing the vulnerability of residents to criminality through 
modifications in the built environment (for example improving street lighting and installing 
cameras).  
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communities in community development and planning initiatives. From 2004 
to 2011 participation and co-responsibility became key principles in local 
public policy implementation. Participatory programmes such as  
'Participatory Budgeting' did not only enhance the knowledge and skills 
accumulated by residents of these areas, but it also challenged entrenched 
practices of clientelism between local community leaders and political 
parties.  
The emphasis and focus of the participatory local policy changed after 2008. 
During the period in which homicide rates were at their lowest (between 2002 
and 2007) citizens´ participation remained focused in areas of urban 
development and planning, but since the crisis of 2008-2010 the state 
authorities have increasingly demanded active participation of citizens in the 
security effort to combat powerful armed actors that exert influence in 
marginalised communities. As mentioned before, increasing desperation 
among local authorities for controlling and reducing violence in the city had 
also increased demands for people’s help as informants and the use of 
community institutional spaces as tools to gather intelligence. 
It is worth highlighting that despite the highly publicised achievements of the 
Medellin Model in terms of social indicators, the expansion of social 
investment made in the poorest communities of the city and their physical 
transformation did not achieve major improvements in terms of reducing 
social inequality and chronic levels of unemployment and informality. These 
problems continue to sentence a big segment of the population to persistent 
levels of poverty and exclusion. To illustrate, Medellin’s Gini index of 0,50689 
in 2013 renders the city as one of the most unequal in Colombia. Access to 
basic services such as water and electricity increased substantially and 
formal coverage is now universal, but because many residents cannot afford 
to pay for these services, a large number of people are still disconnected 
                                                          
89 Between 1991 and 2010 income inequalities widened. During this period the Gini index 
increased 20% in Medellin. 
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from the systems90. In combination with the prevalence of structural 
problems, the arrival of local government services and the legalisation of 
tenure in marginalised neighbourhoods often bring an increase in the cost of 
living for residents, which guarantee that residents still struggle for survival. It 
is in this context and with the continued arrival of forcedly displaced people 
from rural areas in need of housing and services, that the developing tertiary 
economy of the city is incapable of offering sufficient jobs and opportunities 
and that criminal groups are able to play a key role in the survival of 
residents and on the social ordering of urban communities91.  
Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the trajectory of the efforts made to contain violence 
and insecurity in Medellin since the late 1980s when the city experienced an 
increase in levels of lethal violence. It identified the mixed security strategy 
implemented throughout the 2000s as evidence of a shift in the history of 
security provision in this city. The chapter also presented the context and the 
evolution of state responses focusing on how the problem of violence and 
insecurity was understood by policy makers and security specialists, and 
how different crises were addressed by different tiers of government. It also 
provided a critical analysis of a wide range of initiatives implemented by the 
state as part of the so-called ‘Medellin Model’ and how they related to the 
security effort.  
This analysis of the security component of the ‘Medellin Model’ is important 
because despite its international recognition as a successful model for urban 
transformation, and it being credited with impressive improvements in 
security levels, few analyses have actually focused on what the model 
implied in terms of security governance. The interest to position the city as a 
laboratory of good practices and efforts to disseminate some of the initiatives 
implemented has led to compartmentalised analyses of state initiatives and 
their results in terms of dealing with urban mobility, reducing poverty and 
                                                          
90A programme providing a minimum of water (2.5 m3 per person) to people who cannot 
afford the service began in 2009 and has reached 25,084 users (Corporación Jurídica 
Libertad & Fundación Sumapaz 2011). 
91 This will be further analysed in chapter six 
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social exclusion, and improving good governance. The analysis presented 
here, however, recognises that the ‘Medellin Model’ embodied a multi-
purpose approach to secure the city which relied on a combination of 
strategies and tactics to deal with violence and insecurity.  
This chapter presented a more coherent understanding of how security 
provision diversified and became more complex at the beginning of this 
century. It also highlighted continuities and discontinuities in the way the 
state has sought to govern insecurity through a combination of coercive 
interventions to regain control of marginalised communities and new and 
more participatory forms of managing urban marginality. In the following 
chapters I used an alternative way to analyse other aspects of the security 
approach in Medellin, mainly the processes that led to its configuration, the 
rationality of security efforts that concentrated state intervention in 
marginalised urban communities, and the contradictions of this security 
approach from the perspective of the residents of marginalised communities.  
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Chapter 5 
Theorising the ‘Medellin Model’ through an Alternative Approach: 
Unpacking the Government of the ‘Ungoverned’ as a Means to ‘Secure’ 
the City 
 
In this chapter, I use the analytical approach developed in Chapter two to 
theorise the security strategy used in Medellin as part of the ‘Medellin Model’. 
Using Foucault’s conceptual and analytical tools and critical discourse 
analysis, I unpack the rationality of the government of urban violence and 
instability in this city. In this chapter I argue that through a process of 
subjectification of the residents of marginalised urban communities as 
‘ungoverned’, the authorities justified the implementation of a wide range of 
mechanisms of power which aimed at pacifying, controlling and transforming 
these communities. This governing process was seen by authorities as the 
best way of dealing with urban violence and instability. The chapter starts 
with an analysis of the social, economic and political processes that helped 
to shape security provision in Medellin between 2002 and 2012. Through 
critical discourse analysis it then unpacks the rationality of security provision 
in the city, highlighting the assumptions and calculations of local authorities 
regarding the problem of violence in the city, the instruments used to deal 
with it, and the role of knowledge production in the process.  
Governing Urban Violence and Insecurity in Medellin  
As was presented in the previous chapter, a sense of urban crisis produced 
by the dominance of armed actors in certain areas of the city and the violent 
urbanisation of the conflict in Medellin, prompted the action of policymakers 
at national and local level in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  This ‘second 
crisis’92was characterised by the violent competition among militias and 
paramilitary groups for the control of marginalised communities of strategic 
and economic significance. It is in this context that the Medellin Model and its 
particular form of security provision combining a complex mix of programmes 
and initiatives took shape in the first decade of this century. 
                                                          
92 This is the term I used to refer to it in the previous chapter. 
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The mixed approach to security provision used in Medellin was built on the 
knowledge produced from the implementation of a wide range of public 
initiatives in Colombia’s three major cities (Bogotá, Medellin and Cali) during 
the 1990s, when these cities also experienced a crisis of violence and 
criminality. As pointed out by Perez Fernandez (2010), many programmes 
adopted by the local governments in Medellin since 2004 rescued initiatives 
used in Bogota, for example, those aimed at transforming citizen culture 
(cultura ciudadana) and public space, combating clientelism and corruption 
through a more technical local government and an ethical management of 
public resources93,  improving education and ensuring the provision of basic 
services in marginalised areas to reduce the social debt (Perez Fernandez 
2010).  Improved versions of repressive, preventive and socio-economic 
oriented policies, which were once used to try to contain incredible high 
levels of violence, as well as new initiatives aimed at transforming the urban 
space, culture and local planning processes, were part of the strategy used 
in Medellin to tackle the new crisis of violence and instability (Fajardo 2007).  
Despite the similarities between some of the programs implemented in 
Medellin and previous attempts to halt urban violence, the security strategy 
used between 2002 and 2012 had a particularity: it not only took shape in the 
context of an acute urban conflict, but it departed from a different 
understanding of the drivers of the city’s problems. Unlike other Colombian 
cities, in the late 1990s Medellin became a key battleground for the armed 
actors involved in Colombia´s internal conflict. The situation in Medellin was 
regarded as one of ‘balkanization’ of the city’s territory (Acero  ND:17)  with 
guerrilla groups, right wing paramilitary fronts and criminal organisations 
controlling entire communities, exercising coercive power and illegal forms of 
security and justice,  as well as competing to expand their influence.  
The city was considered to be the most representative example of the wider 
security crisis across the country, which security experts, academics, 
policymakers and growing sectors of society attributed to the state’s 
                                                          
93 These were key promises of the Antanas Mockus administration (1995-1997 and 
subsequently  2001-2003) and of the Enrique Penalosa administration (1998-2000) 
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incapacity to exercise territorial control and monopoly of violence. The 
following quote from one of the most influential security experts in the 
country illustrates the dominant view during the 2000s. In his view, the 
State’s incapacity to exercise its authority across the territory explained the 
growing capacity of armed and illegal actors to replace the state and 
accumulate social influence:  
‘ the real and hidden roots of our political violence are traumatic 
and painful processes of territorial occupation (still unfinished), of 
state building and of national integration. We have much more 
territory than state and that state is precarious in the 
administration of justice, the collection of taxes and the exercise 
of monopoly of force. It is in these gaps and taking advantage of 
these weaknesses  that irregular groups have grown...have 
gained support in sectors of the population and exercise para-
state functions in many regions’ (Rangel, 2005:21 cited in 
Alcaldia de Medellin 2009:12). 
This understanding of the country’s situation inspired a new way of thinking 
about the urban problems in Medellin too and led to an important change in 
the strategy to deal with them. Until the late 1990s, the critical levels of 
violence in Medellin were understood to be mainly the result of structural 
problems (such as chronic poverty and unequal urban development), which 
were buttressed by the incursion of drug trafficking. Although these problems 
remained present in the public agenda and the new political movement in 
power since 2004 recognised the existence of a huge social debt demanding 
the relocation of public spending to address inequality (Fajardo 2007), both 
social marginalisation and high levels of urban violence were attributed to the 
fact that the state had relinquished its duties and was incapable of exercising 
its authority in areas where armed groups now challenged its sovereignty.  
The ‘ungovernable city’  
In this line of thought, the city’s development plan designed by the Fajardo 
administration and continued by his successor, identified the situation in 
Medellin at the time as one characterized by a ‘systematic crisis of 
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governability’ that resulted in high levels of violence and the existence of 
armed actors exercising territorial control of particular areas (Alcaldia de 
Medellin 2004). This notion of urban ‘ungovernability’ inspired a new 
government model and a wide range of interventions between 2004 and 
2011. To make the city governable, the local administrations opted for a 
management model based on co-responsibility and an urban development 
model that promoted human development. In this manner, they strived to 
reduce the high levels of violence and to address the state’s lack of 
legitimacy, which was evident from people’s lack of trust in state institutions.    
Making Medellin a ‘governable city’ implied not only a particular kind of state 
institution (effective and transparent in the provision of services, capable of 
inspiring legitimacy and credibility among citizens and of managing urban 
development in dialogue with people), but also a particular kind of society (a 
solidary society with participatory citizens, conscious of their responsibilities, 
respectful of rules and capable of interacting peacefully) (Quinchía 
2011:134). This explains why Fajardo’s development plan calling for citizen’s 
involvement94 contained a line of action to change citizen culture by 
promoting civic values like solidarity and peaceful coexistence, respect for 
the law and self regulation among citizens; another line of action to promote 
citizen participation, understood as a responsibility of citizens and civil 
organisations; and finally, one to achieve the transparent management  of 
public affairs and the promotion of institutional development within 
institutions involved in the provision of security and justice (Alcaldia de 
Medellin 2004).  
The notion of state weakness that the Medellin model aimed to address was 
accompanied by a characterisation of the urban space as a fragmented one, 
with areas of order and effective exercise of state sovereignty, and other 
feral areas controlled by armed actors and characterised by complex 
problems of poverty and violence. This understating of the city as a fractured 
entity, which has been common in other Latin-American cities as well 
(Rodgers et al 2011), meant that the ‘ungovernability’ of the city was not 
                                                          
94 The Development plan was called ‘Medellin, commitment of the entire citizenry’ 
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seen as a generic urban problem, but one that could be geographically 
identified and visualized through georeferencing instruments. The use of 
maps to identify the prevalence of key problems, such as the low human 
development indicators (during the Fajardo administration) and occurrence of 
violent incidents and crimes (during the  Salazar administration), allowed 
policymakers to identify and characterise ‘ungoverned areas’ in need of 
differentiated forms of state intervention. The following quote from the 
Secretary of Government during the Salazar administration illustrates the 
importance of this type of instrument:  
‘... So we created a city map, an obverse of the one Sergio did to 
strengthen state intervention in areas where human development 
index was lower... we took the city map and said ‘ok this the whole 
city, but for the purpose of security and coexistence projects, these 
are the different Medellins’...we looked at what was happening in each 
territory and built a new map of violence in the city with problematic 
areas coloured in intense red and safer areas in a pale red. According 
to that we allocated security programs and resources...obviously you 
are not going to send urban control forces (highly trained units for 
antiterrorist combat), to areas with low violence indexes, but to areas 
with high levels of violence.. in intense red areas we concentrated 
resources, technology and investigations...that map allowed us to see 
where criminals, homicidal violence, crimes against property...and 
problems of coexistence were. Based on that map we created 4 
categories and divided the city into safe communities, safe areas, 
sensible areas and critical areas... that way it is easier to occupy the 
territory little by little and to dispute territories to organised crime... 
One would say metaphorically that in safe communities we shake 
hands with people, in sensitive areas we use a clenched fist and in 
critical areas we hit hard’  
(Interview Former Secretary of Government, 4/11/2009) 
 
Georeferencing urban problems and profiling marginalised areas and their 
populations made them visible objects of public policy. Policymakers 
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developed and justified the allocation of resources and the implementation of 
particular initiatives and programmes in these ungoverned areas as a way to 
create paths for the inclusion of historically neglected communities, but in 
ways that could help the local state to build its capacity to govern and pacify 
the city.  
A critical analysis of the security strategy implemented helps to illustrate that 
a wide range of public interventions  seek a broader purpose beyond their 
immediate objectives (creating opportunities for youth, improving 
infrastructure and urban facilities and encouraging citizen participation in 
public affairs for example). The Medellin Model’s form of security provision 
aimed at strengthening the state in the face of a material and symbolic 
dispute for territory and legitimacy with armed actors. In the process, the 
security effort contributed to the subjectification of marginalised communities 
as ungoverned spaces. 
The mixed security model implemented in Medellin was not a detached 
strategy designed with the sole purpose of curbing violence and delinquency 
rates95, but a key driver within a more comprehensive state-building effort 
that was guided by a new rationality of government that established 
differential power relations with areas and populations regarded as 
problematically ‘ungoverned’. This effort, which started in 2002 with a 
national initiative to take territorial control of an area controlled by insurgent 
groups, and which was shaped by a wide range of policy initiatives 
implemented by two independent local administrations (2004 to 2011), has 
been articulated and marketed as a model of urban transformation relevant 
to other cities in the global south. This supposed model, which the new local 
government in 2012 promised to continue, has attracted considerable 
attention from donors, academics and policymakers, as a successful way to 
contain urban violence and to promote urban transformation. Although some 
analyses exist regarding some of this Model’s programmes, little is known 
about the rationality of the security provision effort, of the forces that led to its 
configuration and of its impact on state society relations. 
                                                          
95 As urban security strategies are normally intended to in other urban contexts 
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As a first step in the process of revealing the contradictions of this urban 
centred state-building process, which put marginalised communities right at 
the centre of the configuration of statehood, in this chapter I first undertake a 
genealogy of the so-called model. I do it through an analysis of some of the 
socio economic and politico-institutional processes that led to the 
configuration of the particular form of security provision in Medellin from 
20012 to 2012. I subsequently analyse the logic underpinning the mixed 
security approach which aimed at effectively governing the ‘ungoverned’. 
A Genealogy of the Model’s Rationality of Government  
Based on critical security thinking and using governmentality as an analytical 
approach, this research analyses urban security polices as an integral part of 
the exercise of power in contemporary societies. Security interventions and 
policies are not apolitical practices. On the contrary, they are located right at 
the heart of power relations and of the working of particular social, political 
and economic orders. Therefore, as Risley argues, a fundamental task for 
security analysts is to critically investigate not only who promotes security 
measures, but how security policies form part of broader political projects 
and visions and contribute to constructing political authority, identities and 
subjectivities (Risley 2006:30).  
In order to unpack what kind of wider social, economic and political 
processes at the local, national and global levels helped to shape the model 
of security provision used in Medellin between 2002 and 2012, I use 
Foucault’s methodological strategy called multiplication of analytical 
‘salients’96(Foucault in Faubion 1994:226-7). This allows me to identify broad 
processes that contributed to the configuration of Medellin’s security model, 
which seek to penetrate and bring ungoverned spaces and communities 
under state control through mixed interventions. 
Following Foucault’s metaphor that analysing a socio-political phenomenon 
is like breaking down the phenomenon into the processes that constitute it, 
as if building a ‘polyhedron’; I identify the following processes as constitutive 
                                                          
96 I explain this methodological strategy in chapter two. 
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of the polyhedron that gave rise to Medellin’s model of security provision: 
The first one is the consolidation of a neoliberal economic model in Colombia 
since the 1990s, which prompted the reorganisation of Medellin’s local 
economy according to the requirements of the global urban competition for 
capital. The second is the implementation of ‘Democratic Security’, a national 
government strategy focused on the strengthening of the state’s military 
capacity with the intention of defeating and eliminating insurgent actors, 
establishing territorial control in their areas of influence and creating 
favourable conditions for the entrenching of neoliberal economic projects in 
the country. And the third process influencing local authorities’ willingness to 
focus public spending on marginalised communities and to open 
opportunities for citizen’s participation in local governance is the active role 
played by a wide range of civil society actors and grassroots organisations. 
These not only supported an alternative political movement to come to power 
in the city, but they also played a key role in the implementation of public 
policies and programmes in marginalised communities during the 2000s. 
These three processes, the relations they prompted between different 
institutional, social and political actors and the domains of reference they 
suggested for the provision of security since 2002, made the emergence of a 
distinctive governing model in Medellin possible.  
The Neoliberal Turn and Medellin’s Governing Process: 
In the early 1990s Colombia embraced neoliberalism through economic 
liberalisation, monetary and fiscal discipline, ‘selective privatisation’ and 
labour market and tax system reforms. These measures sought the 
flexibilisation and internationalisation of the national economy in the context 
of the weakening of the country’s coffee sector (Estrada Alvarez 2004). This 
capitalist turn which prompted the further decline of the national industrial 
sector and the emergence of a powerful tertiary sector, continued through 
the second decade of the new millennium, with the creation of favourable 
conditions for foreign investment97 and with the negotiation of free trade 
agreements with various countries98.  
                                                          
97 mainly through deregulation and tax breaks for corporations 
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Such neoliberal economic policies had particular manifestations and impact 
at the urban level. In Medellin, a city with a powerful industrial sector since 
the mid-twentieth century, the economic liberalisation of the 1990s 
accentuated the deindustrialisation of the local economy99. Weakened by the 
neoliberal turn, the once powerful industrial sector was eclipsed by a 
prosperous financial service sector by the early 2000s. Interested in creating 
favourable conditions for the internationalisation of the city, the new 
economic elites and political centres of power in the city seek to re-organise 
the local economy and integrate it into global flows of capital (Betancur et al 
2001). Their efforts concentrated in improving the city’s competitiveness and 
reorienting the city’s economy towards clusters and sectors with possibilities 
of competing in global markets and attracting capital.  
In this process the local state’s functions were transformed (Franco 2006). 
Strategic planning exercises undertaken in the city in the mid 1990s100, 
pushed local governments to take on a more entrepreneurial role as 
demanded by Medellin’s entry into the fierce global interurban competition. In 
this context, creating an urban environment propitious for businesses and the 
attraction of investors became a key governmental function. This required 
the adaptation of urban space and ‘territorial marketing’ to transform the 
image of the city from a place strongly associated with violence and drug-
trafficking to an ideal hub for business, tourism and investment (Corporación 
Jurídica Libertad & Fundación Sumapaz 2011; Moncada 2013b).  
Given that the 1990s neoliberal turn coincided with a crisis of urban violence 
in Medellin, state intervention in this city differed substantially, in method, 
from that observed in other Latin American cities (Hylton 2007). While 
neoliberal reforms in the region were normally associated with significant 
reductions in public spending, in the case of Medellin the need to create 
                                                                                                                                                                    
98 For example, the bilateral free trade agreements with Canada, US, Chile-Peru-Mexico, 
South Korea, European Union and Israel 
99 As in other cities in the region neoliberal policies and the contraction of the industrial 
sector produced a deterioration of working conditions and a substantial increase in 
unemployment and informal labour.  
100 Such as the ‘Strategic Plan for Medellin and its Metropolitan Area’ 
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conditions to increase the city’s competitiveness in an urban context of 
extremely high levels of urban violence required social and economic 
interventions that targeted marginalised communities through new forms of 
governance (Betancur 2001). During the 2000s, this tendency continued with 
significant increases in social policy spending targeting marginalised sectors, 
especially during the Fajardo and Salazar administrations (2004-2011).  
The allocation of resources to impressive infrastructural projects in the 
poorest communities of the city did not mean a change of direction in the 
city’s economic trajectory, but rather a moment of acceleration under the 
notion of the modernisation of the local state (Corporación Jurídica Libertad 
& Fundación Sumapaz 2011: 181). Actually, it was during these two 
administrations that the economic strategy consolidated and achieved its 
major successes in attracting capital to specific clusters, in reorganizing 
urban space and promoting Medellin as a place for international events and 
business oriented tourism. 
Evidence of the systematic effort by the local administrations in power during 
the 2000s, to make Medellin a competitive and attractive city is the hosting of 
major international events such as the General Assembly of the Organisation 
on American States in 2008, the South American Games in 2010 and the 
World Tourist Organisation General Assembly in 2015, as well as the bid to 
host the Summer Youth Olympic Games in 2018101. Other forms of proof can 
be seen in the proclamation in 2012 of Medellin as the most competitive city 
in Colombia according to the Global Competitiveness Index102, its 
designation in 2013 as the most innovative city in the world by the Urban 
Land Institute, Citibank and the Wall Street Journal, the city’s move up to 
85th place in the 2011 ICCA World Ranking103 and the hosting of the 2014 
World urban Forum. The consolidation of Empresas Publicas de Medellin 
                                                          
101 In this bid the city was one of the three finalists. 
102 It measures economic strength, international appeal and human capital. 
103 It measures the number of international events hosted. Medellin was ranked 11th in Latin 
America. 
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(EPM)104, as the biggest and most profitable conglomerate in the city, with 
presence in other Colombian regions and countries, is another indicator of 
the steady entrepreneurial role played by the local state in the last decade. 
In this context, the configuration of the Medellin model and some of its key 
components acquire special meaning and importance. For example, social 
urbanism, one of the most renowned programmes implemented in Medellin, 
massively contributed to the reconstruction of the city’s image as a 
progressive and innovative city (Brand 2013). The model’s emphasis on the 
physical transformation of the urban space, as a way to improve the life of 
citizens in the poorest areas of the city, fitted perfectly with the need to 
transform and effectively manage the city’s territory in ways that could 
facilitate Medellin’s repositioning in the global market.  
Neoliberal economic measures implemented in Medellin had particular 
implications for the provision of urban security. The security model 
implemented in the city since 2002 was not only shaped by policymakers’ 
interest in addressing the conditions of insecurity and violence affecting 
citizens, especially in the most marginalised areas, but by the need to 
demonstrate that there was a clear break with the city’s troubled past. The 
private sector played a key role in the design and implementation of state 
responses to local violence that did not rely only on coercive measures but 
that focused on changing citizen culture and the urban space. The private 
sector not only actively promoted reformist citizen security policies but it also 
aligned with civil society organisations to promote a political independent 
candidate to the Mayor’s office who was willing to implement them (Moncada 
2013b). 
 In the context of the city’s history of violence, security policies became 
crucial to the process of creating a competitive city that could assure safety 
as well as competitive operational costs to investors and tourists 
                                                          
104 the industrial and commercial enterprise owned by the state for the provision of public 
utilities  (Electricity, water, gas, sanitation and telecommunication)  
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(Corporación Jurídica Libertad & Fundación Sumapaz 2011:182-183)105. In 
this line, the need to show the city’s transformation and the positive results in 
the reduction of violence led policymakers and some analysts to rely almost 
exclusively on the number of homicides as the indicator of urban security and 
the marker of the city’s success. The impressive reduction of homicides rates 
from 2002 to 2007 being the most frequently used piece of evidence to the 
success of the city in dealing with chronic insecurity within official documents 
and policymakers’ addresses.  
In the context of the re-orientation of the local economy towards sectors 
capable of attracting capital, the perceived success of the city in dealing with 
high levels of violence had another impact on security provision. Not only  
has there been a move towards a more entrepreneurial management of 
security in the city, but also an increased interest in making the provision of 
security a source of revenue. As an illustration, the entity created by the 
city’s council in 1982 to guarantee the provision of equipment and logistical 
support needed to provide security in Medellin, became in 2002 a 
commercial and industrial state-owned business. This has gradually become 
more focused on the design, development and commercialisation of security 
programmes and services, not only in this city but in other municipalities 
across the country. In 2010 the ESU (Empresa para la Seguridad Urbana) as 
it was renamed, established as one of its strategic objectives the 
consolidation of its trademark in the provision of security at regional and 
national level by expanding its services to public and private entities.  
The services offered by the ESU rely heavily on the use of technology such 
as video surveillance106, specialised software and web platforms for 
emergency management and reporting of security incidents, alarm systems 
in communities and commercial areas, networks of civilian informants (red de 
                                                          
105 Through the availability of cheap labour and flexible contractual conditions with labour, 
tax reductions to capital, adequate infrastructure and efficient local management  
106 By October 2013 there were already 533 video cameras installed across the city. There 
were also plans for the installation of 200 more in various comunas. Additionally, the ESU 
had implemented an Automatic Vehicle Localization System -AVL- through GPS and 
wireless communication. This served to locate vehicles used by security and justice 
institutions (http://www.esu.com.co/esu/index.php/es/72-la-esu-aporta-con-la-tecnologia-a-
la-seguridad-ciudadana accessed 06/10/2013) 
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cooperantes ciudadanos) equipped with radios and video streaming tools 
that allow them to communicate with the police, etc. This technological move 
towards the provision of security which has been recognised by the IADB as 
a remarkable example of the management of security in the region has 
started to attract the interest of other municipalities and security institutions 
around the world. This is why the Municipality of Medellin recently 
announced its intention to make ‘security services’ another strategic cluster 
in the city107.  
The attempt by local authorities to profit from some of the achievements of 
the Medellin model has another implication. The commodification and 
commercialisation of security services requires high levels of marketing and 
this has a profound impact on the symbolic and material provision of security 
in a city that still struggles with very complex problems. It distorts the notion 
of security as a public good making it an object of consumption to which 
private actors can have better access. It also makes local authorities very 
sensitive to fluxes of information regarding security problems given that this 
can affect the image of the city and in consequence be bad for business.  
Democratic Security and the Medellin Security Model 
Another process that shaped the model of security provision in Medellin in 
the last decade was the implementation since 2003 of a national defence 
and security policy called ‘Democratic Security’ (Presidencia de la República 
2003). This was implemented by President Uribe Velez during his two 
consecutive terms in office (2002-2010) and continued with some 
modifications by his successor President Santos (since 2010). This national 
level security policy which became the national government’s flagship for 
almost a decade, responded to the generalised disappointment caused by 
the failure of the peace process pursued by the previous administration with 
the FARC and to the perception that the country was on the brink of 
                                                          
107 The Municipality of Medellin and The Commerce Chamber defined six clusters that aim at 
increasing the city’s productivity: Electric Power, Construction Sector, Textiles/Fashion and 
Design, Business Tourism/ Events and Conventions, Medical Services and Information and 
Communication Technologies. The seventh cluster would be Security. 
http://www.elcolombiano.com/BancoConocimiento/M/medellin_perfila_un_septimo_cluster_e
n_seguridad/medellin_perfila_un_septimo_cluster_en_seguridad.asp(accessed 06/10/2013 
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becoming a failed state. The simultaneous strengthening of guerrilla groups 
and the consolidation of paramilitary forces supported by powerful sectors of 
society and enabled by the tacit approval of the Colombian military forces 
contributed to this perception.  
 
The Democratic Security Policy promised to address the Colombian state’s 
weakness and to build its capacity to establish order, impose its authority, 
exercise territorial control and defeat the illegal armed groups. It relied on a 
hard fisted approach to combat insurgent groups which were associated with 
the security threats the government considered priorities (such as terrorism, 
kidnapping, extortion, drug trafficking and homicides), not only because they 
affected the lives of citizens, but because they were an obstacle for the 
economic performance of the country and the possibilities of attracting 
investment. While the government focused all its efforts on the military defeat 
of the guerrillas, it undertook a different approach with the paramilitary forces 
across the country. In 2002, after paramilitary groups declared a cease fire, a 
problematic peace negotiation leading to their partial demobilisation began.   
 
Although the democratic security policy focused on the security situation in 
rural areas as epicentres of the Colombian protracted conflict, this policy also 
had a profound impact on the way security would be provided in Colombian 
cities in the 2000s. It reshaped security institutions across the country 
(police, military and the intelligence agencies), it promoted a particular notion 
of security that guided their performance and practices and it defined a new 
role for society in the public provision of security. In the particular case of 
Medellin, key components of the mixed approach to security provision used 
between 2002 and 2011, were the direct result of the implementation of the 
Democratic Security policy and of the way it reshaped the security debate 
and practice across the country. One example could be the initiatives to 
retake territorial control of marginalised urban communities and the 
demobilisation of an important number of paramilitary members in the city.  
The national security strategy aimed at strengthening a particular form of 
state authority and at guaranteeing the necessary conditions for the 
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consolidation of the neoliberal economic model in the country (Angarita 
Cañas 2011). The state function was conceived as mainly concerned with 
the exercise of authority through law enforcement agencies over portions of 
the territory under the influence of illegal armed actors. In consequence it 
produced the militarisation of the state’s role and of national life. The armed 
forces were regarded not only as the main agents in the war against drug 
trafficking, terrorism and insurgent groups across the territory, but also as the 
embodiment of the state and of its symbolic and material power and 
legitimacy. This explains the massive effort made by the national government 
to increase the state forces not only in numbers but in capacity, equipment, 
intelligence and power. With the financial and logistical support of the United 
States and the private sector, there was a substantial increase in the number 
of security personnel and increased bureaucracy in the country. The number 
of military and police forces went from 313.406 men in 2002 to 426.014 men 
by the end of Uribe’s presidency in 2010 (Leal Buitrago 2010)108. This 
enlargement and the improvement in equipment and logistical resources 
demanded a huge increase in public spending in the defence and security 
budget109, to the detriment of investment in other sectors. 
The rapid increase of security forces was not accompanied by equivalent 
attempts to address a long history of malpractices within these institutions 
that had led to a long record of human rights violations and cases of 
misconduct. On the contrary, the extreme pressure exerted by the president 
to show results in the battle field reinforced entrenched practices that led to 
the perpetration of dreadful crimes by the military forces with the help of the 
paramilitaries, such as the extrajudicial killings of more than two thousand 
civilians who were presented as deaths in combat110 in exchange for 
                                                          
108 In cities the number of police officers increased substantially,  from 112000 to 145871 in 
2009 (El Tiempo 2009). 
109 The national private sector, multinationals with presence in the territory and the resources 
transferred by the USA made additional contributions to the spending in this area. En 2010 
the budget of the Ministry of Defence was more than 15 billion pesos (63% was allocated to 
the Military and the rest to the Police) (Leal Buitrago 2010:35). 
110 In 2009 The Prosecutor’s Office calculated that the number of citizens murdered by the 
army reached 2077, including underage children and women (Lopez 2009:2 cited in Angarita 
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institutional rewards and promotions. This is one of the most dramatic 
examples of how the criteria used to evaluate the performance of the security 
personnel instead of promoting the protection of citizens became an 
incentive for further disregard of human rights by the armed forces. This 
explains why despite its acclaimed initial successes, in terms of decreases in 
the number of homicides, kidnappings and massacres, the protection of main 
highways and military presence in several municipalities previously besieged 
by guerrilla forces, the Democratic Security Policy also led to a rise in 
violations of human rights such as arbitrary detentions, disappearances111 
and forced displacement, especially in areas of ‘rehabilitation’ targeted by the 
state (Cinep 2009 in Angarita Cañas 2011:286).  
 
It was as a consequence of the implementation of the Democratic Security 
Policy that the emphasis of the security effort and of the state consolidation 
process across the country focused on securing control over territories that 
were considered of strategic importance for the national neoliberal economic 
project underway112.  In the process, the government’s implementation of the 
democratic security policy reinforced the notion that rights and democratic 
values could be sacrificed if needed, in the search for security and the 
reestablishment of order and state authority.  
Another profound impact this policy had on security provision both in rural 
and urban areas, was that it suggested and demanded a particular role from 
citizens in the security effort. The national government’s doctrine assumed 
that the democratic state was being threatened by the terrorism exercised by 
armed actors and that citizens needed to demonstrate their alignment with 
the state by contributing to the elimination of security threats. Unrestricted 
                                                                                                                                                                    
2011:295) According to CINEP there were 1.119 extrajudicial killings between 2001and 
2010. 
111 According to the UN in the last three decades there have been more than 57200 
disappearances in Colombia. According to The National Institute of Legal Medicine the 
number of people reported as disappeared is 106108 and 22366 of these cases are believed 
to be victims of forced disappearances. 
112 For example areas given to multinational for exploitation, areas where mega productive 
projects are implemented or where there are illicit crops (Angarita 2011) 
168 
 
citizen support to the state and its armed forces, as well as civilian 
participation in the combat against state enemies through the provision of 
intelligence, was regarded as a form of proven patriotism. A massive network 
of civilian informants and collaborators who provided information to the 
security forces, sometimes in exchange of payments, was created113, 
disregarding the dangers this posed to civilians in the context of an armed 
conflict. The direct involvement of non combatants in the war against armed 
groups not only constituted a violation of international humanitarian law as 
denounced by international114 and local organizations, but it contributed to 
the damage of the social fabric and of civic values within communities. 
Additionally, it constituted another tool of the many used by the government 
to stigmatise dissident voices and critics of the government who were 
accused of siding with terrorists and illegal armed groups.   
 
The Democratic Security Policy concentrated on the war against insurgency 
and it did not contain special considerations for the provision of security in 
the cities; in the process it blurred the differences between military and police 
functions. While it broadened the functions of the military forces, it demanded 
the police forces to undertake highly militaristic tasks, creating confusions 
and blurring lines between their jurisdictions. On the one hand it expanded 
the police tasks in municipalities through the creation of rural mobile squads 
and fortified stations. On the other, the cities were patrolled both by army 
units and police units. Previous attempts to demilitarise the police in its 
functions, structure, and relationship with civil authorities, were dismissed by 
the Democratic Security Policy which regarded the police as another military 
force (Casas Dupuy 2005). As a result, the Police was confronted by internal 
tensions with deepening differences between those police units taking on 
increasingly military functions and other police units orientated towards 
traditional and preventive policing functions such as community policing. 
After a decade, the balance moved towards the former, which benefited from 
                                                          
113 The Ministry of Defence reported in 2004 that the number of members of the network of 
informants and collaborators was more than 2500000.  
114 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia. 
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evaluation systems that were designed in the context of the war against 
illegal armed groups, rather than regarding the prevention of urban 
insecurities and the protection or urban communities.  
 
The absence of a citizen security strategy within the Democratic Security 
Policy led the Police to demand more involvement from the local authorities 
in the provision of security in cities. However this did not mean that local 
authorities could take on a leadership role, or that Police accountability 
towards civil authorities would increase. On the contrary, Police forces 
continued to develop their own security plans and initiatives independently, 
and demanded local authorities’ contribution through investments in 
equipment, security infrastructure and funding for security plans.  
 
 By the end of Uribe’s government, unaddressed urban security problems 
produced a substantial increase of violence and insecurity in the main cities. 
The response of the Uribe administration and of his successor, President 
Santos, relied on the same security model. The war against insurgency 
slowly transformed its rhetoric becoming a war against criminal organizations 
(many of which were the outcome of the failed demobilisation of paramilitary 
forces). Although the Police developed an initiative to address urban 
insecurity, ‘ the National Plan of Communitarian Surveillance by Quarters’, 
and the Santos government launched the first National Citizen Security 
Strategy’ with some prevention components, the approach used for urban 
security provision, relied on punitive measures, increases in the number of 
police forces in the streets and militarisation of civil life and urban life 
specially in marginalised urban communities, which became the main focus 
of police action.  
 
Additionally, police forces continued to be dominated by the military 
orientation imprinted on them by the Democratic Security Policy which 
makes them highly impermeable to civil control, prompt to respond with 
reactive rather than preventive approaches, highly distrusted among citizens 
and communities especially in areas that police forces regard as problematic. 
Police and security forces continue to have a predominant role in the 
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provision of security in Colombian cities; they are expected to address 
complex security problems with the collaboration of communities who distrust 
them. In the fight against criminal organisations they have become more and 
more orientated towards the use of technology, intelligence, technical and 
human, through the use of economic rewards for information. 
 
It is important to recognise the impact of the Democratic security policy in the 
analysis of the processes that configured the mixed security model in 
Medellin. Not only local forces, but national and institutional dynamics, as the 
ones described, shaped the mixed intervention targeting ungoverned areas 
in Medellin. The urban model that is normally presented as a novel way of 
approaching urban problems relied on the implementation of measures 
inspired by traditional and restrictive notions of security. The implementation 
of the Democratic security policy for example, led to the military intervention 
in Comuna 13, to the occupation of urban territories and the establishment of 
alliances with paramilitary forces to weaken insurgent groups. The resulting 
reductions in homicides levels in the city allowed the local authorities to 
concentrate resources and attention on other components of the security 
model (social urbanism for example). In other words, the most progressive 
components of the security strategy in Medellin relied on the partial results of 
a highly traditional security approach. 
 
Community Resilience and Agency and Local Governing Structures 
The third process that led to the consolidation of a novel form of governing 
marginalised communities, combining forms of coercion with normalizing 
forms of biopower, has its origins in the often ignored history of the forms of 
organisation and participation that exist in these communities. A broad 
analysis of the way communities and civil organisations in the city created 
their own forms of participation and their own agenda for urban 
transformation illustrates that many of the public policies and interventions 
that have been regarded as democratic and progressive within the so-called 
Medellin model were not created by policymakers. These were in fact the 
result of a broader political process that brought together grassroots 
171 
 
organisations, civil society, critical academic circles and various forms of 
political mobilization since the 1990s (Uran 2012:35). This political process 
and the active role of residents and community actors in the implementation 
of government programmes during the 2000s, denotes that those subject to 
state power played a key role in shaping that power and the governing 
process that configured in Medellin during that period. 
 
Since the formation of communities at the margins of state influence in 
Medellin’s surrounding hillsides, their residents have articulated multiple 
forms of self organisation and self management which could be regarded as 
organic forms of participation that have been evolving and adapting to the 
city’s context and history. Many of these forms of self organisation, inspired 
by the residents’ desire to survive and flourish in a city that did not welcome 
their mass arrival from rural areas, responded to the legacy of the campesino 
and indigenous culture of association and organisation and to expressions of 
local customs and way of life from their places of origin (Gomez et al ND). 
Several of the original participation practices aimed at strengthening 
community links in the context of difficult economic situations (for example 
the ‘convites’115), while others aimed at making communities visible to the 
state and to the rest of the city (for example neighbours assemblies). In 
general, community organisations and social participation have been 
motivated by two aspirations: Firstly, the recognition of these territories and 
their populations as part of the city, as a way to improve residents’ lives 
(which are severely affected by poor employment, lack of income, poor 
education, deficit in health centres and poor housing conditions). And 
secondly, resisting the coercive influence of armed actors in these areas and 
developing alternatives to the urban conflict and the high levels of social 
violence associated to it (Interview with Community Leader Comuna 8, 2009 
                                                          
115 A form of shared work and solidarity gatherings where neighbours work together to solve 
problems and difficult situations. Through these ‘convites’ residents collectively constructed 
streets, houses, community centres, health centres and churches and basic utilities like 
electricity connections. (Many residents talked about this type of gatherings during informal 
conversations, especially older adults who participated in these activities) 
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and Informal conversations with Community Leaders Comuna 8, Comuna 1 
and Comuna 6, 2010). 
 
In addition to these forms of self management and non institutionalised forms 
of community support, which were key to the early development and 
improvement of residents’ living conditions, other forms of community 
participation took the form of demonstrations to promote and rescue 
community identity and protests against violence, impunity and in favour of 
peace. Some forms of organic participation evolved into more organised 
forms of agency at community level, with the help of development agencies 
and NGOs. The difficult situation of violence in the 1990s in the country also 
made the state and powerful sectors of society favourable to the opening of 
spaces for citizen participation in the administration and management of the 
city, as a way to regain legitimacy. Community sectors with a long history of 
self organisation took this as an opportunity to achieve state recognition 
beyond Community boards and became more institutionalised in the form of 
youth clubs, elder’s life clubs, housing committees, etc.  
 
The 1990s was the decade in which community mobilisation transformed into 
youth movements, women groups, participatory planning processes in 
various comunas (6, 13, 4 and 1) and initiatives like ‘a week for peace’ in the 
northeast comunas, which aimed at protecting public space and defending 
community and social organisations from threats from extreme right and left 
and from criminal organisations. These community practices, especially 
those around planning processes, some of which could be representative of 
what Holston calls insurgent forms of citizenship (Holston 2008; Uran 2012), 
became more and more structured and administratively organised116.  
 
These forms of participation which emerged in marginalised neighbourhoods 
since their inception, as well as multiple civil organisations and NGOs 
promoting human rights in the city have constantly interacted with local tiers 
                                                          
116 Some of these have evolved into initiatives that help to improve human security as the 
research by the OSHM found out (OSHM 2014). 
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of government. They have impacted municipal level politics and helped to 
shape institutions and policies that are key to the development of the city. 
Through agreements and contracts with different administrations for 
example, community and civil organisations have helped to formulate plans 
for the ordering of the urban space117 since the 1990s, and have also trained 
community residents and strengthened the organisational and participatory 
capacity of these communities. 
 
Strategic alliances between community forms of participation, for example 
civic boards, and NGOs, civil society organisations, the private sector and 
some local universities, have also impacted on the urban agenda. These 
alliances led to the consolidation of a movement which promoted an 
alternative discourse around urban issues in the city, promoting citizen 
participation and the democratisation of planning processes as a way to 
meet residents’ basic needs. This movement was crucial for the 
institutionalization of a Municipal Planning System in 1996 and the promotion 
and implementation of the Participatory Budgeting process in 2004. It was 
also the force behind the arrival of Sergio Fajardo and Alonso Salazar to the 
Mayor’s office in 2004 and 2008. The programmes associated  with social 
urbanism, the most prominent component of the so-called Medellin Model, 
and their planning and participatory components, were shaped and 
strengthened by this movement and by the demands, experience, capacities 
and community processes that had been consolidating in various 
communities for decades, as a result of the work of civil and community 
organisations. During the 2000s civil society leaders assumed key positions 
in the local government and from various municipal offices they promoted 
progressive policies in a wide range of areas.  In other words, both civil 
                                                          
117 For example through the Plan for Territorial Ordering (Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial- 
POT) which is an instrument to plan and order the city’s space. It defines the environmental, 
physical, and functional dimensions for the development of the city and the way the space is 
inhabited. 
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society and citizen participation were powerful forces shaping the most 
progressive components of the model118.  
 
In the recent history of community organisation and self management in 
Medellin there are examples of community initiatives which were later 
adopted by public agencies as governmental programmes (OSHM 2014, 
Interview with Community leader Comuna 8, 2010).However, the role played 
by residents and community forms of agency in the consolidation of a new 
form of governing these areas is invisible in official documents and 
international depictions of the Medellin Model. This obscures the fact that 
residents of these areas are not passive beneficiaries of governmental 
intervention and that they have the power to construct their own 
subjectivities, but also, that sometimes the state instrumentalises that power 
to improve its capacity to exercise power and to normalise and control these 
areas regarded as ‘ungoverned’. 
 
Throughout the 2000s for example, the relationship between community 
actors and the local state changed substantially, as efforts to strengthen the 
state capacity to ‘govern’ these areas intensified.  Since 2004 with the 
articulation of community plans in different areas of the city, the local state 
and other agencies promoting development used civil society, especially 
community and social organisations and NGOs with a long history of 
community work, to deliver many services that the state was not capable of 
delivering, such as education, recreation, environment, culture, etc. Rather 
than on direct intervention, the state building process in this urban context 
relied heavily on contracts with community and social organisations for the 
implementation of programmes orientated to community development. 
Through these contracts the state performed as a contractor and auditor and 
community organisations performed as operators in the implementation of 
programmes. State institutions also used these organisations not only as 
                                                          
118 For example the creation in 2007 of a high level Municipal office for the promotion of 
public policies to improve gender equality in the city (Secretary for Women-Secretaria de las 
Mujeres) was highly influenced by the advocacy of the women’s social movement in the city.  
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sources of information and deliberation, but also as means to legitimate their 
presence and interventions. 
 
This type of interaction has allowed the state to deliver many aspects of the 
governing model in areas where it did not have institutional capacity or 
legitimacy. It has also led to the progressive normalisation of many organic 
forms of community participation by forcing them to meet institutional 
practices and technicalities (Gomez et al ND:104). By forcing them to meet 
certain standards, the governing process of marginalised communities has 
reduced the level of autonomy of community organizations and increased the 
competition among them for access to public resources. As it will be 
analysed in the following chapter the state entry to ‘ungoverned areas’ has 
also created unforeseen incentives to illegal actors to try to co-opt 
community spaces and forms of organisation. 
  
Recognising the importance of political and popular forms of organisation 
and participation allows for the construction of a more nuanced picture of the 
configuration of the Medellin model. As it has been discussed in this section, 
its different components, dimensions and programmes were the result of a 
complex combination of particular processes taking place at community, 
local and national level. Unpacking the configuration of the governing 
process marginalised communities have been subject to in the last decade 
and of the Medellin model which embodies it, reveals that it was shaped by 
the combination of multiple processes, such as the neoliberal turn in the 
economic orientation of the city, the implementation of a national security 
strategy focused on strengthening the state’s anti insurgent capacity and the 
consolidation of the capacity of civil society and community actors  to 
articulate an alternative agenda for the democratisation of urban 
development. 
 
The impact of these processes in the configuration of Medellin’s approach 
questions the assumed replicability of this model in other urban contexts. It 
also demonstrates the way security provision is shaped by political and 
socio-economic and institutional processes. In the next section, we advance 
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on the analysis by dissecting the rationality of the Medellin model through a 
critical examination of the discursive practices it relies on. This will reveal its 
assumptions and calculations, the instruments and mechanisms it used to 
exercise power on ungoverned communities and the subjectivities it created 
in the process.  
 
 
 
Unpacking the Rationality of Medellin’s Security Approach 
 
I analyse the rationality guiding the security strategy within the Medellin 
model, using critical discourse analysis of not only official texts and 
documents describing security policies and programmes119, but also of 
interviews and conversations with public officials, police officers and security 
experts. I also analyse public addresses of key municipal officials and high 
ranked police officers at local and international events. The public officials 
and security experts interviewed were involved in the design and 
implementation of the security strategy in Medellin during the 2000s, many of 
them at the highest levels -for example as Secretary of Government or 
Secretary of Social Development, while others were responsible for key 
programmes. The critical discourse analysis of these data helped to unpack 
the Medellin model’s rationality of government targeting ‘ungoverned 
spaces’.  It revealed the assumptions and calculations it was based on, and 
the instruments and mechanisms it used to exercise power on particular 
communities in order to create security and stability in the city, as the 
following blurb from the official Security Master Plan for the City (Plan 
Maestro de Seguridad Defensa y Justicia para Medellín y el Valle de Aburra) 
illustrates:  
                                                          
119 This included for example: the Development Plans designed by different administrations 
and official documents detailing the security policy strategies and its results, minutes of the 
city Council meetings, minutes of meetings and events at which public officials were invited 
to report on policies implemented. 
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‘When the mayor took office in 2004, he considered important 
and a priority for his government to have a security and 
coexistence plan for the city that would allow not only the 
reduction of violence and criminality indexes, but to improve the 
presence of state institutions in different areas of the city that 
had been controlled by illegal groups. He also thought it was 
important that the plan focused on modifying the citizens’ 
behaviours that privilege the use of indiscriminate violence and 
the acquisition of goods through illegal means...the foundations 
of that plan were: coordinating the municipality’s work with that of 
security agencies (mainly police, IV brigade and DAS) an justice 
institutions (Fiscalia general and INPEC), making the state 
legitimate through its presence and the territorial control 
exercised by state authorities, and through citizen participation in 
the city’s decisions, impacting on citizen culture and promoting 
culture of legality and the social reintegration of demobilised 
armed actors. (Alcaldia de Medellin 2006:1-2) 
The security and coexistence plan outline above captures key aspects of the 
Medellin Model and its emphasis on strengthening the state’s capacity to 
exert its sovereignty in particular areas of the city, as well as the diversity of 
spheres of intervention and instruments that were seen as relevant to that 
purpose. This plan addressed the problem of urban violence and insecurity in 
a different way based on particular assumptions and calculations. This 
research reveals the thinking behind Medellin’s security approach through an 
exploration of the way those in charge or influential in its design and 
implementation articulate it. It is important to highlight that this research is 
concerned with the transformation of strategies, calculations, objects, 
subjects and technologies of power, and not with an assessment of the 
security institutions’ performance, or with policy evaluation. 
Assumptions about marginalised communities and their populations: 
The first key assumption is that urban development and prosperity is related 
to the integration of ungoverned spaces and communities ‘to the city’. The 
recognition and characterisation of these neglected areas was the first step 
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to their integration. The official discourse focused on the identification of the 
problems of these areas (lack of development, poverty, low levels of quality 
of life, violence, informality, isolation). These are portrayed as areas of 
absence (lack of the state presence and services for example), as areas of 
disorder, violence and illegality, the state was then set out to intervene them. 
Integrating these areas in the view of policymakers means bringing state 
institutions and services there, exerting effective control of the territory (and 
their populations) and transforming these communities.  
The ungoverned areas are attributed, within the official discourse, 
particularities that make them a source of instability and danger to what is 
considered the urban order. These communities become objects of state 
intervention not only due to their vulnerabilities and low levels of human 
development, but because they are regarded as spaces produced by armed 
actors and by political actors and illegal and questionable practices that 
supposedly contradict the principles and the legal order that are associated 
with the ideal notion of state and democracy (Quinchia 2013:128). The 
characterisation of these marginalised areas through what is missing and 
problematic in them, from the perspective of those who represent the legal 
and prosperous ‘city’, tends to ignore their socio-spatial and cultural richness 
and justifies differentiated forms of state intervention as the following quote 
illustrates: 
‘...in a city of 2 and half million people with 16 comunas and 5 
rural areas there are very particular security problems to each 
territory...those problems are the result of the way that territory 
was socially built and of the cultural and social characteristics of 
its population, so security cannot be thought and provided in a 
generic manner, it cannot be delivered the same everywhere, 
security has to be delivered in a flexible, adaptable and creative 
way in each area...if you look at the territory you will find different 
security problems ... comunas like Castilla, the northwest and 
Robledo, they were populated long time ago and the population 
is mostly middle class  and workers with permanent income, 
legal homes, there is a social fabric there that has been 
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developing for some time, in that case you see particular forms 
of social organization, criminality and violence and these are 
completely different from those you find in the northeast 
comunas where we have unfinished settlement processes, 
people coming from rural areas forced by violence  who have not 
been in the city for more than a generation...so if you understand 
these particularities in the territory...you see that those 
particularities demand a security intervention according to those 
differences’ (Interview with Municipal official at Secretary of 
Government 10/02/2010) 
The urban integration process of these ungoverned areas had a strong 
spatial connotation. In the view of policymakers, key indicators of these 
communities’ integration to the city is that their territory is not exempt from 
legal regulation and forbidden to state institutions, especially the police, and 
other outsiders (such as residents of other areas and tourists), but accessible 
through public infrastructure (such as the metrocable). However, the 
transformation of these ungoverned areas, through state intervention, is 
meant to be not only a spatial transformation, but also an alteration of 
communities’ practices, values and culture. As in the following quote from the 
Secretary of Social Development, there is a recurrent allusion in the public 
discourse to the aspiration of transforming citizens: 
‘…we have talked about Medellin, about social urbanism, about 
public buildings and integral urban projects. All that has a north 
(norte): to make education and culture the key tools in the 
transformation of our city, of our society...the result then is not 
only a new building, or a new space for culture. The main 
outcome that we seek is a new citizenry, new citizens who are 
conscious of their rights and duties, participatory, responsible for 
their surroundings, committed to the present and future of their 
most immediate environment: their neighbourhood; citizens with 
the responsibility and the conviction that starting from the 
neighbourhood, from each one of them, we continue 
transforming the city.’  (Melguizo, 2009, Presentation by 
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Secretary of Citizen Culture at an International Event organised 
by the Mayors’ Office of Medellin)  
Education and culture were regarded in the Medellin Model, as key 
instruments for the transformation of citizenry in general and of behaviours 
that were seen as vicious and prone to violence and illegality in particular. 
Many policymakers and police officers referred to the ‘cultural problem’ that 
in their view accounted for the prevalence of illegal practices and actors in 
the city. The next quote illustrates this common view:  
‘...the priorities for public policy and public spending in Sergio 
and Alonso’s administrations are education and culture, we 
believe these are key tools  in the transformation of the city, we 
are convinced that what we have to do is to generate inclusion 
factors and more justice, we really believe that in this city poverty 
is very much associated with violence, although some people 
disagree, there is a cultural problem here. Colombians have a  
‘easy money’ (‘facilista’) culture, but specially in Medellin, paisas 
(people from Medellin) are used to cheating and breaking the 
norms for their personal gain and whoever does that is 
admired...the one who cheats, gets involved in illegality and 
succeeds, well that person is someone to look up, it is big 
problem that we have a very flexible culture regarding illegality 
‘(Secretary of Social Development, presentation at local event on 
security challenges in Medellin, 06/11/2009) 
 In the official discourse and state practices, education was often spoken 
about, not as a right, but as tool that could eliminate referents and practices 
of violence, especially in marginalised communities. Given that the problem 
of violence was strongly associated with the prevalence of a damaging 
culture, reducing it was often regarded as a matter of re-educating people, 
almost as a pedagogic endeavour that often targeted young people. The 
following description of community police officers’ activities illustrates this: 
Community Police officer 1: ‘let me give you an example of the 
things we have done: one day we brought coffins to the 
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communities and made a funeral march on the streets. We put 
mirrors inside the coffins and invited young people to see who 
was inside the coffin. To their surprise they saw their own 
faces...This was a campaign to send a strong message to young 
people...we asked them if that is where they wanted to end up...  
Commander of Community Police Unit: Yes, preventive activities 
like this help them to become aware (‘tomar conciencia’). We 
need to help them change their culture...in that respect we also 
implemented another programme, we invited young people from 
the gangs that did not have criminal records and invited them to 
do a sort of military service. More than 1000 people signed up to 
the programme...these were all young guys who extorted 
residents of their communities and were involved in assaults and 
robberies, these were the kind of crimes these guys committed... 
They entered our programme but we did not give them military 
training, nor therapies, they just attended workshops on human 
rights and civility. (Conversation at International Symposium on 
Coexistence, Medellin. 24/11/ 2010)   
 The emphasis on the transformation of these communities denotes an 
important aspect of the Medellin Model, its effort to normalise120 these areas 
through the righteous use of the urban space, through education and the 
promotion of civic values and of respect and acceptance of the state 
institutions as legitimate, exercising control over the lives of actors or as a 
last resort, through the threat of punishment. Even the creation of 
‘opportunities’ for vulnerable populations like youth, which seek to 
discourage young people from getting involved in illegal and criminal 
activities, work in the Model as a tool for the normalisation of a population 
group that is perceived as prone to violence and illicit behaviours. 
The impact of drug trafficking has been felt across all sectors of Colombian 
society since its rapid expansion in the late 1980s, with the highest sectors of 
                                                          
120 In a foucaultian way, this refers to the construction of what behaviour, and therefore who, 
is considered ‘normal’ in the population. 
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society as well as political, economic, security and judiciary institutions 
infiltrated by mafias and criminal organisations. However the official 
discourse tends to overemphasize young people from the poorest 
neighbourhoods as those who represent the culture of illegality and violence 
in the city. There seemed to be a generalised perception, among police 
officers and some policymakers, of young people as a ‘risk group’  that has 
to be persuaded or threatened into following the ’right path’. The ‘persuasion’ 
of young people took the form of a generous DDR programme and other 
programmes targeting youth (such as the Fuerza Joven programme 
described earlier) which offered especial benefits to gang members or guys 
at risk of being recruited by gangs, at key moments when violence escalated 
in the city, while at the same time coercive measures aimed at controlling 
young people in marginalised communities were also implemented (curfews 
for underage people, stop and search police practices and illegal recruitment 
of young people).  
‘The operative capacity of the police is very important and efforts 
should be put in so that we make criminals feel they are being 
chased…from around 18,700 captured people, 2,493 are 
adolescents, this tells us that there is a huge problem with the 
youth, this current generation is lost...I think also parents are 
giving up on their responsibility to educate and control their 
children, we should have some legal tool that allow us to put 
parents in jail too when their children are caught on illegal 
activities, they have a responsibility’ (Interview Commander of 
the Metropolitan Police, Medellin 12/11/2009) 
‘We offer the carrot to those that follow the norm, that is why we 
give opportunities to those that want to change...and to those 
that disturb the peace, well, we offer the stick.. The ‘promotores 
de vida programme’ for example is in that direction, we know that 
there are so many young people inadequately educated (mal 
educados), doing nothing, we open the door of the military 
service to them... (Commander of the Community Police Unit 
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Medellin, Public address at International Symposium on 
Coexistence, Medellin 24/11/2010)  
 
In the official discourse associated with the Medellin Model, the people in 
ungoverned areas are portrayed as passive beneficiaries of state 
intervention (Uran 2012), as areas disconnected from (rather that 
problematically and perversely connected to) what is considered the 
physical, political, economic, institutional, social and representational area of 
influence of the state. This highly territorial understanding of the relation 
between the state and these ungoverned areas, not only ignores (i) the many 
ways in which these communities have interacted and helped to shape the 
state, and (ii) that they are already part of the city and influence it as citizens, 
including through their participation in the election of its leaders; but it also 
renders the benefits and rights attached to their citizenship, conditional on 
state recognition and their cooperation with state institutions. The following 
quote from a security expert who has served as adviser and contractor to the 
local government illustrates the conditionality and the passive nature of 
citizenship that is commonly assumed regarding marginalised communities 
targeted by the Medellin Model: 
‘The city has brought the security forces to the comuna, made 
robust social investments and built impressive infrastructure, 
however we still have communities opposing police actions and 
led by 20 year old gang leaders with 15 to 20 people in their 
groups, these constitute considerable sectors of society 
committed to violence... this shows the state still has not yet 
achieved legitimacy, generated enough trust, strengthen social 
fabric and motivated people’s cooperation... that is why I have 
suggested that the families from these comunas who receive 
subsidies continue to do so but on the condition of keeping their 
children in schools and cooperating with the authorities to 
improve security...people have to be asked something in 
exchange...  (Giraldo, 2013 quoted in ElColombiano 2013) 
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With the pacification and ‘integration’ process of marginalised communities to 
the ‘city’ that is supposedly achieved through the Medellin Model, these 
communities play another role. Within public discourses and practices these 
become a (vitrina) ‘display cases’ of the so called Medellin Model, which 
facilitate the internationalisation of the city and become useful in the effort to 
attract capital whether in the form of investments or loans. The processes 
and transformations that take place in these communities are presented as 
unique, innovative and as a direct consequence of a new form of state 
intervention, which serves to attract interest within political, academic, policy 
and economic circles beyond the city.  
These intervened communities serve as showcases to demonstrate the 
success and achievements of the urban state-building process and project 
an image of a strengthened and efficient local state to outsiders (to 
policymakers, cooperation agencies, investors, tourists). This is regardless of 
the fact that multiple forms of violence and insecurity remain part of people’s 
lives and that from time to time armed violence resurges.  
The importance that intervened marginalised areas have for the 
marketisation of the Medellin model and the internationalisation of the city is 
illustrated by the way the Urban Integral Project in the north east area of the 
city and the housing project of the Juan Bobo stream121 have served to 
attract the interest and resources of cooperation agencies. These two 
projects which have attracted a great deal of interest among urban planners 
across the world, were among the first interventions the municipality 
undertook in the most marginalised areas of the city and have become the 
most emblematic examples of the type of socio, spatial and participatory 
form of intervention the local state implemented as part of social urbanism. 
The two projects have been widely documented and have been used by the 
municipality to promote Social Urbanism internationally as a successful 
strategy for urban transformation. The systematisation of these two projects, 
published by the local state owned Urban Development Company (EDU) with 
                                                          
121 ‘Proyecto Urbano Integral de la zona Nororiental’  and ‘Proyecto de consolidación 
habitacional en la quebrada Juan bobo’ in Spanish. 
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the support of the French development agency as ‘an example for other 
cities in the world that can replicate these good ideas and make sustainable 
and socially responsible urban development possible, illustrates the extent to 
which community interventions have become part of an exportable model:  
‘Present in Colombia since the late 2009, the AFD (French 
development agency) found in Medellin one of its most important 
allies, from the first day. In a few months the agency  approved a 
loan for 250 million dollars to the Municipality for the partial 
funding of the Integral urban project in the centre east part of the 
city; beyond the funding the agency developed an important 
strategic alliance with Medellin based on an ambitious technical 
cooperation program...one of the key topics of this alliance is the 
‘innovative model  of urban development of Medellin, the famous 
‘social urbanism’, whose excellent results contribute...to 
transform not only the city but the image of Medellin and 
Colombia abroad. From the beginning, the AFD decided to 
promote the diffusion of this model in France, in its countries of 
intervention and across the world, through the support to 
presentations in events for experts’ exchanges and through an 
important exhibition in the Pabellon del Arsenal de Paris... the 
experience of Medellin was also included as one of the 7 
emblematic projects in an exhibition celebrating the agency’s 70 
years of history presented in the main French cities and in 
agencies of the AFD across the world’. (Alcaldia de Medellin et 
al., 2014:10-11) 
 
Assumptions regarding the State:  
During the 2000s the local authorities in Medellin recognised that state’s bad 
practices (such as inefficiency, corruption and clientelism) had contributed to 
its low credibility among citizens. Thus they decided to implement a new 
management model based on transparency and a security strategy that 
privileged the occupation of the territory by state security forces and 
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agencies. This strategy contained a highly paternalistic understanding of the 
state –society relation. The control, government and management of 
marginalised areas by the state was assumed to bring a solution to urban 
communities’ problems and in consequence improve state legitimacy and 
foster stability, peace, security and development to the whole city.  
Even the existence of some of these communities whose households often 
do not appear in official maps, is recognised, legalised (through the 
legalization of property rights for example) and somehow dignified only as a 
result of state intervention:  
‘In Medelllin we have to build the most beautiful buildings in the 
places where state presence has been minimal. The first step 
towards quality education is the dignity of the space, when the 
poorest child in Medellin arrives in the best classroom in the city; 
we send a powerful message of social inclusion. If we give the 
most humble neighbourhoods beautiful libraries, those 
communities will feel proud of themselves, we are also saying 
that library or that school, with spectacular design, is the most 
important building in the neighbourhood and we send a clear 
message of social transformation. That is our revolution’ (Mayor 
Fajardo 2007 in Newsweek 11/10/07) 
The arrival of public resources and state institutions that are meant to 
permanently occupy the territories (police and military personnel and 
bureaucrats), is assumed to be good in nature and capable of producing 
positive processes in these communities. This however ignores the existence 
of entrenched institutional practices that contaminate and make their 
relations with local populations problematic (for example corruption, recurrent 
use of violence and their collusion with violent actors for pacification 
purposes).  
 ‘Police officers are often held accountable for the fight against 
crime but the Police has other functions too. The police officer is 
also a role model of citizenship and a point for reference for 
society, that is why our presence and attitude is so important for 
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citizens’ happiness and community harmony... for example the 
Police is responsible for the happiness a citizen experiences 
when he sees the police officer remove the drug addict from the 
corner...this function is also important. However crime and 
delinquency exist in communities; the question is what should we 
do so that people stop breaking the law? And also what can we 
do so that those who break the law become good citizens? Well, 
the Community Police with its programmes comes like ´a 
phoenix´ to these comunas...’ (Commander Community Police 
Presentation at International Symposium on Coexistence, 
Medellin. 24/11/ 2010) 
Another key assumption within the official discourse and shared by some 
academics and local security experts is that increasing the presence of state 
institutions, especially of those associated to security (the police, the army) 
and making them permanent would increase state legitimacy and reduce that 
of non state actors122. The assumption that the ‘entry’ of the state to these 
areas meant the weakening of these actors and their role in these 
communities and the achievement of the state’s monopoly of violence, as will 
be illustrated in the next chapter, was problematic. This assumption ignored 
the many ways in which these actors were able to accommodate to the 
permanent presence of the state and even benefit from it. 
...In August 2002..the decision of intervening Comuna 13, one of 
the communities in dispute and with dominant presence of FARC 
guerrilla was taken. It was intervened with the action of security 
and justice institutions. After the intervention this community 
passed from 717 homicides in 2003 to 173 in 2004, this event 
which exemplifies the legitimate use of force and authority, 
marked the beginning of the return of institutions to territories 
dominated by illegal and criminal groups....in this context ...the 
mayor Sergio Fajardo not only continued but strengthened the 
                                                          
122 As one resident commented: ‘One thing is that the state institutions are present here, 
another different is if they are the ones who rule... Illegal actors are the ones who rule 
around here.’ 
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institutional state presence in the comuna 13.... with his 
development plan and especially with his Coexistence and 
Citizen Security Plan, designed with the advice of PNUD experts, 
and the work of the security institutions has managed to reduce 
violence and improve coexistence, he has also managed to 
make legitimate institutions present across the whole city and 
these institutions are the ones providing security and justice to 
citizens now..(Acero sf: 17-18) 
In order to make state authorities the ones that provide security 
and justice in all comunas of Medellin what we did was to 
strengthen the metropolitan police so that they can have 
permanent and active presence in all comunas and to create 
interinstitutional spaces of justice closer to citizens that 
implement and promote alternative mechanisms of conflict 
resolution and different programmes to promote citizen 
coexistence....we now have police officers patrolling some 
neighbourhoods that until very recently were patrolled and 
controlled by illegal actors...we (mayor’s office) signed an 
agreement with the police so that the number of junior police 
officers could be increased, now we have 670 more of them who 
live in the same neighbourhoods where they serve, this gives 
you an idea how the state  is now present and providing security 
to all its citizens. (Interview Municipal official at Secretary of 
Government 18/11/2009) 
It is important to highlight that the security strategy within the Medellin Model 
was modified by the end of the 2000s in order to deal with the increased 
levels of violence produced by a new war between criminal factions for the 
control of illegal economies. This moment in the history of the Medellin model 
can be regarded as a critical conjuncture, a moment in which the Medellin 
model was called into question by a new crisis that rendered marginalised 
communities as battlefields full of young casualties. The way the security 
strategy was adjusted to cope with this crisis that affected the areas that had 
been the epicentre of state intervention for 7 years, reveals more clearly the 
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way in which the Model combined biopolitical and sovereign forms of power 
to intervene ‘ungoverned’ areas and populations.  
On the one hand the local authorities supported the increase in police 
numbers and the creation of special units that were meant to restore order by 
capturing those involved in gangs and criminal bands, and on the other, they 
tried to widen the participation of citizens in the security effort and expanded 
programmes for young people involved in the conflict as a means of offering 
incentives to stop fighting and to prevent more youngsters from joining 
gangs. 
An important strategy we have implemented in these areas 
(marginalised communities affected by violence) is the 
‘encounters promoting life’, we have done at least 10 events like 
this. It is an all day event, in the morning a group of around 30 
people from the different dependencies of the municipality walk 
around the community house by house, shop by shop talking to 
people and asking them what are the security problems, what 
can we do about them in their neighbourhood, then at 2 pm we 
put up stands and offer information regarding the 41 
programmes the municipality offers to residents and the 88 
programs we have for young people...it is like bringing the 
municipality, bringing the state to these neighbourhoods...we 
have done this in the most problematic areas, for example in 
borders separating areas controlled by opposing gangs, we go 
there and try to reach out to guys from the gangs, their families, 
mums, aunts and grand mums and convince them they should 
stop fighting...we offer opportunities for them. We don’t get 
involved with the dangerous criminal bands using these kids, 
those whom young guys work for, we (the mayor’s office) leave 
that to the police. (Secretary of Social Development, 
presentation at public event 06/11/09) 
 
Processes of Subjectification: Constructing the ‘Ungoverned’ Subject  
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The rationality of government analysed above creates particular conditions 
for the inclusion of communities and population groups into what is regarded 
as the prosperous and desirable city order. Their integration depends on the 
construction of particular subjectivities regarding the nature and role of the 
state, of these communities and of young people. The subjectivities 
produced by the Medellin model did not necessarily eliminate the roots of 
stigmatisation that these sectors of society are subject to and that perpetuate 
their marginalisation. 
Within the Medellin model the state was discursively constructed as the 
exclusive driver of the deep social and urban environmental transformations 
the city experienced since 2002. Its policies were seen as unidirectional, and 
not as the result of a dialectic process involving communities and civil actors 
who demanded them, promoted them and sometimes resisted them and 
transformed them. The state, portrayed as benefactor whose presence was 
regarded as intrinsically good for historically neglected communities, was 
assumed to become the ordering actor once its permanent presence was 
established in peripheral communities. 
Marginalised communities on the other side were discursively constructed as 
problematic, vulnerable and dangerous (if not untamed) for the urban order 
and the city’s development. State intervention through a wide range of 
mechanisms and tools targeted these communities as ‘ungoverned areas’. 
Once subject to state control and influence, they became useful ‘showcases’ 
to demonstrate to outsiders the state’s capacity to keep order, stability and 
control of the city and to materially protect the urban space and fluxes of 
people and capital.  However when violence resurges in its most visible 
forms (through armed confrontations and homicides), some policymakers 
and other sectors of society tend to assume that these communities or 
particular groups within them are unfixable. They assume communities 
choose to resort to violence as a way of life instead of becoming 
beneficiaries of substantial public investment. This dominant perception of 
ungoverned communities is particularly true for young people living in these 
areas, who continue to be seen as a potential risk to society and as subjects 
that need control, disciplining and persuasion in order to avoid criminality. 
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This is despite the fact that, as the public official’s quote below illustrates, 
there is evidence of the agency and the positive contributions the majority of 
young people make to their communities: 
‘Youth has been a key target of state intervention since the 90s, 
interestingly a lot of youth organisations, community 
organizations, and NGOs have been working on youth issues in 
the city,  making proposals and trying to push the state to create 
a public policy on youth. During the last two administrations we 
have made some progress and developed policies that 
recognise young people as subjects with rights...In my work I 
have discovered so many youth initiatives that promote peace 
and resistance to violence in the city promoted by young people, 
civil society, youth organizations... these are initiatives to escape 
from gangs and violence but they are ignored, invisible to the 
mayor offices, they are not interested so much in them because 
they see in these young people a radical and critical discourse... 
I think we should strengthen them and protect them, but it is 
difficult to get my colleagues in other secretaries to understand 
these initiatives and their importance…it is not lack of interest, 
the problem is the security approach...here security is not 
associated with rights. Although in Medellin there are around 
501663 young people and the number of those involved in gangs 
is no more than 5000, the idea here is that young people are 
dangerous. The majority are not involved in illegal activities...I 
keep quoting these numbers, but the stigmatization is so strong, 
we generalize young people as dangerous all the time...it is very 
hard to convince people in the municipality and the police that 
young people are not a problematic sector of society,  dangerous 
and violent...that is why they keep implementing control policies 
for young people…(Interview Municipal Official at Secretary of 
Youth, 10/07/11) 
A closer look at the diversity of tools, instruments and mechanisms used by 
the local and national tiers of government to contain the high levels of 
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violence produced by the 2008-2010 crisis and to preserve the Model’s 
widely advertised achievements, illustrates the way ‘ungoverned’ areas were 
subjected not only to coercive forms of state power, but also to forms of 
biopower. 
Instruments and Mechanisms to Govern the ‘Ungoverned’ Subjects: 
Permanent presence and constant increases in the number of security 
personnel 
As mentioned before, the wide range of programmes and interventions 
targeting marginalised areas of the city seek to integrate and transform these 
communities in ways that could guarantee the exercise of state sovereignty 
over the urban space. The ultimate purpose of the pacification efforts, of the 
new government model promoted by the local authorities and of the integral 
transformation of marginalised areas was to make the city and these areas in 
particular ‘governable’. As many policymakers recognised, the security 
forces worked as the first and primordial tool in the symbolic and material 
conquest of these untamed and feral areas by the state.  
‘The basic and uncontested principle was that ‘the’ power had to 
be in hands of the legitimately constituted authorities and our first 
tools to recover that type of power was the police; that is why we 
(the municipality) had to have good relations with the Police and 
to demand from them efficiency and a fight against corruption. 
That is why we supported the police forces so much, we gave 
them tools and equipment and funding to help them be more 
efficient, but this is also the reason why we supported the 
community police work, in order to get closer to the local 
communities’ (Interview Security Adviser to Municipality of 
Medellin and Coordinator of City Security Strategy 05/02/10)   
The first step in the process of achieving state control over these areas 
was to make the presence of police officers and soldiers permanent in these 
areas. Their main function was to occupy places that had been historically 
left in the hands of illegal armed forces. The construction of police stations 
and military bases in strategic areas –in the same places that had served as 
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headquarters of illegal groups for example123, as well as the later installation 
of cameras, served as a symbolic demonstration of the state presence and of 
its intention to exercise territorial and other forms of social control.  
The permanent presence of police and military personnel in these 
communities was meant to facilitate the entry of other state institutions to 
these communities. By the end of the decade, when armed violence was 
resurgent, the security personnel placed in these areas and new forces sent 
in response to the crisis were meant to serve as deterrent to violent 
confrontations between gangs and as a mean to weaken criminal groups 
through captures and prosecutions of their members. Through tight controls 
of residents’ movements, they were also meant to contain violence and 
prevent it from spreading to other areas.  
The presence of security forces in these areas meant the increase of daily 
interactions between the state and residents who distrusted these institutions 
and between the state and illegal actors who exercised social and territorial 
control of neighbourhoods. It also led to the use of urban space in ways that 
could facilitate the exercise of state control, even if that occasionally became 
problematic for residents, as the local representative of the Municipality in a 
neighbourhood of Comuna 1 recognised:  
‘When I arrived in the comuna in November 2009 the situation 
was very hard. There were daily confrontations and homicides 
between the 38 gang, the Galera gang in La silla area... I even 
had to deal with the displacement of 17 families that were forced 
to leave by gangs...These areas were like ghost 
neighbourhoods. Although there was a tense calm in December, 
in January the situation deteriorated again so the Mayor came 
with the Fiscalia (Public Prosecutor´s Office), the Police and 
other authorities. We made a security council up there in Santo 
Domingo and the Mayor even worked from there. Our strategy 
was to retake the four areas affected by our institutional offer. 
                                                          
123 As in the case of Comuna 13 where a police station was built in the same house that 
insurgent militias had used as a headquarter.   
194 
 
With a team of people from the Secretary of Social Development, 
secretary of government, of civil order, of citizen culture and 
metrosalud was dispatched to these areas, we did vaccination 
campaigns, provided medical attention, and from the police 
station the Mayor oversaw the situation to reassure people the 
state was here. We had to take social centres that were 
administered by social development dependencies and establish 
police stations there instead. We took those social centres and 
used them to develop investigations, to launch special police 
operations in the area to capture criminals... People who were 
using those social centres resisted when we took them and there 
were even confrontations and many tensions with those whom 
we took the centres from, but for the community what we did was 
something very good....That is why there is a sense of tranquillity 
now, it was not only due to negotiations with the armed 
groups’....(Interview Municipal Social Work Specialist in Comuna 
1, 12/06/ 2010) 
 
Transforming the Ungoverned through Spatial Interventions  
Based on the assumption that physical transformations of the urban space 
can produce deep social, democratic and cultural transformations, the 
municipality used social urbanism for the normalisation and government of 
areas regarded as chaotic and violent. Through modifications in the 
environment, construction of aerial transport systems, the improvement of 
housing conditions and the availability of local services and infrastructure; 
local authorities tried to reduce violence and to establish new relations 
among citizens and between them and the state. The metro-cable transport 
system for example, while connecting residents of these communities with 
the rest of the city, imposed on them certain types of social norms and rules 
of behaviour, it also made them subject to daily forms of surveillance and 
policing, which Brand and Davila found most residents accepted as 
something positive or necessary, even though they also provoked a 
discomfort, inconformity and resistance (Brand and Davila 2011) .  
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As the quotes below illustrate urban spatial transformations were often 
directed to the transformation of residents’ perception of their quality of life 
and of their level of inclusion ‘in the city’, but not necessarily accompanied by 
structural changes that could also mean a beneficial economic and social 
integration of marginalised communities in the city’s development.  
...The previous administration from which this administration is a 
continuity, made a huge emphasis on social urbanism, that is 
directing resources and articulating the work of all dependencies 
and secretaries of the mayor’s office to impact particular 
territories with substantial transformations... we have empirical 
proof of that when the urban space is transformed, also people 
are transformed, their conducts, behaviours and the way they 
relate to each other changes...if you transform the surroundings 
and the public space with high social impact infrastructure 
projects(obras) you generate more public space, more citizen 
encounters and more democracy...that experiment proved that 
there is an absolutely  evident relationship that can be tested 
empirically , that if you improve the environment, the space ..this 
by the way is not the same as the ‘broken windows’ approach, 
we are talking about interventions with social oriented 
infrastructure in the territory and public spaces but agreed with 
the residents (Interview, Municipal official  at Secretary of 
Government 20/07/2010) 
‘We were a honest political party without commitments, that is 
why we could invest the money where it was most needed, not 
where commitments were established before being elected...in 
addition to a transparent use of public resources, we started to 
transform the city with the PUIs, the integral urban projects, 
these were projects for physical and social upgrading of all kind 
done with communities, these improved participation and quality 
of life, for example the Juan Bobo stream, an extremely poor 
area where houses were on the stream and people did not have 
sewage. We got the money and created an urban boulevard with 
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apartment buildings for those people, that dignifies anybody’s 
life...it was like 250 thousand million pesos more or less put in an 
area with the lowest quality of life index, an area that was the 
birth place of the militias... an abandoned area ...what we did 
was to go there to met and connect those people..there was 
metrocable already so we connected the metrocable above with 
the poverty under, development could not pass over there 
without touching those people...with upgrading, libraries, 
boulevards, parks, synthetic football pitches, all that creates a 
pole of development for the city, but it also transforms the life of 
very poor people...that transforms the perception of quality of life 
of those people...the social and integral content is what 
transforms people...it is not that the municipality goes and builds 
whatever it wants there, it is through workshops with residents 
that we make people feel they own those new communities... 
(Interview Municipal official at Secretary of Government 
18/11/2009) 
The transformation of public space and the enhancement of public buildings 
in these areas also served as a mechanism to symbolically and materially 
position the state as an institutional and social referent for intervened 
communities. Many policymakers spoke of the importance of constructing 
impressive buildings in these neglected areas in the process of changing the 
perception citizens had of state presence and power in these communities: 
´´We pledged to change the skin of the city. Where there was 
once violence, fear, criminals, today we have the most beautiful 
buildings, buildings of the best quality so that we can all gather 
around science, culture and education...Given the dimension, 
relevance and number of physical works we have done since 
2004...it is important to mention the meaning, the transforming 
power that public buildings have for us; physically, public 
buildings have been the image of a precarious state...the existing 
buildings projected an image of a deteriorated and illegitimate 
state with insufficient  presence, due in part to the fact that 
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constructions were obsolete and inadequate. These lacked 
minimal spaces and were uninviting...At least in Medellin, this 
was the case of a great deal of public buildings destined...to 
education and culture in the poorest neighbourhoods. We 
conceived public building as fundamental referents of a 
transparent government which treats everybody with dignity and 
in equal conditions and without restrictions´´ (Interview Municipal 
Official at Secretary of Social Development 25/11/09) 
 
Involving Citizens in the Governing Process  
The governing process of historically neglected areas contained mechanisms 
through which citizens could help the state consolidate its influence and 
improve its capacity to deliver services. The promotion of citizen participation 
was a key and differentiating aspect of the Medellin model. The Fajardo 
administration not only designed its development plan for the city with the 
participation of residents and civil society, but it also facilitated the 
involvement of  citizens in the implementation of certain urban projects and 
on the allocation of public resources for community development through 
participatory  budgeting. Citizen’s involvement in public affairs became part 
of the model’s distinctive feature, but more importantly, it became a key 
instrument in the process of improving state legitimacy and promoting good 
governance, as the quote below illustrate: 
Citizens’ participation, as a strategy and  as a public policy, is part of 
Medellin’s brand (sello) today...the transformation that people live in 
Medellin today and that is recognised by those who visit the city, is 
also a transformation in the way of governing and in the strategies and 
the approaches that boost the community’s participation. With the 
improvements in the mechanisms of participation, we aim at greater 
institutional legitimacy, so that the participation is real and not only in 
paper, so that participation is not only substantial in quantity but in 
quality… All secretaries and decentralised institutions have 
mechanisms for the effective participation of citizens. In 84% of the 
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municipality’s offices a great deal of the normal work is done under 
the influence of citizen participation. Today we assume participation 
as a political task for the transformation of traditional leaderships and 
for the creation of new leaderships...  (Secretary of Social 
Development, presentation at public event 12/11/09) 
The use of citizen participation in the process of making the city governable, 
demonstrates that within the Medellin model, the subjects of the governing 
project were expected to play a key role. The process of pacification, 
normalization and integration of marginalised areas did not rely solely on the 
use of coercive sovereign power, but on other forms of power and processes 
that aimed at making citizens accept state power and collaborate in its 
consolidation. Citizens were expected to help the state-building effort not 
only through self-regulation and the transformation of their culture and daily 
practices, but through their active participation in institutional spaces made 
available by the local state, such as communal workshops, councils, 
participatory budgeting exercises. 
The local state facilitated different formats and scenarios for people’s 
participation, which a great deal of community and civil society actors were 
keen on using to advance their vision of community development. However, 
citizens’ participation appears in the official discourse as something the state 
concedes to citizens, and as a means to help the state pacify and govern 
these areas, rather than as a right. By making invisible the multiple forms of 
agency and participation communities have accumulated and the way they 
have contributed to shape planning processes in the city, the official 
discourse assumes the participation of communities only exists in the format 
the state establishes. This type of state fostered participation is not oriented 
to exercising oversight of state institutions, to holding bureaucrats and 
officers accountable, or to influencing the strategic future of the city. Citizen 
participation is assumed to work as an instrument to increase the legitimacy 
of the governing process of marginalised communities; and this is evident in 
the policymakers’ insistence of ‘co-responsibility’ as a principle for the 
management of urban affairs.  
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...one of our bets for this social urbanism is that the planning 
needed to be done with people so we did imaginative workshops 
to see how people imagined their surroundings based on what 
they wished for, this inputs helped in the designing of the 
infrastructure we did...so people said  it would be nice to have a 
park here and a school there, or a library...so community’s 
participation is key for social urbanism.... now, a few months ago 
the local government presented a security strategy that aims at 
responding to the current crisis and to reducing the high levels of 
violence we saw last year ...we had to revise the development 
plan for the city that we had because it was done assuming that 
things would continue in the same way but the narcotraffic and 
the violent fights within the criminal world for the control of 
criminal economies... forced us to revise that. The new security 
strategy now has three components: first, social mobilization 
which demands citizens participation, second, creating 
opportunities and third, improving the capacity of security 
institutions like police and justice... (Interview Municipal official at 
Secretary of Government 18/11/2009)   
Citizen participation was not circumscribed to social urbanism and 
community development projects; it also became key to improving security 
provision. Throughout the 2000s decade, both national and local tiers of 
government promoted the active involvement of citizens in the security effort 
and the fight against criminal actors. People were called to ‘participate’ in the 
security effort by informing against other residents involved in gang related 
activities and providing intelligence to the authorities. This type of 
participation which became a test of citizen’s loyalty to the state was meant 
to regain state control and influence in these areas and to facilitate the 
pacification of comunas.  
Regarding the difficult security situation in the city, we are trying 
to encourage people’s participation, this responds to what the 
development plan established. We preach that  security is a 
matter ruled by co-responsibility: this means security forces, the 
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local state, citizens, we are all responsible for preserving and 
maintaining the security levels we had, without security it is 
impossible to exercise rights and freedoms, so with the security 
strategy there are two ways in which we materialise citizens 
participation...in problematic communities we have implemented 
control measures and called people directly to contribute with 
information that help authorities prosecute criminals...what we 
demand from citizens in safe communities  is to organise 
themselves to improve security through  ‘security fronts’124 for 
example...the municipality and the police support them with 
cameras and technological tools, permanent assistance and by 
allocating community police officers to those areas. Also by   
creating training programmes on community security, there is a 
lot of dialogue between authorities and communities in these 
areas...the idea is to protect safe areas that do not require armed 
force police... that type of armed force is allocated to more 
complex and difficult areas (Interview Secretary of Government, 
Medellin 4/11/2009) 
We have different programs that allow the participation of 
citizens in this effort, such as the ‘citizen security schools’, these 
are spaces of interaction with the community in which we teach 
them norms so that communities and the decent citizens 
respond to their duty and to the principle of corresponsability and 
inform the police when there are security problems. We also 
have ‘local security fronts’ that help us work with citizens to 
respond to insecurity problems, through this programme people 
receive alarms and technological tools. We have a programme 
called ‘DARE’ to educate young people in schools and reduce 
the consumption of drugs in schools, because the problem in 
Medellin is the illegal drugs. We have the ‘civic juvenile police’, a 
                                                          
124 These are organisations at community level created with the leadership of the Police. It 
brings citizens together with police officers and together they develop strategies to improve 
security in a neighbourhood or a community.  
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programme that helps us educate young people and children in 
principles and values. We also organise workshops for parents 
of children who attend these programmes. At the moment there 
are like 2,778 young people in this programme...We also have 
98,765 citizens as members of an informants network. Through 
this network we pay economic rewards to good citizens who help 
the authorities in the fight against crime ...these are all important 
programmes for the participation of citizens (Interview 
Commander of the Metropolitan Police, Medellin 12/11/2009) 
The institutional spaces created and regulated by the state for citizen 
participation in the security sphere, envisaged a particular form of 
participation that was not meant to allow citizens to hold the state 
accountable for the type of interventions implemented in their communities. 
They stripped it from its more democratic nature, making it at the same time 
a duty and a concession from the state, rather than a citizen or community 
right which has long been demanded by these sectors of society. 
Incentives and Negotiations to Pacify ungoverned areas 
Considered a neglected and potentially dangerous population group, youth 
from marginalised areas were subject to particular tools in the process of 
governing ‘ungoverned’ spaces. In addition to the increased daily controls 
through curfews and stop and search police techniques, for example, the 
local state designed special programmes for them. These were meant to 
offer those involved in armed groups and in risk of joining gangs, incentives 
and opportunities to reintegrate to communities and to engage in legal 
activities. However in the context of competition with illegal armed actors for 
influence in these marginalised areas and efforts to make the state capable 
of controlling violence erupting from these areas, both the generous DDR 
programme and preventive programmes targeting youth implemented by the 
local government were seen by officials as tools to pacify the city in times of 
crisis and to reduce the growing power of armed actors, especially after the 
2008 crisis, as the official description of the programme illustrates: 
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In the context of the demobilisation of the AUC since the late 
2003 -and as a result of national politics-, the Fajardo 
administration needed to urgently formulate from scratch 
municipal polices that would be coherent...The administration 
instead of crossing its arms perceived the challenge of 
reintegration (of these combatants) as an opportunity for 
Medellin to end the presence of paramilitary groups that in the 
same way that guerrilla militias had attacked life and rights of 
inhabitants of wide areas of the city for a long time. The Mayor’s 
office created then the municipal programme Peace and 
Reconciliation, as an institutional space to take 4,163 men and 
women out of violence and conflict. Departing from the 
conviction that the city had to be responsible for its young 
people, there was still need to establish a preventive work, this 
consolidated from 2007 with the Alonso Salazar administration 
through a programme to meet the needs of youth at risk (Alcaldia 
de Medellin 2009:18) 
These programmes were often seen by policymakers, bureaucrats and 
police officers as a tool to reduce the number of fighters available to criminal 
organisations, rather than as means to address the complex problems 
affecting young people’s lives in marginalised areas. The value of these 
programmes was often assessed from the perspective of the state war 
against powerful criminal organisations and the need to reduce homicides 
rates, not from their capacity to address structural unemployment, poverty, 
discrimination, etc. In their view, the subsidies and opportunities to obtain 
support and training form the state offered to young people served to reduce 
confrontations and to ‘steal’ people from the gangs’ ranks: 
To those young people (members of gangs) we are offering 
direct and immediate opportunities to them, we offer them 
education, training, employment and opportunities without 
requesting their disarmament. Look, last Saturday we managed 
to get 4 gangs in ‘Las Independencies, Los Conquistadores, and 
El Salado in Comuna 13 to sign a ‘non aggression pact’. We 
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invited 65 guys and 41 of them signed the pact. The idea is that 
this pact leads later to their demobilization ....many of those guys 
are in those groups because they are being paid to work. They 
take care of drug selling points, they are given a weapon and 1 
million and a half or 2 million pesos a month, instead we are 
offering them much more, we offer them much more support... I 
think Medellin is the only city in Colombia where the reintegration 
process is working. From 5 thousand people who demobilised, 
more or less 10% of them are dead, 10% are in jails, but many 
more are studying or trying to find a job...it is very hard to 
compete with an illegal business that produces 10 thousand 
million pesos a month, that is the criminal organisations profit in 
Medellin, but we are confident of this opportunity and we are 
offering young people opportunities...To those who criticise the 
Municipality for investing all this money in this programme 
targeting guys involved in the conflict, I tell them that we prefer 
those guys signing pacts. We are giving them support so that 
they stop shooting at each other in the streets. It is because of 
these pacts that homicides stop in Medellin... (Secretary of 
Social Development, presentation at public event 06/11/09) 
 
Although these types of programmes were tailored to a particular group of 
young people in these communities, to those involved in illegal activities125, 
they were often spoken of as the key programmes available to young people 
in marginalised areas, under the assumption that the only reason why young 
people in these areas joined armed groups was that they had nothing else to 
do. This denotes a common over simplification of the dynamics and forces 
facilitating the growth of recruitment in these areas. 
‘As a result of our (police) efforts and programmes, we managed 
to convince 7 gangs from the Manrique area to give up their 
                                                          
125 As it was mentioned before, membership to an armed group or proof that one is member 
to a gang was one of the requirements to be eligible to these programmes. 
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arms (knives) voluntarily in exchange for some training 
opportunities, this year more than 20,000 arms were handed 
over voluntarily ... we understand the situation is very hard: there 
are like 250 gangs in Medellin, that is the equivalent of 4,500 
youngsters working for 6 or 7 bigger criminal bands in Colombia 
and ready to die...we know that if young people have nothing to 
do they will go to those groups that is why Coronel Rojas has 
tried to find opportunities for those young people and help them 
to join the ‘promoters of life initiative’ that allows them to make 
their military service at the police and to get some training at the 
SENA...once they hand in their weapons, they can access the 
opportunities...one day there were 23 women in the queue ready 
to hand in arms, we sent some of them to the Fuerza Joven 
programme, others were given a place in the SENA in other 
regions, this shows you women are playing a bigger role in the 
violence, even as mums they legitimise the illegality of their 
sons....’ (Commander Community Police Presentation at 
International Symposium on Coexistence, Medellin. 24/11/ 2010) 
 
In addition to these programmes and in the context of resurgent violence, 
local authorities relied on fostering pacts among gangs and offering their 
members incentives as a mean to discourage them from fighting. These 
pacts which included benefits and entry to state programs to gang members, 
aimed at stopping the confrontations, but were very fragile and offered no 
medium or long term benefits for communities. These pacts that were seen 
as a means to bring peace to communities meant that state actors, including 
police officers, were authorised to dialogue, negotiate, persuade and make 
agreements with members of illegal groups in these communities. As the 
community police officer in charge of fostering one of these pacts between 
gangs in La Sierra, one of the communities most affected by the gang wars 
of the late 2000s describes, these pacts meant tacit recognition of the 
important role played by gang leaders in these communities. 
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...talking to the leaders of the bands is not very nice...to be able 
to meet them you have to bring clear and very precise ideas that 
can convince them...I had the support of my commanders and of 
the mayor’s office...The gang leader is someone’s brother, 
someone’s son, so when you talk to them you have to bring clear 
ideas and recognise the communities problems...the municipality 
has the Fuerza Joven program and the Peace and Reconciliation 
programme (DDR programme) for paramilitary and guerrilla ex-
combatants...those youngsters had been beneficiaries of those 
programs...but because they continue their way of life they 
stopped attending and were retired from the programme...in any 
case, there are those programmes for youngsters who...are 
waiting in the corners for something to do, so that they can bring 
food to their houses, so my proposal was to open this program to 
them... I sat with Yair the leader of La Sierra...he has more or 
less 60 youngsters and with Antonio from Villa Turbay he has 20 
or 30 people...you cannot just small talk them so what I did...I 
explained to them the community police programme...and the 
community problems and why people needed the police ... I was 
telling them that they should let us work in the community...that 
we bring things that benefit residents..Yair also told me his and 
his guys’ problems and how they felt, so I suggested Fuerza 
Joven programme to him. I explained that it was a big problem 
that homicides were so high again after the big drop... it was 
hard to convince them that it was a good idea to talk about 
security...but they have this idea that they are leaders and that 
they take care of the community, and they are, they do, but in a 
bad way, violating others’ rights, displacing people for 
example...so I told them if you are leader, then work as a 
leader...I think the key point was that I recognised his potential 
and that people in the community believe in him...I started taking 
them to community meetings... they control the community 
boards behind the scenes so people were very scared in the 
beginning, but my presence there helped... when I started 
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meeting with them I had to organise some meetings to explain to 
residents that I was not meeting with them to arrange extortions, 
but to  help the community but people still talk...(Interview 
Community Police Officer based in Comuna 8, 19/11/09) 
The incentives and opportunities offered to those involved in illegal activities 
through the DDR process, preventive initiatives targeting youth at risk and 
through pacts between gangs, clearly exceeded those available to other 
young people who did not get involved in criminal activities and even those 
available to young people who organised peaceful initiatives in these 
communities in the attempt to prevent children and young people from joining 
gangs. The fact that these programmes where under the responsibility of the 
Secretary of Government126, instead of the Secretary of Youth127 reveals that 
these programmes were seen as tools in the pacification of communities. 
They were meant to improve security conditions by taming the most 
dangerous and powerful community actors, not to address the problems 
affecting the development of youth. The tensions created by the differences 
in the budget available for these type of programmes and those for the wider 
youth population is registered in the account of an official working at the 
Secretary of Youth: 
...During the last two administrations (Sergio and Alonso’s) some 
opportunities opened, so many of the youth groups creating 
peace initiatives managed to access some resources through the 
participatory budgeting programme. My secretariat and 
metrojuventud128 had to work a lot to support them and offer 
these young people training so that they could participate in the 
PB programme. It was hard because the traditional leaders often 
                                                          
126 This is the municipal agency in charge of advancing policies regarding citizen security, 
coexistence and culture. It is also in charge of supporting the judicial system and promoting 
the credibility of local institutions and the security forces. 
127 This Secretariat is in charge of ‘contributing to the integral human development of youth’. 
128 This is a specialised office at the Secretary of Citizen Culture in charge of integrating the 
offer and programmes offered by the Municipality to youth. It promotes the implementation of 
programmes to improve the life conditions of young people in the city. 
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ignored them and undermined them …so we trained them so 
that they could present their initiatives and youth projects… we 
saw an increasing number of youth initiatives accessing public 
funding, this gives you an idea of the potential there..However it 
is hard and problematic when you compare the budget we 
(secretary of youth) have for these kind of programmes, with the 
amount of resources invested in the Fuerza Joven programme 
(for members of youth gangs and managed by the secretary of 
government) ...if you compare the amount of money invested in 
members of gangs and the investment in say, programmes for 
displaced victims and the rest of programmes we have available 
to young people who are not involved in crime (like youth clubs 
and Participatory Budgeting for Youth), an impressive 
percentage of the public budget is spent in Fuerza Joven. This 
created a big tension in the city because we ended up offering 
subsidies, education and incredible opportunities to the ‘bad 
guys’  and not much to those who have nothing to do with 
illegality...we have tried to address this, especially because of 
social pressure...we are designing a programme now to offer 
scholarships and subsidies to other young people.. (Interview 
Municipal Official at Secretary of Youth, 10/07/11) 
 ‘Expert Knowledge’ Production and the Governing Process  
Governing process and practices are justified and reproduced through the 
production of particular fields of intervention (Foucault 1980, 2007; Dean 
2010) and ‘expert’ knowledge.  In the case of Medellin, urban space and 
citizen culture, especially those values and practices associated with 
illegality, became key fields of governmental action to which multiple tools 
and mechanisms were directed in the process of governing marginalised 
communities.  
The kind of governmental practices and tools that targeted these 
communities since 2002 were not originally conceived and delivered as a 
coherent model of urban transformation, but as a combination of 
programmes, initiatives and interventions implemented by different 
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government agencies and tiers of government in the process of making 
marginalised communities governable and controllable by the state. The 
notion of the existence of a ‘Medellin model’ emerged later on, by the end of 
the decade, accompanied by the consolidation of supposedly innovative 
concepts.  
Knowledge produced around the urban transformation of Medellin has been 
adding notions to the urban planning jargon used in the region and beyond, 
such as the ‘social urbanism’ concept129. This knowledge has also 
contributed to the more recent marketization of different interventions in 
ungoverned areas as a ‘model’. Certain academic circles and institutions, as 
well as international cooperation agencies have played a crucial role in the 
production of ‘expert’ knowledge regarding social urbanism, regarding the 
impact of urban physical interventions on violence levels, and regarding the 
effectiveness of violence prevention initiatives and programs. In the process 
they have helped to make Medellin a hub for learning for policymakers 
across the region.  
Local and international academics of different disciplines, security experts 
and public officials have helped to disseminate the achievements of some 
interventions as promising tools for other cities. The publication of articles, 
systematizations of successful interventions and programmes implemented 
in the city since 2004, trips of municipal officials to other cities in the region to 
share their knowledge and experience in the implementation of programmes 
in marginalised areas, visits to Medellin by public officials from other cities 
with the aim of learning from the Medellin Model and numerous academic 
and expert events (including the creation of a summer school programme to 
study the urban and social transformation of Medellin’130 and workshops131), 
                                                          
129 Social urbanism appeared a posteriori, as a tag that referred to the urban interventions in 
neglected areas of the city and interventions that meant to address urban problems by 
producing quality public space with citizen participation (Quinchía, 2011) 
130 The summer school is provided by the ‘Centro de Estudios Urbanos y Ambientales’ 
Urbam – EAFIT and is entitled: ‘Social urbanism in Medellin: urban and environmental 
processes. It aims at sharing the kind of transformation Medellin experienced in recent years 
http://www.eafit.edu.co/escueladeverano/cursos/Paginas/urbanismo-social-en-medellin.aspx 
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have all played a role in legitimising and reproducing governing efforts on 
marginalised communities that are still regarded as vulnerable, outside state 
influence and  at risk of violence.  
The Colombian Ministry of Education’s account of one of the international 
events organised in Medellin by the municipality and a higher education 
institution to discuss Social urbanism with architects and policymakers from 
Argentina, México, Ecuador, Brasil y Colombia, is telling of this process 132: 
‘After the event the implicit message is that Medellin has become 
an example of social intervention and political will in the 
transformation of marginalised or fragmented communities. A 
reality that, according to the former dean of the Universidad 
Catolica de Quito, is transversal to all Latin-American cities...for 
the participants to the debate, this model of urbanism has 
resignified the way architecture was being thought of in Latin 
America, where until recently, cities highlighted structural icons, 
such as emblematic private buildings, highways and stadiums, 
which represented a high cost, but were delinked from the 
inhabitants’ needs and in some cases from the city...Medellin is 
an example of the symbolic resignification of the high 
neighbourhoods and of transformations in the urban space which 
dignify people’s living conditions. After this event it is very likely 
that favelas and marginalised neighbourhoods in the southern 
cone countries adopt some of the intervention and management 
models that, since the administration of Sergio Fajardo 
Valderrama, gained strength in the city (EAFIT/Ministerio de 
Educacion 2010) 
                                                                                                                                                                    
131 Such as the one organised by the development planning unit at UCL in association with 
Colombian universities http://www.bartlett.ucl.ac.uk/dpu/programmes/summerlab/2014-
series/medellin 
132 The event was organised by the Municipal owned Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano (EDU) 
and the ‘Centro de Estudios Urbanos y Ambientales’ at EAFIT University. 
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This expert knowledge that presents the processes taking place in 
marginalised communities as special and replicable has also reinforced 
particular criteria for defining the success of state interventions in these 
areas. As Foucault argues, knowledge is key to governing processes 
because it justifies certain governmental practices and establishes particular 
measures of success (Foucault 1980). At the same time that improvements 
in some indicators of quality of life became the official evidence that the 
Medellin model was improving people’s lives133, in terms of security, 
reductions in homicides rates, especially the one occurred between 2003 
and 2007, became the evidence, according to officials, that the state had 
succeeded in exerting control of ungoverned areas; this disregarding the fact 
that none of the more that 300 gangs in the city working for sophisticated 
criminal organizations disappeared as a consequence of state action. 
In Medellin, within the public and academic discourse the number of 
homicides in particular, as well as what the authorities call ‘high impact’ 
crimes, became the key measure of success for state interventions. An 
example of the way academic circles  helped consolidate this quantitative 
indicator, as a dominant tool for arguing the success of certain state 
interventions, is the highly publicised publication of an academic article in the 
American Journal of Epidemiology which argued, based on quantitative 
evidence, that changes in the physical infrastructure in neighbourhoods (in 
particular the construction of a public transit system in 2004 connecting low 
income neighbourhoods to the city’s centre, and improvements in 
infrastructure) had produced a decline on the homicide rate of 66% in 
intervened neighbourhoods (Cerda et al. 2012). 
This type of academic study exclusively based on quantitative indicators, did 
not take into account other forms of violence affecting residents (such as 
disappearances, intra-urban displacement, sexual violence, extortions, etc.), 
nor did it consider relevant the role of other variables, such as the hegemony 
exerted by armed actors on reductions in homicides and armed 
                                                          
133 Sergio Fajardo’s development plan established as measurement of success the Quality 
of Life Index.  
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confrontations at community level. However it reinforced the notion of 
homicides rates as a reliable measurement of policy implementation. Based 
on this indicator of lethal violence, municipal authorities have claimed the 
success of state interventions and the solution of community problems, 
although residents continue to endure chronic levels of insecurity, as it will be 
illustrated in the next chapter.  
What becomes evident is a reliance on expert knowledge that allows 
authorities to defend the implementation of controversial programmes and 
resist or discredit criticisms from civil society and community organisations. 
Previous to the 2008 crisis for example, when community residents and civil 
society organisations criticised the implementation of the DDR programme 
claiming that communities were still subject to the violent control exercised 
by beneficiaries of the state programme, officials discredited these accounts 
by arguing among others, that homicides were still low. It was only in 2009 
when violence spiralled producing exponential increments in the number of 
homicides that the municipality decided to revise their security strategy.  
In the case of Medellin governing process, expert knowledge was also 
influential in the way public officials directed their efforts to building state 
institutions as a way to deal with complex security problems in marginalised 
communities. Security experts have been reiterative of the need to improve 
state institutions´ performance as a way to deal with increasingly 
sophisticated criminal networks. As the quote below suggests, institutional 
development is considered the best way to improve citizen security and to 
handle recurrent violent crises in the city: 
Until now municipal administrations in Colombia have various 
institutions intervening and dealing with security and coexistence 
issues. This produces in some cases disconnection and lack of 
coordination among those different institutions; this also affects 
the required integral administration of citizen security....it is 
important that municipal governments build an administration 
system to deal with coexistence  and citizen security, in which the 
mayor, as highest authority in the municipality...coordinates the 
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security, justice and coexistence institutions. These in turn will 
have to answer to citizens for their respective constitutional and 
legal responsibilities. The administrative structure suggested for 
this purpose includes the creation of four directions: 1) one 
dealing with security, 2) one dealing with justice and human rights, 
3) one dealing with coexistence and citizen culture and 4) another 
dealing with administrative issues. Additionally, there should be a 
security fund…and an observatory of violence... (Acero quoted in 
MCV 2012:4) 
Expert and policy debates around urban security in the city tend to be 
focused on local institutional development and on improving crime statistics 
and measure mechanisms of security levels. This has encouraged local 
public efforts to develop better security data systems as a mean to improve 
security provision and decision making, but it has also eclipsed discussions 
around structural factors fuelling urban insecurity which remain unaddressed.   
Local knowledge produced around the Medellin Model and the way it 
improved urban security in particular, also determines the criteria used to 
evaluate the results of public security initiatives in the city. Recognising the 
role knowledge production plays in the articulation and legitimization of 
particular forms of exercising power, brings our attention to the question of 
who participates in the definition of these criteria and who does not. In the 
case of Medellin, expert analyses on security do not tend to take into account 
the voices and experiences of residents of the most affected areas where 
violence and insecurity are chronic. In this thesis I intend to unpack the 
rationality of security provision in Medellin, but also to recognise and 
understand such experiences. I argue that people’s notions and daily 
experiences of the kind of governing processes they have been subject to 
throughout the 2000s, can help us build a more complete picture of the 
consequences and contradictions inherent to the process of making this city 
of the global South safer by means of constructing marginalised areas as 
‘ungoverned’. 
Conclusion 
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This chapter offered an alternative perspective on the ‘Medellin Model’. 
Using the Foucauldian notion of governmentality and critical discourse 
analysis, I revealed that the security strategy in Medellin was guided by the 
idea that security could only be improved as long as the state succeeded in 
governing ‘ungoverned’ urban areas. The analysis of the calculations, 
assumptions and justifications that guided policy-makers and state 
representatives involved in the implementation of state initiatives showed 
security not only as a process for dealing with violence, insecurity factors and 
criminal actors, but also as a more complex process for governing certain 
populations.  
The chapter illustrated how security responses profoundly affected state-
society relations and shaped the subjectivities of particular population groups 
in the process of dealing with violence. The security provision process that 
took place in Medellin from 2002 to 2012 is revealed as a process through 
which people’s identities were constructed and re-constructed based on 
assumed attributes of both the state and marginalised urban communities. 
By classifying certain groups as ‘ungoverned’, for example, special 
instruments and mechanisms to transform, control and normalise them were 
justified. The security provision resulting from this differentiated interaction 
with urban communities with higher levels of vulnerability was key not only in 
reducing certain indicators of violence but also in facilitating the 
internationalisation of the city and the attraction of capital. 
This section presented a more nuanced understanding of the complex 
factors that had influenced the design and implementation of security policies 
in Medellin. The origin of the mixed security strategy rested not in the single 
political will and visionary leadership of local municipal officials, as it is often 
portrayed in other analyses, but in the complex interconnection of local and 
national processes. In much the same vein, the chapter demonstrated how 
neoliberal urban processes, national-level dynamics and institutional change, 
and community-level agency shaped the ‘Medellin Model’. In the next 
chapter, I advance the analysis further, focusing on the experiences of those 
who were targeted by governing processes unleashed by the type of security 
provision that took shape in Medellin throughout the 2000s. This reveals 
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some of the contradictions and unexpected consequences of the ‘Medellin 
Model’. 
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Chapter 6 
Security Provision and Governing Processes on the Ground: 
An ethnographic informed account of state-society relations in 
‘Ungoverned Communities’ 
 
Last month the minister of defence came here with the governor 
of Rio...they were calling the intervention here (comuna 13) a 
success and I could not believe it...one thinks f...I felt so much 
impotence because we live here and we have to endure very 
heavy things daily you know: murders, violence...seeing the 
security forces lending their rifles to the combos (gangs)... it is 
like they (state authorities) are selling the city...(Interview Young 
male resident Comuna 13, 11/06/2012)  
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I use a set of methods informed by ethnographic 
methodologies to investigate the governmental consequences of the security 
strategy used in Medellin, from the perspective of residents of marginalised 
urban communities. This chapter reveals the contradictions and unexpected 
consequences of the ‘Medellin Model’. Based on the way state security 
initiatives were experienced, witnessed and talked about by residents of the 
‘ungoverned spaces’, I argue that the Medellin Model allowed the state to 
exercise its permanent presence and some forms of power, but it did not 
address chronic problems of insecurity affecting residents of these areas. 
Not only were people living in fear of armed violence, but also armed actors 
had augmented their capacity to exert control of communities. The chapter 
also reveals the way in which some techniques used to address violence and 
insecurity reproduced stigmatizing state practices and created opportunities 
for armed actors to increase their influence and power. The chapter starts 
with an analysis of residents’ daily experiences of insecurity and violence 
despite state presence. It then discusses people’s interactions with state 
agents, especially with police officers, as well as residents’ experiences of 
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state initiatives and programmes used to govern urban violence. The chapter 
concludes with evidence of the agency of residents of these areas, who were 
constructed as passive subjects of state power by the state, but who also 
found ways to resist such subjectification process. 
Using Ethnographic methods to Investigate Security Provision in 
Medellin 
As the previous chapter illustrates, the last decade saw the emergence of a 
particular rationality of government for dealing with the urban crisis Medellin 
experienced at the beginning of the XXI century. This rationality sought the 
integration of areas that were regarded as outside state dominance into ‘the 
city’ through a wide range of power mechanisms. The exercise of power over 
historically neglected communities meant a subjectification process that 
constructed them as ‘ungoverned areas and populations’ needing special 
forms of state intervention and security provision. This chapter reveals how 
the exercise of power materialised on the ground and shaped state-society 
relations.  
Using participant observation and semi structured interviews and focus 
groups with residents of Comuna 1 and other marginalised urban 
communities, I illustrate the contradictions underlying the governing process 
that entrenched in the city since the early 2000s. The field observations 
focused on capturing community level dynamics, relations and experiences 
concerning the provision of security and services and the implementation of 
a wide range of state programs in marginalised communities. The evidence 
was mainly gathered in Comuna 1134, an area in the north-eastern side hills 
of the city which encompasses 12 neighbourhoods135 and is home to 
approximately 154853 people. Most of this urban community’s population is 
young (73.4% of the population is younger than 39) and the great majority of 
                                                          
134 Although data collection activities (such as interviews, focus groups and field visits) were 
also carried out in other urban communities with similar characteristics (Comuna 6- Doce de 
Octubre, Comuna 8-Villa Hermosa and Comuna 13-San Javier) 
135 Santo Domingo Savio Nº 1, Santo Domingo Savio Nº 2, El Popular, Granizal, Moscú Nº 
2, Villa de Guadalupe, San Pablo, El Compromiso, Aldea Pablo VI, La Avanzada, La 
Esperanza Nº 2, Carpinelo 
217 
 
its residents live in low (75.4 %) and very low (24.6%) socioeconomic 
conditions136.  
Much like the other marginalised areas of the city, this comuna became a 
main hub for migrants escaping violence, poverty and hardships in 
Colombian rural areas since the 1960s. The history of its neighbourhoods 
and its residents’ lives have been particularly shaped and impacted by the 
cycles of violence the city has experienced since the late 1980s. Not only 
was this comuna famous for having been home of many of Pablo Escobar’s 
young hit men during the consolidation of his criminal empire, but  it has also 
been a strategic stronghold for all the illegal armed actors that have emerged 
and mutated during this city’s recent history (among them self defence 
groups, militias, street gangs, paramilitary groups and criminal networks 
linked to drug trafficking and other illegal economies).  
Due to its turbulent history, the low quality of life in this area and its strategic 
location, Comuna 1 was also a key epicentre of state intervention in the 
2000s. Some of the most renowned interventions done by the state in the 
process of pacifying and transforming the city were either implemented in 
this comuna or targeted their residents. Some examples are:  the 
construction of aerial cable-cars system (metrocable) connecting 
neighbourhoods to the rest of the city as well as an emblematic library park 
(parque biblioteca España), the implementation of urban upgrading 
programmes137, the increase in number of state security forces and 
construction of police stations and also the implementation of participatory 
planning exercises,  the demobilisation process and programs focused on 
children and youth, etc.  
As analysed in the previous chapter, according to the official discourse these 
type of interventions in marginalised areas intended to curtail very high levels 
of violence and put an end to the presence of illegal armed groups that 
challenged the state, its monopoly of violence and its capacity to effectively 
                                                          
136 According to the Colombian socio economic system of classification of residences:  
Estratos 1 and 2 
137 Including the ‘Granizal Sport Complex’built in this area. 
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govern the city.  Through impressive infrastructure, increased social 
investment and strengthening of state institutions and permanent state 
presence, local authorities sought the physical renovation of what 
policymakers saw as particularly vulnerable and unruly urban areas, as well 
as the social and cultural transformation of their residents. This was seen as 
necessary for their effective integration into the successful and legal ‘city’, 
and for making Medellin a ‘governable’ and competitive city.  
By the end of the first decade of this century, when the field work for this 
research was undertaken (2009-2012) policymakers spoke of communities 
like comuna 1 as areas that had stopped being ‘no-go zones’ for the state 
and as epicentres of promising public policies and security and coexistence 
models that could and were being replicated in other cities. While this was 
somehow true, the ethnographic work undertaken uncovered that despite the 
consolidation of state presence in these neighbourhoods, daily experiences 
of chronic insecurity and violence were common occurrences for residents.  
State intervention in Comuna 1’s neighbourhoods had diversified the type of 
relations between residents and state institutions but also between them and 
illegal armed actors and between the armed actors and the state in ways that 
not necessarily meant a sustainable improvement in levels of community and 
personal safety. In the next sections I illustrate the security context in the 
neighbourhoods of this particular comuna, and then the nature of the multiple 
interactions taking place between residents and state agents, especially 
security forces which became the most visible and foremost face of state 
power in these areas. I also identify the unexpected consequences of some 
of the tools and mechanisms of power that intended to transform socially and 
culturally the ‘ungoverned communities’. And finally I analyse some forms of 
resistance that were emerging in these contexts. 
Life in a ‘governed area’ 
‘Yes, yes, there is state presence in these neighbourhoods, there 
are not ‘forbidden’ areas for the state anymore, but there are still 
armed groups here, one does not understand what happens, we 
still have to pay ‘vacunas’ (extortions), there are invisible 
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frontiers and still people use gangs to solve their conflicts and 
problems’... (Interview Young male resident Comuna 1 interview, 
09/10/2010) 
The following segment extracted from my field note diary describing a 
participatory activity undertaken with children in La Avanzada 
neighbourhood, illustrates the complex context in which residents found 
themselves living after a decade of state intervention in their territory. In this 
neighbourhood at the highest eastern end of the Comuna, from which the 
famous and imposing ‘Biblioteca España’ could be seen, one of the 
innovative peripheral police stations had been built recently to improve the 
reaction capacity of the police. Home to some of the most recent newcomers 
residents of the city, this neighbourhood had been selected by the 
community organisation I was working with as a volunteer to benefit from a 
programme which hoped to prevent recruitment and sexual exploitation of 
children by gangs and to promote human rights and non-violence. The 
programme consisted of a series of weekly workshops for children between 6 
and 13 years old138 delivered by social workers. The following is my account 
of a particular workshop I helped to design to identify actors, places and 
practices children associated with safety and insecurity based on their daily 
experiences:  
 ‘...We asked children to collectively build a boy and a girl using 
different materials. They named the dolls they built ‘John’ and 
‘Luisa’. In separate groups we then asked boys and girls to 
identify actors and places of their neighbourhood where they 
thought Luisa and John would feel safe and happy and others 
that would make them feel scared and in danger. Children 
initially spoke of places. The girls identified the park for example 
as a place of danger because there were too many arms and 
drugs there and also because there they could be hit by bullets 
and they could meet bad people. Some children agreed hospitals 
                                                          
138 Sometimes they bring siblings between 1 and 3 years old who are left under their 
supervision. 
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could be dangerous because they could be caught in shootouts 
or execution attempts against people being taken there after 
armed confrontations...while girls spoke of their house as a safe 
place where they could be safe from shootings, two boys agreed 
that their house was a place of danger because as they said ‘all 
bad things happened there’. Later, one of the teacher explained 
to me that some of these children’s relatives were gang 
members and used their homes to hide weapons and drugs 
stashes. Because children did not mention any actors in 
particular, I asked, what about the police officers? Do they make 
you feel safe? And my colleague added, or ‘the guys’ (referring 
to the gang members), how do they make you feel? When we 
asked that in the boys group, they looked at each other and went 
quiet. Then a boy asked me ’profe, why do you ask that to us? 
That cannot be discussed’. Another boy insisted ‘profe, if you 
want to live don’t talk about that, that is not something to talk 
about, that is something you cannot ask, and if they hear us 
talking about that they can come and kill us...’ Maria, the most 
experienced social worker intervened and said ‘don’t worry. We 
can talk about that because we are not pointing at any particular 
group, we are just talking in general, about everybody: the 
teachers, the doctors, the soldiers, the police officers, even the 
guys (gang members), we all live here in our neighbourhood’. 
Boys relaxed a bit and then agreed that police officers, soldiers 
and ‘the guys’ should be listed both under actors that protect 
them but also in the list of actors who put them in danger. 
According to children these actors all have weapons and 
sometimes protect them and sometimes they do bad things too... 
In terms of the perception of safety for these children there 
seems to be no qualitative difference between a police officer 
and a gang member, except for the fact that some of the gang 
members are people they know better and have grown up with’ 
(Field diary note, 13/09/ 2010) 
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The following week, while we were doing the next workshop, members of the 
local gang came to the school’s door and hung around there looking at us 
and the children the whole time. Although children did not seem affected by 
their presence, the school teacher, the other social workers and I felt 
observed and intimidated. The school teacher was sure that gang members 
had asked the children about the activities. According to her, some children 
were relatives of gang members and others were being used by gangs as 
‘carritos’ (little cars) or ‘vigias’ (lookouts). Residents  would later confirm that 
children as young as 5 or 6 years old were being used by gangs as 
informants, telling them when police or other gang members were around or 
to transport weapons, ammunition or drugs around the neighbourhood in 
exchange for petty money children then used to play in coin machines. 
This incident illustrates the difficulties discussed in chapter two  regarding  
the process of doing research on security in intervened communities where 
the state was now present and continually undertaking intelligence activities. 
Through interviews and conversations with residents I later discovered that a 
wide range of community activities and meetings organised by local leaders 
and organisations had become a source of distrust for gang members. State 
institutions had fostered local events to provide information to residents 
about state services and to promote programmes, but at the same time they 
had used some of these events, including those for children, to gather 
intelligence regarding local gangs. In consequence residents were 
discouraged by gang members from attending events and local leaders who 
facilitated the entry of state actors to the community were warned ‘not to 
bring problems to the neighbourhood’ (focus group male residents Comuna 
1, 2009). 
More importantly, what happened at the workshop revealed the vulnerability 
children were still subject to in this community context, although these very 
children from marginalised communities had been specially targeted by state 
programmes. Public policies and initiatives focused on children included the 
Buen Comienzo programme(Good Start), the construction of quality schools 
(Escuelas de Calidad), improved access to school restaurants, sport schools 
(Escuelas Populares del Deporte) and play centres, as well as a subsidy 
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programme by the national government (Familias en Accion) . The 
community police was also in the process of implementing a preventive 
programme for children called youth civic police (policia civica juvenil)139. 
These state programmes were appreciated by residents, but in their view 
they did not address the underlying problems affecting them and putting 
children at risk of armed violence. 
With the arrival of state forces to these communities and with increasing 
competition for the control of illegal economies, gangs adapted and designed 
new strategies to avoid persecution. In the process they had increased the 
use of even younger children to move illegal goods around the community, to 
collect intelligence and to undertake surveillance activities. These put 
children in constant danger of recruitment and increased the risk of 
retaliation from gangs if they broke certain codes or if they were believed to 
be helping the authorities.140 Children, as the account above illustrates, were 
conscious of that danger and had naturalised certain secrecy codes to 
minimize it in a context of urban conflict.  
Residents, members of civil organizations and community organizations in 
this area recognised an increase in the capacity of armed groups to use 
children for illegal activities such as drug trafficking and sex exploitation 
networks. Strategies used by the gangs to attract children included 
promoting drug addiction even within their own schools, but also forced 
recruitment. Many residents spoke of their fear of their children being 
dragged into gangs as one of the main reasons why families were being 
forced to leave their homes. A male resident and father of five children 
expressed his dilemma during one of the focus groups: 
                                                          
139 Around 240 children were part of the Juvenile Civic Police programme in Comuna 1. 
140 Two children (11 years old) were murder in Comuna 13 in February 2013. They were 
attacked with machetes and their bodies thrown to a grave for crossing the border between 
neighbourhoods controlled by opposing gangs. This happened in the comuna with the 
highest number of security personnel in the city (at the time there were more than 300 
soldiers patrolling the streets daily, one police station and 3 police mobile stations in this 
comuna).  
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‘They (local gang) are going to take my youngest boy to one of 
those groups...they keep saying he has to join the war. I asked 
what could I do in order to leave the area because they almost 
killed him the other day, he cannot even look through the window 
because they start shouting things at him...people in the 
neighbourhood told me I have to leave as a displaced person, 
but that has consequences..they say they will call me to attend 
face-to-face meetings to denounce who was trying to recruit my 
son, and if I identify someone, then they will do something to me 
or the rest of my family...so I better leave the area by my own 
means, even if that means losing my house, but I better think of 
my family’s life first...’(Focus group with male adult residents 
Comuna 1, 26/11/2009) 
Other studies and community organisations’ reports confirm the increased 
incidence of recruitment of young people and children in Medellin and other 
Colombian cities (Springer 2012), the increasing impact of armed violence on 
schools in Medellin141, and also the recruitment of girls for abuse and sexual 
exploitation which made them objects of  dispute (COALICO, 2012). Various 
civil society organisations reported increasing levels of sexual exploitation of 
children living in marginalised communities, especially of young girls whose 
virginity has become a lucrative merchandise to be sold by members of 
criminal organisations. Even the municipality’s secretary of government 
recognised that since 2009 there was an increase in the number of children 
and adolescents killed in the city (in 2010 children were the victims of 9% of 
homicides committed while between January and March of 2011 children 
accounted for 14% of 472 homicides committed)(Secretaria de Gobierno de 
Medellin). According to the same governmental dependency, 81% of 
homicides of children were consequences of the action of criminal groups 
that had been in fierce competition for the control of communities and illegal 
economies since 2008.   
                                                          
141 schools were used as a market for drugs and arms by illegal armed actors 
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The research undertaken in Comuna 1 revealed that even though 
communities like this had experienced the most important reduction in levels 
of homicides from 2003 to 2007, which led policymakers to declare them as 
pacified examples of Medellin’s successful transformation, the state 
intervention had not had an impact on the military capacity of local gangs, 
nor their willingness to engage in urban wars for the control of lucrative 
economies. Their power over community life on the contrary, had been 
growing despite a decline in levels of lethal violence for five years. The 
military, social, territorial and economic influence of these armed groups only 
became more visible to outsiders to the community during the 2009-2010 
crisis.  
Although homicide rates did not reach the unspeakable levels of the early 
1990s, residents of comuna 1 identified this urban crisis as ‘one of the worst’ 
they had experienced in the last 25 years. The following segment from my 
field diary illustrates:  
‘…after we finished the meeting a few residents had to stay with 
us. Someone had received a call to his mobile phone from home 
alerting him that a shootout was taking place around his 
house...Don Sergio lamented that his house seemed to be 
located in an strategic place, right at the border separating the 
territories controlled by opposing gangs... he and other 6 people 
stayed at the community centre and waited to see if the gun fire 
ceased...while we had lunch residents exchanged information on 
the location of last night’s shootouts. Don Sergio said ‘I don’t 
know how is that we don’t get more ill with this situation, I have 
lived hard wars here, the one with the militias for example, but 
this war is getting crazy, it is miracle I am talking to you now, last 
night death came real close, I had already taken the bed apart so 
that we could all sleep on the floor, thank God I did it, because if 
we would have been sitting on the bed then, the bullets that 
crossed the room would not be on the wall but on me or the 
children’...The other residents looked at him as if they knew what 
he was talking about. It turns out that all of them and their 
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children are sleeping under their beds for fear of being hit by 
stray bullets ... Another lady added ‘my house is full of bullet 
holes, every day my children find one more, every day I get sick 
to think that when I get home I am going to find that something 
bad happened to my children or my mum’...(Field note diary, 
28/11/2009 ) 
Between 2008 and 2011 6.663 homicides occurred in Medellin and a great 
majority of those were linked to armed confrontations between gangs for the 
control of communities (Personeria de Medellin 2011). The fierce battles 
between gangs were accompanied by more threats to residents, forced 
displacements, recruitment of children and young people, forced 
disappearances. In Comuna 1 alone, between 2009 and 2010 the homicide 
rate reached 102 people per 100 thousand inhabitants, and around 29 
families (aprox. 101 people) were forcibly displaced due to threats or the 
murder of a family member142. Due to the confrontations, the local armed 
groups tightened their controls over the population. Armed actors established 
strict controls over communities in order to protect their illegal activities and 
lives in the midst of confrontations with other gangs. Limits to people’s 
movements within and across neighbourhoods were established through 
invisible borders or ‘fronteras invisibles’ that were protected with lethal force. 
Other forms of social and economic control that had been in place also 
became more visible and exploitative. Members of these groups imposed 
higher ‘vacunas’ (extortions) on residents, shopkeepers, suppliers of goods 
and bus and taxi drivers. They also increased their control on who was 
allowed to enter or live in each neighbourhood, until what time people were 
allowed to be in the street, leave or come back to their own homes, who had 
to abandon his/her home, what kind of behaviour was appropriate and what 
kind of deviance from their imposed rules was punishable and how, etc. 
(OSHM 2012).  
                                                          
142 The number of people violently forced to abandon their homes and becoming displaced 
persons within the city limits has continued to increase despite reductions in homicides 
rates. From 5.098 victims of displacement in 2010, the number reached 8.434 people in 
2011. The number of forced disappearances has also increased in the last 4 years. 
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Young people were especially vulnerable to the controls imposed by armed 
actors. Young men for example found it very hard to move around their 
neighbourhoods due to the risk of being mistaken by a gang member or 
forced to join a group. In this context residents had to adapt and designed 
self-protection measures to reduce their risks; this included adjusting their 
schedules and daily activities according to the geography of the gangs’ war 
and trying to avoid forbidden areas. The naturalization of survival practices 
and of the violence people experienced daily was explained by Yonny during 
an interview: 
‘...for example in my family, in my house, we know that there is 
an armed conflict right? We know the territories and where the 
combats are, so every time that we have to take the younger 
brothers to the school or cross the area that is in dispute, the 
young men of the house stay at home, they don’t go, only the 
women in the house go out...but it cannot be any woman either, 
because if it is one of the girls that is linked somehow...for 
example, a cousin of mine  that is going out with one of the guys 
from the San Pablo gang and he has a cousin on the other side 
that knows her...she cannot go there, if the guys from the combo 
on that side see her...no! We are very conscious of the conflict 
and of all those relations in order to find ways to move around 
the area’ (Interview young male resident Comuna 1, 09/10/2010)  
The recurrence of armed violence and homicides often concealed the rise in 
other forms of violence that was taking place in the neighbourhoods, for 
example interpersonal and domestic violence143 involving women144. Some 
of the chronic levels of insecurity experienced by female residents emerged 
early on during my first field visit while I was trying to get to know the local 
context and design protection mechanisms to reduce my risks. One 
                                                          
143In 2011 more than 5.949 cases of domestic violence where reported to public institutions 
(comisarías de familia) from which 26% (1.557) involved children. 
144 In 2011 the number of women murdered reached 114.  
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afternoon while I was explaining the purpose of my research to a group of 
young women at the community centre and discussing with them the best 
way to be safe in the neighbourhood, the women’s advice revealed the kind 
of risks they were enduring even though they lived in areas supposedly 
pacified and subject to state control. In addition to the dangers described by 
other residents, female residents also spoke of the possibility of being 
sexually assaulted and of the special restrictions imposed on them:  
‘Vivian who is 27 years old recommended to me to be very 
cautions where I walk. She said that, but not only referring to the 
shootings... three blocks from where we are they tried to abuse 
her. Yesterday after the celebration we were attending, after we 
said goodbye and she walked home...she walked past quickly 
the corner and one of the guys started to chase her shouting 
‘come here come here right now’. She said she ran as fast as 
she could and managed to get home before he could reach her... 
she said it is exactly the same place where they tried to abuse 
her sister some months ago... one of the guys that is always in 
the corner grabbed her, the guy tried to kiss her but she resisted 
and they struggled until the guys from the San Pablo combo 
(gang), from the other corner where she lives, came down and 
forced the guy to leave her alone...when I asked if she or her 
sister had talked to the police or any state authorities, she said 
they did not want to denounce because they felt embarrassed 
and thought going to the authorities would cause them a bigger 
problem... Jennifer, who is 26 years old, also asked me to be 
very careful; according to her the guys (gang members) are very 
jealous. She said ‘the guys should not see you with one guy and 
another guy later ’. She says she takes extra care that the guys 
who control her street don’t see her kissing anyone because they 
are very jealous and if they like a girl and then see her walking 
with guys to her house, immediately they make claims that she 
should be with them too...she says girls get easily raped here for 
that reason...when there are girls in the neighbourhood they like, 
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even if they don’t date  gang members, they don’t allow them to 
be with anyone else...Jennifer said that she does not let her male 
friends come to her house. She tries to meet them in the city 
centre or far from home and if they come to her house she asks 
her brothers and sisters to say hello to them in ways that the 
guys ‘who watch her street’ understand they are family friends. 
She said the guys (gang members) are always watching... and 
they do whatever they want... she said they tried to rape her 
once and she had to talk to ‘el duro’, the boss who controls 
things in her neighbourhood... a neighbour advised her to talk to 
him... When I asked why she did not go to the police, she said 
‘ohh no that would have been worse!...but talking to ’el duro’ 
helped because he gave the order that none of them could come 
near me, specially the ‘twin’, the one who tried to rape 
me’...(Field note diary,  30/11/ 2009) 
Forms of violence, sexual abuse and social control particularly exerted by 
local armed groups on women are strongly connected to their competition for 
the territorial control of these communities (IPC 2010c). However the multiple 
forms of violence and insecurity women face in these contexts do not 
necessarily follow the same trajectory of homicides levels and armed 
confrontation. For example, in Medellin homicides started to drop in 2011; by 
the end of 2012 armed confrontations had substantially reduced in Comuna 
1 due to the hegemony achieved by one of the criminal factions over this 
area145. This reduction in the number of shootings was however not an 
indicator of a reduction of the capacity of armed groups to exert control on 
people’s lives and women’s bodies (OSHM 2012).   
Living with the State in the ‘governed areas’ 
State intervention in Comuna 1, as in other marginalised areas of the city, 
relied on the use of different instruments of government and on the 
combination of coercive as well as normalising forms of biopower. As 
analysed in chapter 3, an important aspect of the approach used in Medellin 
                                                          
145 however confrontations were still taking place in other communities 
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to contain urban violence was its objective to pacify and integrate historically 
neglected communities and populations by making them objects of a wide 
range of public policies. In the next section I illustrate some of the 
interactions among community actors fostered by these state interventions 
used to bring people under the influence of the state.  
I first analyse residents’ experience of the increased number of security 
personnel stationed in these areas.  This worked as the first and primordial 
tool in the symbolic and material conquest of these untamed and feral areas 
by the state and as a way to control and pacify their populations. Then I 
analyse other state initiatives aimed at the social and cultural transformation 
of residents of these communities, especially programmes targeting youth 
and involving citizens in urban upgrading and security provision. 
On the Exercise of Sovereign Power and the Reproduction of Insecurity  
As some of the previous accounts suggest, in this community context the 
permanent presence of police officers and other state institutions was not 
necessarily associated with an improvement in people’s safety.  Residents 
rarely spoke of state institutions as providers of solutions to their daily 
security problems. Although the state was regarded as present in the area, 
especially in the form of security forces (both police officers and soldiers), it 
was not necessarily understood to be there with the main purpose of dealing 
or solving their problems. As an example, during a meeting with young 
people from the comuna 1 who wanted to join the youth support programme 
at the community organisation where I worked, one of the boys from the 
Santo Domingo neighbourhood lamented: 
‘It does not matter that there are tombos (slang for police 
officers) everywhere; they are not here to protect us, but to take 
care of the concrete block (referring to the emblematic library 
park) and the metrocable. You can see them...when something 
happens, right next to the metro stations is where you can see 
them... but they won’t come to protect us; no, we still cannot 
come down, it is too dangerous...’ (Field diary note, Youth 
Meeting 16/09/2010) 
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Residents from these neighbourhoods found it very difficult to see state 
security agents as willing, capable and preferred providers of their security. 
This was the result of a complex mix of factors, among them: high levels of 
corruption within the police forces, entrenched violent practices that 
characterised their interactions with residents, and also closely related, a 
perceived closeness and even resemblance between the state security 
forces and the illegal coercive actors present in the area. 
‘When the shootings start, the police run and hide but do not 
confront those who are spraying bullets, the tombos avoid the 
confrontations...the other thing, look we all wonder if there are 
only 7 access roads to enter the north eastern area and in all 
those roads they have installed police roadblocks, so how are all 
those arms and ammunition for the combos entering?...this just 
makes evident the corruption in the police forces...in front of San 
Blas all people know that the commander and some police 
officers have facilitated the entry of armament for the combos 
they protect, they not only help them logistically, but they also 
give them information where to move, etc ...so with that 
corruption police here is more like an agent of insecurity, not of 
security (Interview Community Leader Comuna 1, 05/11/2009) 
Regarding corruption, during interviews residents reported that local police 
officers were easily bribed by the local gangs and bigger criminal 
organisations and that some police officers even worked for those groups. As 
the interview segment above illustrates, people’s distrust of the police forces 
emerged from what they saw as neglect and from the fact that many police 
officers benefited from the illegal activities undertaken by the local gangs. 
One such example would be a form of illegal tax charged by corrupt officers 
to the armed groups on the money they collected from drug trafficking and 
extortions (Focus group with female and male residents Comuna 1, 
12/11/2010). 
This widespread problem, rarely discussed openly by policymakers, 
contributed to an emerging sense of ambiguity among residents regarding 
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security forces and their relation with illegal armed actors. Different from the 
official discourse in which the local gangs and criminal organisations were 
portrayed as the enemies of the state and threats to society, in the 
community context where police forces were sent to combat these actors, a 
more complex set of interactions was established between illegal and legal 
actors beyond antagonism. 
In order to keep levels of violence under control, some members of the police 
force established some forms of cooperation with local armed actors. For 
residents of one of the neighbourhoods of Comuna 1 for example, it was 
clear that during the ‘last war’ (2009-2011), the police at some point made an 
alliance with the ‘la silla’ and ‘la 38’ gang in order to defeat ‘la galera’ gang 
(informal conversations with residents Comuna 1,  06/10/2010). Establishing 
agreements like this allowed police forces to reduce the competition between 
gangs that increased the possibility of violent clashes in the area and higher 
homicide levels, the key measurement of police performance. Other 
indicators like the number of homicides and other high profile crimes, as well 
as captures and the number of arms and drugs seized, were used to 
evaluate the success of police work in the area.  Additionally, police forces 
were under constant pressure to keep violence under control, from both local 
and national governments. All this contributed to the establishment of 
problematic relations between them and criminal actors. In one of the 
neighbourhoods residents reported for example that there had been a case 
of an ‘arranged’ capture, that allowed police officers to show their success in 
the fight against crime, in exchange of allowing the gang to continue their 
activities in the area (informal conversations with residents and social worker 
Comuna 1, 02/12/2010).  
In practice it seemed that to govern these communities, not only state, and 
presumably legitimate, power was being used. The illegal and coercive 
power of local armed actors was useful to state security forces too. The fact 
that the state arrival to these areas in 2002 was facilitated by and 
coordinated with paramilitary forces was only the beginning of the further 
consolidation of problematic relations between state actors and illegal ones 
throughout the decade. The process of establishing a permanent state 
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presence in marginalised urban communities was accompanied by the 
consolidation of existing and new armed groups that emerged from the 
incomplete demobilization of paramilitary forces in the city. These actors 
linked to illegal economies were able to strengthen their territorial, social and 
economic power in urban communities and this power could not be ignored 
by police officers stationed there. On the contrary, it was often acknowledged 
by state officers, as the following field diary segment illustrates: 
‘Susana, a colleague at the community centre was an hour late 
to our appointment. We had arranged to meet to discuss the 
details of next week’s activities. When she finally arrived, she 
was accompanied by her friend Bianca. Both looked upset...The 
reason why they were late was that while they were walking 
towards the community centre in the company of another friend a 
young guy had stolen their mobile phone. Since they were close 
to the police station they decided to report the crime... When 
they managed to finally talk to one of the officers and explained 
what had happened, the officer told them there was no point in 
making a report there for something like that, they would not do 
anything about a stolen phone, however he suggested they go 
and talk to ‘el duro’ (local gang leader). In the police officer’s 
view he could do something about it...he would get her phone 
back in a couple of hours’ (Field diary note, 20/08/ 2011) 
According to various residents, sometimes police officers used the influence, 
power and coercive capacity of armed actors. They mentioned in informal 
conversations that it was not uncommon for police officers to threaten young 
residents with sending them or handing them to local armed groups. These 
incidents illustrate some of the complex relations that security agents had 
established with illegal actors in the process of controlling and pacifying the 
‘ungoverned communities’. These problematic relations also contributed to 
increase the influence and legitimacy of illegal armed actors. 
The role of state forces as legitimate security providers in the community was 
also severely undermined by the recurrent use of violence by some of the 
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officers in their daily interactions with residents, especially, but not 
exclusively, by those from the Special Forces that were the leading effort in 
the fight against criminals in communities. Despite their fear of talking about 
it, young people and other residents reported that violent encounters with 
police officers were very common. Young people felt stigmatised by police 
practices and especially vulnerable to police abuses, as the segment from a 
focus group illustrates: 
Young man 1: ‘One is always pointed at because one is from this 
area and young, so for them (police) that means that you are a 
drug addict, a thief, or a trafficker..and they treat us just like that 
as if we are criminals...  
Young Man 4: ‘What the public force does generates resistance 
from the community...especially when they come with violence or 
when they take the lads in illegal raids in the street...just for 
being in the street they take you and then leave you in another 
part of the comuna where they know you cannot be...they know 
that those who live in one area cannot go to the other area 
because they will get killed, so what the police do, they take lads 
from one area and leave them in the other...they once took a 
friend at 10pm and left him and others at 4am in the other 
neighbourhood, although they know it is so dangerous, that is 
real evil, but things like that happen here... (Focus group with 
young residents Comuna 1, 12/08/2011) 
Being illegally recruited by the army or the police was a particular concern for 
young residents of these communities. It was very common that young men 
older than 18 were stopped in the streets and taken by force to military bases 
by the army if they did not provide evidence of having done their compulsory 
military service146. The next account of what I saw at the metro station while 
doing an interview to a public official in another area of the city demonstrated 
that this happened all across the city: 
                                                          
146 The Constitutional Court in Colombia declared illegal these raids by which the army 
recruited and forced young men to do their military service.  
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‘while we were talking in a café near the metro station, a group of 
soldiers located themselves strategically at the entrance of the 
station. Fernanda kept looking at what they were doing and after 
a while she said she needed to go there because something 
wrong was happening.. The soldiers were gathering a group of 
young men, around 7 guys were there waiting for something. 
Fernanda said she needed to go and check what was going on. 
When we got close we saw the soldiers asking for the guys’ IDs. 
Fernanda approached one of the soldiers and said ‘excuse me, 
what you are doing is illegal, recruiting these guys is illegal’. The 
soldier looked at her and said ‘these are my Major’s orders’ and 
continued collecting the guys’ Ids... The guys in the group looked 
very nervous and started to tell us that they have done nothing 
wrong, there were just going to work...while Fernanda insisted 
that the soldier stop this procedure, she also reached her phone 
and called a colleague at the personeria. She spoke loud so that 
the soldiers could hear that she was requesting a team from 
personeria to be sent to the metro station to check what was 
happening... While she was on the phone the cabo came and 
asked her who she was. Fernanda explained she worked at the 
mayor’s office and that what his soldiers were doing was illegal. 
She then explained that a group from personeria was on its way 
to check the situation, to check if the rights of those guys were 
being endangered...The Cabo tried to sound conciliatory and 
explained that they were checking the ‘guys’ situation’. He said 
‘we are here to protect the citizens and are doing our 
job’...Fernanda insisted that what he was doing was illegal...She 
also kept telling the guys, who were visibly nervous, not to 
worry...After waiting almost half an hour there the cabo ordered 
the soldiers to give the IDs back to the guys...he then explained 
to us that none of them were found with criminal records so they 
were free to go... the young guys quickly left the 
area....Fernanda later explained to me that this was the second 
time in two months that she had had to use her credentials to 
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prevent  either the police or the army from taking young people 
illegally... Since the police had increased their presence...her 
office kept receiving complaints of young men being forced and 
taken to do military service or mistreated by security officers... 
She said, the police and army end up targeting guys who leave 
the comunas mostly looking for work in the construction sector in 
el poblado and the southern part of the city … (Field diary note, 
02/06/2012)  
Although older residents stated during interviews that they would like to see 
more police officers in their neighbourhoods, and that people valued the work 
of community police officers who were thought to do more preventive work, 
young people feared the police. Their daily interactions with police officers 
were very often violent and abusive. This made it difficult to differentiate 
them from other coercive illegal actors that imposed curfews and restrictions 
to them. Violent practices were at the end the recurrent behaviours of both 
security forces and gangs when dealing with residents problems.  
On Changing the Illegal Culture and the Unexpected Consequences of 
other Forms of Biopower  
The model targeting the ‘ungoverned’ subjects of marginalised communities 
implied the normalisation of residents and the transformation of particular 
traits that seemed to be obstacles for their integration to the city; in particular, 
their supposed tendency towards illegality. In this context, at the same time 
that the local state built its capacity for service provision in these neglected 
areas, it facilitated the implementation of new governance arrangements and 
programmes that aimed at promoting a culture of legality and allegiance to 
the state among the local population. 
In the view of policymakers, the implementation of integral urban projects, 
participatory planning exercises, of a comprehensive demobilization 
programme and youth violence prevention initiatives (such as Fuerza Joven) 
meant convincing residents of the ungoverned areas that compliance with 
the law and loyalty to the state were not only viable, but also preferable to 
the benefits offered by illegal actors and activities. However, as it is 
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illustrated below, some of these state initiatives not only created challenges 
to existing forms of citizenship that had promoted non-violent and positive 
values, but in some cases unexpectedly increased the recognition and 
influence of illegal actors and reinforced the perception that illegality paid off. 
‘It does not pay to be good’ 
One of the most important programmes the local government invested 
resources in was the Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration 
Programme. It was regarded by public officials as an opportunity to weaken 
and dismantle armed actors in the city and to discourage young people from 
joining these groups and participating in illegal activities. Through this 
programme ex-combatants became beneficiaries of state benefits and were 
encouraged to participate in community development initiatives. This 
programme and others targeting youth at risk were considered an effective 
way to demonstrate to young people from marginalised communities that it 
was better to play by the rules and that a life away from criminality could pay 
off and bring benefits. Although these types of state initiatives benefited an 
impressive number of people through subsidies, training  workshops and 
opportunities to improve their skills, education and even to find a job; the 
cultural transformation that policymakers expected to  produce with them did 
not seem to be taking place on the ground. On the contrary, the message for 
many residents of the community was the opposite: that those involved in 
criminal activities were always in a better position to make a living and also 
to get concessions and support from the state in moments of crisis.  
While many members of the armed groups joined the demobilization 
programme, this did not mean that they had ceased their participation in 
illegal activities or renounced the use of  coercion in the community. Instead 
some were using the benefits granted through the state programmes as an 
opportunity to increase their legitimacy, to economically benefit and to 
venture in other spheres of community life.  As residents agreed during a 
focus group: it seemed that ‘desmobilizados (demoblised) have just changed 
their strategy, now some of them focus on social activities  in the community 
and the other ones focus on military ones, and they are more powerful than 
ever’  (Focus group with Older adults 16/11/2009).  
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Residents and members of community and civil organizations from various 
comunas denounced that some of the economic benefits received by the 
beneficiaries of the DDR and other programmes were used to buy drugs and 
arms. Numerous residents from comuna 1 also regarded as a problem the 
fact that those whom they understood as still being members of powerful 
illegal organisations were receiving support and recognition from the state. 
The DDR programme which was later recognised as a partial demobilization, 
did not achieve the dismantling of criminal structures in the city and instead 
seemed to be contributing to the informal legitimisation of illegal actors, as 
the following segment from an interview with a young woman of the comuna 
1 reveals:  
‘They (the gangs) have more power now, the government 
allowed them to demobilise but I don’t see in which way they 
demobilise, it is the same thing, here paracos have the 
control...The guys who are always in the corner (local gang 
members), are supposedly demobilised and were trying to 
reintegrate to community but that is false. They were still armed, 
the only difference is that they were receiving a monthly salary...I 
don’t know what for ...supposedly for taking care of the 
neighbourhood... so I don’t know, it is like the state is authorising 
them to control who enters and to control what happens in the 
neighbourhood right?...in my neighbourhood sometimes I arrive 
late...and they still stop me and ask me ‘skinny where are you 
going to, why are you arriving late’, they know me so they let me 
pass but they still warn me that I should take care of myself 
(Interview Young female resident Comuna 1, 14/11/2009) 
Interactions with residents also revealed that the implementation of young 
violence prevention initiatives like Fuerza Joven, which aimed at 
discouraging young people at risk of joining armed groups and illegal 
activities, was problematic. Although public officials spoke of these 
programmes as serving the youth in marginalised areas, the economic and 
social benefits offered by the state seemed to be in actuality directed to a 
minority of young people who were part of armed groups. These incentives 
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seemed to disproportionately benefit and reward those who had been 
involved in criminal activities, in comparison to the majority of young people 
from these communities who, despite hard circumstances, tried to find ways 
to survive without resorting to illegal means. This seemed to reinforce the 
perception among residents in poor communities that armed groups were not 
only powerful actors due to their coercive capacity and their access to the 
profits produced by illegal economies, but also because they were capable of 
negotiating with the state and obtaining better benefits for their members. 
This was causing many residents, especially young people, to conclude that 
in their context ‘it did pay off to be bad’. The following segment from a focus 
group illustrates that one of the unexpected consequences of this type of 
programme was that young people who were not members of local gangs 
were encouraged to consider approaching these groups as a way to access 
state benefits:  
Adult Man1: ‘where I live there are many good kids but many of 
them tell me: ‘look It is easier to make a living and even to get a 
job if you are a criminal, than if you are a honest man’... and that 
is true, what can I tell them, it is true, haven you seen how those 
guys (gang members) get paid?, they get paid by the 
government to quit the conflict but they are still there’ 
Young man1: ‘that’s true man...look, people say ‘there is no job, 
so I can go and hang around with this combo (gang) for a month 
and then I go and say that I am working with them so that I can 
join the programme... many people who were not involved in the 
conflict went there and put their names in the list of demobilised 
just to get benefits (Fuerza Joven programme)’  
Young woman1: ‘there are no jobs here but if people go and say 
in the municipality that they are demobilised, they will 
immediately give them a subsidy and things... it is difficult to 
understand, as a single head of the household I can get a 
subsidy but I have to go and pass many requirements to get it, it 
is like a calvary to get a few pesos for my children, but if you are 
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a demobilised things are so much easier...the police say 
criminality does not pay off, but of course it does! Look, one of 
my neighbours, she has many economic problems and has 
young children and I know she is not in any armed group, but 
she went and borrowed money to buy a gun so that she could 
demobilise...she went to the municipality and now they are going 
to send her money for food and they are going to help her to 
study at nights’...(Focus group with residents from Northeast 
Zone (Comunas 1,2,3,4 and 8), 20/09/2009)   
The Medellin model of urban transformation seemed to treat young people 
from poor neighbours as potential criminals and as ‘ungoverned’ subjects to 
be pacified not only through restrictive measures, but through economic 
incentives. In that logic certain groups of citizens were being granted 
privileged access to rights based on the risk they were theoretically posing to 
the security situation in the city, while levels of inequality and poverty in the 
communities remained very high.  The implementation of programmes for 
young people linked to armed groups, without addressing the structural 
problems affecting them in these particular contexts, especially those 
causing chronic levels of youth unemployment, contributed to distorted state 
efforts to distance young residents of marginalised areas from armed groups. 
The following segment of my conversation with a young leader in Comuna 1 
illustrates this:  
‘these programmes are like little efforts to contain the overflow of 
violence youth is involved in, we are the visible face of the war 
because we are easily co-opted by mafias, because we have the 
energy but we don’t have a salary, we finish school at 19 years 
old and nobody is going to hire us because we have no 
experience, the education system does not give us any particular 
skills so that we could go and work somewhere, additionally we 
have a stigma on us. People think that because we are from 
here we are criminals, that is what people outside these 
neighbourhoods  think of us...look, when you are between 15 
and 19 you have to confront this question, let’s say you are 
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studying, but sometimes in your house there is no food, your 
mum is unemployed and so on and you face the youth dilemma, 
do I continue studying and make the effort to try to make an 
ethical living knowing that there will be great difficulties?, or 
should I just take things easier as the context offers me and join 
an armed group?... they (criminal organisations) will give me 
around hundred thousand pesos and additionally the state might 
even get me opportunities...that is so contradictory, the state 
prefers to invest public funds in paying lads that supposedly 
demobilise, than investing in improving programmes for integral 
youth development right? So I wonder, what is the message the 
state is sending to the community?...That criminality and illegality 
at the end does pay off, look you will get not  only the money 
your weapon will generate, but also the privileged position in the 
community the state will give you because you 
demobilise...(Interview Young Community Leader Comuna 1, 
14/11/2009) 
However, even in this difficult context many young residents resisted the idea 
of joining armed groups and some even actively tried to prevent violence and 
other young people from joining groups by promoting non-violence and 
community values of solidarity. Some of them tried to use the spaces opened 
by the municipality through participatory planning and other youth 
programmes to strengthen their initiatives and get economic support and 
recognition. Compared to the support available to youth groups involved in 
peaceful, artistic and non-violent initiatives across the city, the programs 
targeting young people in armed groups certainly seemed to offer 
unexpected and disproportionate incentives related to involvement with 
these; as explained by a member of a youth group in Comuna 13: 
‘we have a group of 16 members…we use theatre as a tool to 
make people and children aware of the importance of valuing life 
and promoting nonviolence… while we were given a 1 million 
pesos in total for all the activities…imagine, these are 16 
potential families and all our friends in our school involved and 
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benefiting from our initiative in favour of peace; each guy who 
sings up for Fuerza Joven gets around more than 500.000 a 
month, they are the ones who have been involved with the 
armed groups and promoting criminality here…you see, of 
course lads would prefer to join an armed group, it looks like 
delinquency is  rewarded here. Those of us who chose to put our 
energy on promoting alternatives to war and crime get 
nothing…we are even doing the type of work the State should be 
doing here but the state does not appreciate that…’(Interview 
Young resident and member of youth group in Comuna 13, 
15/11/2010 ) 
The quote above illustrates the impact that the relationship that the local 
state established with members of armed groups through programmes that 
were supposed to promote legality, had on other community actors that 
existed in these contexts. As analysed in the previous chapter, these 
communities had seen the emergence of a number of community 
organizations and citizen initiatives; these had tried to promote community 
development, contain the reproduction of violence and challenge the 
influence of illegal actors through meaningful forms of citizenship, since the 
1990s. With the arrival of the state to marginalised areas with the intention of 
pacifying, transforming and integrating their populations, such community 
actors were confronted with opportunities to engage the state in ways that 
could give them visibility and access to resources, but also with huge 
challenges.  
During the 2000s the implementation of integral urban projects as well as 
participatory budgeting exercises opened opportunities for community 
organisations and citizens to participate in the implementation of state 
initiatives targeting the ungoverned areas of the city.  Participatory forms of 
urban management allowed the local state to augment the offer of services 
and programmes for these communities by relying on local and community 
organisations with a long record of community work for the implementation of 
a wide range of initiatives. The allocation of public resources to local 
organizations through contracts meant an important push to some of these 
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organisations by allowing them to advance their agendas and materialise 
their projects. However it also created a great deal of conflicts at the 
community level by increasing the competition among community actors 
around the acquisition of contracts for the delivery of community services. 
Soon after the implementation of participatory budgeting exercises for 
example, not only residents, but also civil organisations overseeing the 
participatory planning process in the city reported the proliferation of 
community organisations opportunistically created to co-opt public funds. 
Although these organisations met regulations and requirements established 
by the law for contracting with the state, they lacked local support and 
experience in community work (Gomez et al ND:263). 
Paradoxically the allocation of public resources locally also created 
incentives for armed actors to venture into new scenarios of community life. 
Illegal organisations started to either create community organisations they 
could control or infiltrate and co-opt existing ones in order to get access to 
public funds. Traditional organisations in Comuna 1 found themselves 
competing with these new actors which had the backing and coercive 
support of armed groups. As the following account illustrates, residents 
recognised the existence of these new organisations controlled by illegal 
groups and the increasing legitimacy and social recognition they allowed 
them to accumulate:  
‘... some of the residents who are elected through popular vote to 
a seat at the JAL147 manage resources for the organisations of 
the armed actors so that they can benefit from those resources. 
Rarely you will hear about that because people won’t talk about 
it, people are very scared and if you report that, well, you die 
fast...Now many resources are going to the corporations 
controlled by the gangs, some of those corporations are fake and 
                                                          
147 Local Administrative Boards (Juntas Administradoras Locales) are public corporations 
made up by a number of citizens who are democratically elected. These boards work as 
channels between communities and local authorities. They help to design municipal plans 
and programmes; they oversee the delivery of services in their communities and make 
proposals to the local authorities on how to invest public funds. 
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others work and manage resources...the problem is that they use 
some of those resources for their things (illegal activities)... Here 
(Comuna 1) the distribution of resources is done through votes in 
neighbourhood assemblies, according to the votes it is decided 
which projects get funding...the guys (gang members) did not 
influence how people voted...most people voted for projects 
related to health and social protection because in this area 
people depend on subsidies...but the sports and culture related 
projects are the ones that leave more profits to the armed 
groups..they are mostly young men so they tend to get involved 
in those type of projects and then other residents say ‘oh the 
guys (gang members) organised this game and let me play or 
this activity’ and that is how they (gangs) win legitimacy...people 
legitimise them and now with the arrival of the state its like they 
have won more legitimacy’ (Interview Female Community Leader 
in Comuna 1, 12/03/2012) 
Through the exploitation of community organisations and institutions, but 
also through coercion, intimidation and forced participation criminal actors 
linked to drug trafficking and other illegal economies started to economically 
benefit from public funds too. Simultaneous to the state intervention in the 
community, these actors became more involved in governance 
arrangements and community processes that were meant to serve local 
development (Abello Colak & Guarneros-Meza 2014) and increase state 
legitimacy. During interviews with community leaders and informal 
conversations with residents they described the way local armed groups 
forced local leaders to contract services provided by these groups’ 
organisations, or to give them percentages when implementing community 
projects allocated through participatory budgeting. This was the case of 
Doña Gloria and Blanca, both community leaders in Comuna 1 who 
described their experiences with members of local gangs:   
‘I used to be very active here, organising activities with other 
residents to help our community improve, but I had a bad 
experience and since then I had to keep a low profile and take 
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my distance from these processes...What happened was that we 
organised an activity for children and their families here in the 
comuna. We had to provide refreshments too, so we hired a 
local resident we knew and trusted. He had a local food business 
with his family... We had not yet received the money from the 
Municipality to pay him for that, when three armed guys knock on 
my door and asked me for 2 million pesos (around 1 thousand 
US dollars). They said it had been established that from all the 
projects implemented, they (local armed group) were supposed 
to receive a share...They were so angry that we had not hired 
the refreshments with their people. They have people working in 
their organisations and providing this kind of services you know, 
so now either you pay them a share or contract services with 
their organisations... in any way they get the money and the 
recognition for doing community activities...Those men gave me 
one day to find the money, which I had to borrow... I did not want 
to pay but they threatened my family...when I went to pay them, 
they had the poor man we had initially hired there...God knows 
what they told him because pale and shaking he told me ‘don’t 
worry, you don’t owe me anything for the refreshments, just pay 
them, just pay them. (Interview Female Community Leader in 
Comuna 1, 04/08/2012, cited in Abello Colak and Guarneros-
Meza, 2014)  
‘Blanca arrived at the community centre visibly nervous. When I 
asked her if she was ok she said she did not know what to do. 
Two men from the local gang approached her yesterday   to ask 
for a share of the grant she is going to  get for the Christmas 
celebrations with children. They also told her that two of their 
members will be attending and participating in these activities. I 
asked what her reply was to these men’s requests. She said she 
told them that she did not know why she was supposed to give 
them money which was meant to serve the community. She also 
told them that she would not receive the money until early next 
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year. Blanca is visibly angry, she thinks this is unacceptable: 
‘Why do I have to give them money? We went through a long 
process to get this approved by the community. We wanted to do 
things different this Christmas; take the children to the river side 
to see the Christmas lights and do recreational activities. We are 
tired of seeing the Christmas parties those guys [gang members] 
organise; they slaughter a pig and give money to people to win 
their favours’. When I asked Blanca if there was something the 
Municipality could do to help her   she sighed and said she had 
just been  talking to the social worker delegated by the state to 
promote and control the use of public resources for the project: 
‘He told me I will probably have to give them the money and let 
some of their people pretend they were involved. Not doing it is 
too dangerous. Can you believe him? . Apparently this is also 
happening in other comunas’. Blanca is visibly outraged by the 
idea of having to give money to armed actors who, in her view, 
badly affect her community. ‘How can I give them money that 
they are going to use to buy arms to give then to our children 
and drugs to make them addicted? But what can I do? Should I 
make myself get killed for this?’ Blanca looks powerless. (Field 
diary note, 05/08/2010. Cited in Abello Colak and Guarneros-
Meza, 2014) 
In this context, as illustrated above, the work of local leaders and members 
of community organisations became even more dangerous and the state 
seemed incapable of offering effective protection mechanisms to those who 
tried to resist violent actors’ influence. The harassment of existing community 
organisations and leaders by armed groups certainly questioned the 
democratising potential of participatory processes (Ramirez Gallegos 2008), 
and also the capacity of the state to weaken illegal actors in intervened 
areas. The state seemed to have increased its bureaucratic and institutional 
capacity in ungoverned areas, without reducing the power of illegal groups or 
effectively promoting a new culture of legality. 
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Dangerous participation 
During the course of the fieldwork there were specific moments in which the 
state seemed to explicitly attempt to deal with the armed actors’ capacity to 
exert coercion in communities. These, however, tended to coincide with 
moments in which competition between these actors had led to increases in 
levels of violence, especially in homicide rates. Public responses in this 
context revealed other types of unexpected consequences of the entry of the 
state and its effort to pacify and ‘govern’ these areas.  
One of the first responses to the violence produced by armed confrontations 
between local gangs in intervened comunas were police raids and 
substantial increments in the number of military and police personnel. The 
purpose was to contain violence and weaken these groups by capturing their 
leaders. These anti-gang police operations had undesirable consequences 
for residents in Comuna1. Both community residents and public agencies like 
the Personeria reported that after police operations took place, gangs tended 
to retaliate, especially when these operations produced captures or deaths of 
their members. In these cases gangs threatened and displaced residents 
who were suspected of having helped the authorities. This was the case of a 
group of families threatened and displaced in 2012 after gang members were 
captured in the area.  Additionally, captures often created new vacuums of 
power within these groups that lead to violent competitions, fractures and 
increasing violence. 
In order to weaken local criminal organisations the security forces and the 
civil authorities put a lot of effort into intelligence activities and for that they 
requested the cooperation of local residents. These kinds of activities 
increased levels of distrust among residents and certainly made the attitude 
of gang members towards residents even more volatile. Two young residents 
explained this during an informal conversation: 
‘ ...on our way to Bibian’s house we met Johan, he asked us 
where we were going and when we told him, he said it was 
better to wait a bit and not to go up the street because an 
operation was taking place. He said it was better to stay away 
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and wait until it was all over...he said he saw men from security 
forces dressed in civilian outfits but armed and asking for 
people’s IDs. Johan seemed scared because there was a truck 
without plates and people were being  put in there...We all 
decided to wait in a near grocery where I had the chance to ask 
them further about this type of operations. Bibian said people 
were reporting this type of actions in the area, she said some 
people that seemed to be security agents were entering the 
neighbourhoods as civilians and renting a house in order to 
collect information. This was then followed by the sudden arrival 
of security forces to the area to make raids and capture people 
or confiscate drugs...the problem according to Johan was that 
this was making the guys from the combos distrustful with people  
they had never seen before in the area, he said this is leading to 
selective killings and it is making it more and more dangerous to 
move around because now as he says ‘if they see you around 
and nobody knows you, they don’t give you time to explain they 
just leave you (kill you) there, immediately because you might be 
a detective’...Bibian agreed with Johan, she said in this moment 
everybody distrusts everybody, there is a widespread distrust 
and everyone is a potential enemy...especially because many 
people are facing a difficult economic situation and the police is 
offering to pay  for information, and this makes things worst...’ 
(Field diary note, 10/08/2010)   
Involving residents in intelligence gathering activities through public appeals 
for collaboration and through economic rewards for information148 had drastic 
effects on levels of trust among community residents; it also weakened even 
                                                          
148 In the midst of another serious outbreak of violence in a community at the centre-west of 
the city, the Police offered to pay citizens 10 million pesos to those who give information 
regarding the location of criminals or arms. The paradox is that these measures resemble d 
the strategies used by the armed actors; as the Commander of the National Police 
recognised, the leaders of one criminal band were offering 100 million pesos to people who 
help them kill one of the gang leaders who had apparently started the new cycle of violence 
by switching sides after killing one of his men. 
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more the social fabric. The authorities demanded the help of residents of 
these areas by providing information and reporting criminals to the 
authorities so that they could be prosecuted.  Public community meetings 
started to be used to collect intelligence on the activities of the local gangs 
and this raised the risks associated to attending or participating in this type of 
democratic spaces. Residents as mentioned before were very reluctant to 
talk about security issues and had been forced to develop informal protocols 
and protection mechanisms to protect their lives in this context. One of the 
most important ones was not to be seen as an informant and that was what 
the state demanded from residents. 
Paradoxically the number of crimes reported by citizens tended to diminish at 
the same time that violence increased. In comuna 1 denouncing gangs’ 
activities resulted in threats to people's lives or to their families, in 
assassinations, disappearances, public punishments or forced 
displacements. People who dared speak up despite high levels of distrust 
with the security institutions, were immediately targeted by the criminal 
actors. In interviews and conversations with residents they mentioned how 
frustrating it was for them to be asked by the authorities to come forward with 
information, especially because the lack of collaboration from residents was 
normally interpreted and portrayed by the state authorities as a 
demonstration of disloyalty with the state and as a proof of the residents´ 
permissive attitude towards criminality.  
‘But what do they expect us to do? the police officers in my 
neighbourhood are friends with the combos, the police knows 
where they are, who they are, where they sell their stuff...but the 
police come and ask us to denounce and if you report those 
things they kill you so what can we do? (Interview with female 
resident Comuna 1, 15/11/2009) 
Look there is a sort of confrontation between the state and the 
community, the problem is that when the state comes to make 
those raids even the Mayor comes here to say ‘this community is 
a permissive community and that attitude is sponsoring 
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delinquency, the community has to report the criminals and if you 
don’t denounce then it is your fault that there is violence and 
insecurity’...can you believe it? I cannot believe the state gives 
the responsibility to citizens for the security situation...the police, 
the other day was distributing this little card that said ‘it is the 
community’s responsibility  to be safe or not’, meaning that 
residents had to denounce so that captures of criminals could be 
effective, but that strategy won’t work here, everybody knows 
that if you go and denounce and a guy is captured, then they tell 
him who reported him and then a week later when he is back in 
the streets you are screwed, it is very complex.. (Interview 
Young male resident Comuna 1, 11/12/2010) 
The way residents of these areas were pressured to collaborate with the 
state in exchange providing them protection and safety differed massively 
from the type of participation in the security effort demanded from other 
sectors of society less vulnerable to insecurity but political and economically 
more powerful. It also demonstrated a lack of understanding of the complex 
and ambiguous role played by armed actors in the community. As a young 
community resident explained during an interview, gang members were not 
outsiders or members of occupying forces in these territories, but young 
members of the community. They were born and raised there and this meant 
they had strong family and social ties: 
‘They (state authorities) don’t understand what happens in the 
family or the neighbourhood if someone decides to denounce a 
guy (gang member), that guy is a neighbour’s son and reporting 
him  will cause confrontations immediately, relations between the 
families will get broken and then solidarity links that help families 
survive in these difficult economic contexts get broken, so yes 
the Mayor and the police officers accuse people of condemning 
criminality but they don’t go and see what happens socially and 
economically in the neighbourhood when people denounce, they 
don’t see that that guy (gang member) is the one who brings 
food to the table, he is the one that supports 4 or 5 children, the 
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one that helps economically other neighbours’; the authorities 
say that because there is participatory budgeting now that they 
are providing everything here, but they lie to themselves... 
(Interview Young male resident Comuna 1, 11/12/2010) 
The guys from the gangs give people money to pay the bills, 
they also give them money to buy food for a while...the truth is 
that they do help families. Sometimes people go to them but 
sometimes the guys (gang members) also come to offer their 
help. That happens because the economic situation here is very 
difficult...this is so common and people see that as 
normal...people accept as given that if there is a patron and he 
has money he normally helps people... (Interview female 
resident Comuna 1, 10/03/2012) 
The ambiguous and often contradictory roles exercised by armed actors in 
Comuna 1 were in no way exclusive to the Medellin context. Studies 
undertaken in other urban contexts across the global south have also shown 
armed actors’ capacity to simultaneously exercise violence and provide 
valuable services to residents of marginalised communities (Moser and 
McIlwaine 2004; Arias 2006; Rodgers 2006). However a distinctive and 
paradoxical aspect revealed by this research undertaken in Medellin’s 
intervened communities is that armed actors’ social recognition and influence 
in these contexts were sometimes favoured, rather than weakened, by state 
intervention in the process of governing these communities.  
State initiatives for the physical and social transformation of the ungoverned 
areas and populations certainly helped the local state achieve recognition 
and increase its legitimacy nationally and internationally. These have been 
regarded by outsiders as examples of state efficiency and institutional 
capacity and portrayed as a successful state led form of urban 
transformation; however as the evidence provided above demonstrates, that 
success did not mean increasing state legitimacy within the targeted 
communities. The paradoxical and unexpected consequences of some of the 
security initiatives implemented by the state confirmed that the local state 
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was able to build its service delivery capacity and its ability to exercise 
coercion in these areas, without necessarily challenging the power and 
recognition of other violent actors.  
Ungoverned or poly-governed? 
One of the most paradoxical aspects of living in a community subject to state 
intervention and considered by policymakers and outsiders as integrated and 
‘governed’ by the state, is that residents were now subject to multiple forms 
of power exercised at the same time by the state and by coercive violent 
actors. People had to find ways to navigate this social order characterised by 
the combination of legal and illegal and formal and informal forms of authority 
in a context characterised still by high levels of vulnerability and exclusion. 
Those once regarded as detached and ungoverned areas of the city had 
become key showcases of the city’s renaissance. These areas were the 
scenario of the local state’s consolidation while also being epicentres of the 
consolidation of armed actors and criminal networks capable of exercising 
high levels of social, economic and territorial control. The following segment 
from an interview and the note from my field diary illustrate: 
‘there are around 50 combos in this area (Comuna 1) and each 
controls its own territory and in their territory each group controls 
the payment of vacunas (extortions), they control who can cross 
the territory, how justice is done or not, who is respected and 
why is he respected... and we (residents) have to respect those 
many controls’ (Interview Young male resident Comuna 1, 
20/11/2010) 
‘some of the guys who participate in the youth initiatives at the 
community centre where I work decided to organise a lunada149 
‘get together under the moon light’ in one of the parks of the 
neighbourhood and I offered to help them. This is a social and 
music event for residents, especially young people, where a 
small stage is installed and young people play music, read 
                                                          
149 These are gatherings where young people and the community residents in general can 
meet and enjoy art and music performances.   
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poems and reflexions and  youth groups from this and close by 
neighbourhoods show their talents (mostly break dancing and 
rap). The organisers wanted to walk to the venue with candles 
and a few music instruments but were still debating about the 
venue. John suggested the sport area in the X neighbourhood 
which seemed perfect for the event, but Juan replied that to do 
the event there they will need to ask for permission. According to 
John they did not need permission to go there, the park was a 
public space and they had right to be there. This however did not 
convince Juan and the other young organisers. Andrea 
intervened and said that she had a friend who could arranged 
things and get the permission, but the debate heated up...Given 
that the park was located in front of the neighbourhood’s police 
station I asked if that was the institution providing permissions for 
activities like that in a park. The girl next to me smiled and said 
‘no, it is not the police, it is the paracos (members of paramilitary 
groups who dominated the area)  the ones that control who 
enters and uses that park, people have to ask their 
permission’...at the end they agreed that asking for these actors’ 
consent to use the park was legitimising them and their violent 
actions, so it was better to do the event in another area ’...(Field 
diary note, 25/11/2010) 
The strict control armed actors imposed on the daily activities of residents 
was revealing of their coercive power despite the permanent state presence 
in the community. However the armed groups’ capacity to control 
communities was also linked to the fact that they provided valuable services 
such as coercive forms of protection, safety and justice, acted as mediators 
in community and interpersonal conflicts, supported recreational and social 
activities in the community, and were also very efficient at raising steady 
incomes for their families. The following accounts of a resident during a focus 
group and of a psychologist working in a local community organisation 
illustrate some of the different roles gang members exercised in the 
community:  
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Last year the police had to be transferred from my 
neighbourhood to another area and the situation became 
difficult, people were being robbed in each corner; girls were 
getting their purses taken, their mobile phones; so people 
organised themselves and brought guys from other 
neighbourhood, from a ‘combo’ [local name for a gang]. We paid 
them so that they will guard the area...So look, if the police and 
the government, don’t give us security, people look for ways, 
even if it is by creating combos... I wonder, if things continue like 
this, when are we ever going to see an end to this gang 
problem? (Focus group with residents West Area (Comunas 
5,6,7,13), 12/11/09 Cited in Abello Colak and Guarneros-Meza, 
2014).  
We try to encourage people not to go to the armed actors to 
solve their problems or to legitimise them, but to use the state 
institutions available in the area. We try to support them in the 
process when they do, but it is very hard for people to comply 
with all the formalities and procedures involved, plus these 
processes can take a long time and often end up in 
impunity..Instead the tough guys [gang leaders]are there in the 
street and will offer fast solutions...Yesterday, for example, Julio 
[a boy in the neighbourhood] came to tell me his dad is coming 
home drunk and hitting his mum, he is scared he is going to kill 
her one day, so he wants to ask the tough guy to intervene. 
When I told him that we can talk to the police or family services, 
he begged us not to do that because social services might take 
him away from his mum and nothing will be done about his dad... 
Instead, the local gang can ‘punish’ his dad in a way he will be 
too scared to beat his mum again. (Interview with Professional 
working in Comuna 1,  07/09/2009 Cited in Abello Colak and 
Guarneros-Meza, 2014) 
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These multiple roles made residents ambivalent towards gang members and 
state authorities. In an interview, a community leader tried to make sense of 
the situation:  
‘The legitimacy that the combos (gangs) have achieved comes 
from residents’ acceptance of their control. People accept their 
authority  and go to them to solve their daily problems...people 
resort to those actors when something gets stolen in the 
neighbourhood, when there is a street quarrel,  when there are 
family conflicts or fights among couples; people go to them and 
give them permission to intervene in those moments; however if 
the gangs exceed certain levels of coercion then people resort to 
the state authority such as the police...when there is only one 
illegal armed actor exercising its power in the community, 
residents tend to accept its authority; however when that actor is 
in confrontation with other armed actors, then residents demand 
more police presence and state action. At the end people distrust 
both: police and gangs. Residents still expect and demand state 
presence in the neighbourhood, at the same time that they resort 
to the armed actors and distrust the way they often abuse their 
power...this is very related to the widespread notion that to 
increase safety there must be increments in the number of police 
forces and permanent presence of state security forces  
(Interview Community Leader Comuna 1, 05/11/2009) 
Although many people disapproved of the disturbances that gangs’ violent 
confrontations caused to their lives, many people respected their members, 
feared them and occasionally sanctioned some of their actions. The 
prevalence of structural problems perpetuating social exclusion and 
inequality also worked in favour of the armed actors’ influence in this 
comuna. Despite the physical improvements in the area, some of which 
made access to and from these areas easier, and despite improvements in 
programmes targeting children, access to education and expansion of basic 
utilities, state interventions did not address chronic levels of unemployment 
and precarious housing. Many residents now had access to state services 
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such as water, electricity and sewage and some of them had even legalised 
their properties, but they still struggled to find ways to pay for those services 
and the taxes that came with their integration to the city. For some families 
this even meant increments in their cost of living. In this context people 
resorted to informal and sometimes illegal means of support offered by 
armed actors, as residents explained:  
‘when Gloria, Dora, Ines and me were sitting outside Dora’s 
house a young guy rang the bell of a house close by, when Ines 
saw him she said ’oh its pay day in that house’. When I asked 
them who that guy was and what she meant. Dora said ‘he is the 
one who comes to collect the pagadiario’. She explained that it 
was very common for residents to borrow money from the guys 
(local gangs). She said when people needed cash they could go 
to them and ask for loans. They all say it is very common. Ines’ 
neighbour for example, has a three floors house, and when the 
guy (gang member) comes to collect the instalments 6 people in 
his family come out, that means 6 people from the same family 
have debts with the gangs. Apparently it is a very organised 
system, if a resident has been recommended by another user of 
the system then the guys (gang members) will lend that person 
whatever he/she needs, otherwise they will lend a first time 
borrower maximum 200 thousand (around US$109). They 
charge 20% interest and each person decides how they want to 
pay the debt. Once the person proves that he or she is capable 
of paying the instalments on time, his/her limit is increased... I 
asked what happens if you cannot pay, they said ‘You can ask 
them to give you some time and a new due date is given, but 
they add 20% to what you did not pay that month’...Then I asked 
if people are not scared to have debts with those guys and Gloria 
said: ‘yes people are scared of being killed if they don’t pay their 
debts and that is why one pays!’ (Field diary note, 18/07/ 2011) 
 ‘...many people are struggling to pay their bills, it is so stressful 
to see your bills accumulating when you don’t have money to 
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pay and they end up cutting off your services... a friend of mine 
and other neighbours are now getting smuggled water150 and 
installing prepaid card systems to pay for electricity. They pay 
these and the gas with the help of ‘pagadiarios’ (illegal credit 
system provided by local criminal organisations)....Consuming 
and then paying the bill is impossible, so instead people prefer to 
top up their cards with 5000 pesos in electricity which last like 
three days... The majority of people having to sort out these kind 
of problems are women...the truth is that situation is hard and 
people cannot live with a minimum wage, the only activities that 
give money here are the ones armed actors are involved in . A 
minimum wage is like 560.000 (230 us dollars aprox) and with 
that it is impossible to sustain a family of four members. So you 
have to have two jobs but if you are lucky to have one job in the 
private sector you will be working from 8 am till 6pm and you 
won’t have time to get a second job somewhere else. On the 
other side the guys here working for the guys (gangs) earn very 
good, they even get money for a bike and all the things young 
guys aspire to have... (Interview Female Resident 02/03/2012) 
Even though they were portrayed in official discourses as criminal and 
predatory actors, and  generated insecurity and exploitative practices for 
residents indeed, gang members also exercised other functions in the 
community which granted them recognition and legitimacy. Many residents 
had naturalised the presence of armed groups; these groups were integrated 
by young men whom they saw growing up, they were their neighbours’ sons 
and people felt close to them. Sometimes they even felt the need to help 
them when they seemed in danger by allowing them to hide in their houses 
for example. Their legitimacy did not mean however that people did not value 
state presence; many residents had become very dependent on state 
programs and subsidies and they often demanded more state presence, 
                                                          
150 Once the service is suspended due to lack of payment, some residents pay bribes to 
employees of the public service company so that they reconnect the service but arrange it in 
ways that the meter does not read their actual consumption. 
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even in the form of police forces. In the search for means of subsistence 
people constantly navigated their way in the midst of multiple forms of legal 
and illegal authority and power.  
Building another type of citizen?: Resistance to subjectification 
processes in ungoverned spaces 
‘...The citizen that the local administration promotes is the citizen 
that is unconditionally loyal to the state, the citizen that 
participates, that cares about the city issues, but that is not 
critical  of the state, the citizen that participates to validate what 
the state does...a politically malleable citizen...for example why 
don’t  they respect and protect the right to be a conscientious 
objector in this city? Why don’t they value the citizen that not 
only seeks the recognition of his rights but goes further and 
suggests changes to structural problems? the citizen that 
denounces the ‘false positives’151 does not have space in this 
country, neither the citizen that says this political model does not 
work...those kinds of citizen don’t work for the state...’ (Interview 
Young Community leader Comuna 13, 11/06/2012) 
As the quote above illustrates, there were some voices that resisted the 
subjectification of residents from these communities as unruled sectors of 
society in need of control and government. Forms of resistance were 
relevant to this study of governing process given that, as Foucault 
recognised, power relations are shaped by the way people resist 
subjectification processes (Foucault 1980:142). Despite chronic levels of 
violence, in the community context depicted throughout this chapter I found 
examples of what Pearce calls meaningful forms of citizenship (Pearce 2007) 
which targeted the State and also challenged violent actors. These emerged 
from people’s everyday experiences and daily interactions with powerful 
actors.  
                                                          
151 Extrajudicial killings of civilians by the army.  
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Some residents had developed methods to exercise their citizenship in ways 
that kept civil spaces opened to promote democratic values, nonviolent forms 
of interaction and solutions to the difficult problems affecting urban 
communities. They were often members of community organisations with a 
long history of community work in the communities. Some of these forms of 
citizenship emerged when residents organised themselves and mobilised to 
demand solutions to their problems or more participation, or to resist 
excesses and arbitrariness of legal and illegal forms of authority and power. 
In many cases their actions de-sanctioned the use of violence in intervened 
communities and defied imposed restrictions and codes of behaviour through 
creative means. The following segments of a focus group with young 
members of a community organisation and an interview with a community 
leader help to illustrate the way some of these expressions of citizenship 
materialised:  
Young man 1:  ‘Young people are becoming more and more 
aware of the historic conditions in this context that affect their 
lives, they understand that the state has not guaranteed their 
rights or that the urban conflict affect their rights due to murders, 
recruitment and displacements, limitations to their right to move 
in the territories and some of them decide to act in many different 
ways, some choose to directly denounce these problems, others 
use art to denounce things reducing the risks, others resist the 
model of development in the city, others resist particular 
governmental decisions that affect them...people resist many 
things, in this comuna (13) for example, people are working for 
memory, non violence and peace promotion...the exercise of 
memory for example seek to resist and challenge the official 
versions of the conflict in this comuna, of the operacion Orion 
and what followed for example, we resist to forget what has 
happened here, we resist not to forget those who have fallen and 
those who disappeared... 
Young man 2:  There are also direct actions in the context of 
violence...if they killed someone then we go there and bring 
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music, try to accompany the affected community...we organise 
festivals, if there is an area people cannot cross then we go and 
organise a youth carnival..in 2008 for example we made an 
action called ‘because limits are not frontiers’. For a long time we 
could not go to some neighbourhoods due to the confrontations 
between combos (gangs), so we dressed in costumes, put on 
makeup and entered those areas dressed as clowns and 
jugglers and with music, we did not ask permission to 
anybody...it was a symbolic occupation of those areas, we were 
like 50 young people attacking with art and music the power of 
actors who impose restrictions and say nobody crosses these 
areas...using culture and art we were telling the residents of 
those areas they should not legitimise these restrictions , we 
were saying we don’t agree and we don’t comply ...it was not 
about defeating them, it was about transmitting a message to the 
community...the biggest struggle is in the cultural sphere, we 
need to bring down the structures that have been created...last 
year we did another action called ‘even in the midst of the 
darkness’ it was called like that because some of the combos 
(gangs) in the  X neighbourhood had destroyed the public lights 
in the neighbourhood and the whole area was in darkness, so we 
went there  with music with graffiti artists and around 9pm we 
turned up some lamps and candles in the darkest area... those 
groups (gangs) are not the only ones who have legitimacy and 
power here, the community organisations have another type of 
power and influence in the community...we don’t fight against 
them we fight against situations that create this context of 
violence we live in, and try to find solutions...(Focus group young 
residents Comuna 13 at youth group,  10/08/2011) 
We (a group of local organizations) had to design a protection 
strategy in X neighbourhood when the local armed group 
threatened the lives of some of the local leaders... the strategy 
contained different elements, it had a psycho-social, a social, a 
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political, a legal and a communication  component. The idea was 
to protect the life of the threatened residents...the community got 
together and organised in a way that all helped to guarantee that 
nothing happen to them...residents decided to have a 
communication strategy to inform if they saw weird movements 
or people in the neighbourhood, we created  a network of 
partners from outside the neighbourhood that could made 
dissuasion...it was decided as part of the strategy police forces 
were not allowed to enter the area, because this was an 
additional insecurity factor ...the strategy relied on the use of 
social networks and the community’s capacity to protect their 
leaders ...we also had to talk to the armed actors. Members of 
the armed group  were invited to a neighbourhood assembly and 
there with the whole neighbourhood present, the residents 
questioned why they (armed group) were going to attack their 
representatives to the JAC152...on that occasion the community 
defended their leaders and pressured the armed group to give 
up any intention to attack the residents of the 
neighbourhood...the community faced its own problems without 
resorting to violence or to intermediaries and created measures 
to protect themselves...this was a alternative action in moments 
of emergency ...it was very hard to deal with the police’s 
reaction... for the security forces it was uncomfortable because 
their principle is that there are not forbidden territories for the 
state anymore , so when residents put conditions to them they 
react with suspicion, the police tried to stigmatise this community 
as allies of insurgent actors, so representatives of the community 
had to talk to the Secretary of government and he is the one who 
understood the complexity of the situation and why bringing 
shock  troops was not a good idea...he decided to only allow the 
                                                          
152 Community Boards (Juntas de Accion Comunal) are civic organisations made up by 
residents who work to promote the development of their communities and citizen 
participation. These boards are recognised by the Constitution as part of citizens’ rights to 
association. 
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entry of community police officers who had a very different 
relation with the community...not founded on intelligence or 
repression....(Interview Male Community leader, 05/11/2009) 
These initiatives demonstrate people’s agency and willingness to exercise 
their rights in these community contexts, even if state or illegal actors do not 
recognise them and even violate them. As a recent study by the OSHM 
demonstrated (OSHM 2014), in many communities of the periphery of 
Medellin there are countless examples of meaningful forms of citizenship 
using sport, art, recreational, religious and cultural activities to protect 
peoples’ lives in the midst of armed confrontations, to demand respect for 
peoples’ rights, to promote nonviolent forms of interaction, to encourage the 
state to recognise citizens as legitimate interlocutors and to empower people 
to articulate their demands, to make their own diagnosis of local problems, 
and to formulate solutions to their community problems based on their 
needs.  
These initiatives challenged the subjectification of residents of marginalised 
communities as either helpless victims of state abandonment who passively 
wait for state institutions to go and solve their problems, or feral inhabitants 
that needed to be controlled, educated, and transformed into law abiding 
citizens.   Their actions constantly called power into question and in the 
process, the governing process. 
Conclusion 
This chapter revealed an underexplored aspect on the ‘Medellin Model’. It 
uncovered how the mixed security approach used in this city was 
experienced by the residents of the marginalised communities who became 
subject to various forms of state power and intervention in the process of 
securing the city. Through an analysis of the data collected through 
participant observation, informal conversations, semi-structured interviews 
and focus groups carried out with residents of Medellin’s comunas, this 
chapter revealed that the exercise of territorial presence by the state in these 
areas did not necessarily mean that the state was able to address residents’ 
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differential and chronic security needs, or that it was able to reduce the 
influence of illegal economies and their brokers in marginalised communities.  
 
Although security problems became less visible, especially for those living 
outside marginalised communities, problematic state practices and social 
practices associated with illegality continued. The power of criminal actors 
also increased. The evidence presented here confirms that governing 
processes in Medellin resulting from the effort to pacify and transform what 
were regarded as problematic communities paradoxically created 
opportunities for violent actors to deepen their influence in these contexts. 
Although the reproduction of violences and insecurity at the neighbourhood 
level continued, the analysis also revealed that some residents were able to 
articulate alternative notions of their own subjectivity and of the role of the 
state in ways that challenged stigmatisation and violent practices.  
This analysis is important because it not only reveals what security provision 
in a global city of the global South such as Medellin means for people on the 
ground, but also because it highlights the contribution that the use of 
ethnographic methodologies can make to security thinking by improving our 
understanding of differential experiences of urban security in contexts of 
chronic violence. Based on this analysis, in the next section I unpack the 
logic of governance of urban insecurity in Medellin throughout the 2000s and 
what the attempt to pacify ‘ungoverned’ areas meant for the construction of 
state authority and its legitimacy in this particularly challenging urban 
context. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusions 
In this thesis I have attempted to develop and apply a critical analytical 
approach for the study of public security responses and initiatives 
implemented in urban contexts affected by chronic levels of violence and 
instability.  This analytical approach aims at filling existing gaps and 
overcoming some of the limitations of predominant approaches within the 
emerging literature on urban security in the global South. I have argued that 
an analytical approach that looks carefully at the working of power in security 
provision processes and that incorporates the voice and experiences of 
those who are targeted by security initiatives and programmes, is better 
placed to reveal the political aspects and governmental consequences that 
security interventions have for particular populations.  
The critical approach suggested in this thesis, uses analytical tools based on 
Foucault’s work on governmentality and complements them with a combined 
methodology that puts security responses under the microscope of power 
and of people’s experiences of security. The alternative analytical approach I 
suggest in this thesis enables analyses of public interventions aimed at 
dealing with violence and instability in urban contexts, in three steps:  (i) the 
first step focuses on identifying political, social and economic processes that 
might have affected changes in the way security problems are framed and 
understood, (ii) as a second step, the governmental responses to those 
problems are analysed; this includes using critical discourse analysis to look 
at how those problems are understood by authorities and how these lead to 
the use of particular techniques, and finally (iii) the critical approach includes 
an ethnographic analysis of the kind of security these understandings and 
techniques lead to on the ground, from the perspective of those who become 
subjects of state intervention. 
In this thesis I use this alternative analytical approach to investigate the 
configuration of a mixed security strategy in Medellin, which has attracted 
international attention for its contribution to promoting urban transformations 
and reductions in historically high levels of violence in this city. The insights 
that emerged from the analysis of the Medellin case using this analytical 
approach demonstrate that bringing in these dimensions (power, people’s 
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experiences and a wide range of economic, political and social processes) to 
the study of urban security, can illuminate aspects of the provision of security 
which remain overlooked within the existing literature. Based on this analysis 
I argue that this critical approach can contribute to academic and policy 
debates on urban security in fragile cities.  
In the next section I present an overview of what the use of this alternative 
analytical approach revealed in the case of Medellin, before drawing some 
more general conclusions of this thesis. 
Medellin’s Security Strategy through a Critical Analysis of Power  
The analysis of the Medellin case started with a review of the recent history 
of security provision in Medellin, which revealed that a great deal of 
preventive and coercive security policies had been implemented in this city 
since the 1990s. During that decade the state had used repressive measures 
to weaken and dismantle armed and criminal actors, it had also started to 
target poor communities and youth with socio-economic interventions, and 
even negotiated and supported the demobilization of armed groups in order 
to reduce violence. Many of these interventions and initiatives, as well as the 
learning they produced, served as actual foundations for the implementation 
of an integral security strategy a decade later. However a key difference 
between previous efforts to halt urban violence and the sort of security 
provision that took shape during the 2000s in this city, is that the wide range 
of programmes and interventions implemented by the state and targeting 
marginalized communities, were guided by a different way of thinking about 
the problem of violence in the city, as well as new calculations and 
objectives. 
While during the 1990s there was a broad consensus that high levels of 
violence in the city were the result of the complex combination of structural 
factors (such as an unequal urban development, chronic poverty, cultural 
traits that facilitated the reproduction of violence and high levels of impunity) 
and detonator factors (such as the expansion of drug trafficking); by the 
beginning of the 2000s there was growing consensus in the city -and the 
country, that the problem of violence responded to the state’s incapacity and 
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unwillingness to exercise its sovereignty and authority in peripheral areas of 
the city, where non-state actors had been granted space and power. The 
assumption that the main problem was the state’s incapacity to act as the 
main social ordering force in marginalized communities led to a new way of 
understanding the function of security provision in the city. It also led to the 
construction of different relations with residents of these communities who 
became subjects of a wide range of governmental efforts. 
The research process allowed me to identify some of the factors that led to 
this shift in local imaginaries of insecurity in the city. The alternative 
approach and Foucault’s analytical tools allowed me to take into account 
neoliberal processes, such as local elites’ efforts to prepare the city for 
attracting investors and hosting mega events; but also other factors that had 
been overlooked in existing analyses of the Medellin Model. For example, 
the implementation of a national security strategy focused on defeating 
insurgent groups and recovering territorial control across the country and 
local civil society’s agency and influence in shaping the local agenda. This 
was an important step because it allowed me to explore the security strategy 
used in Medellin in the last decade, in the context of a wide range of 
processes which were particular to this city. 
The second step in the analysis which consisted of unpacking the rationality 
of the government of violence in the city through critical discourse analysis, 
revealed the assumptions and calculations that steer interventions in what 
were regarded as ‘ungoverned communities’. As discussed in chapter five, 
the combined security strategy used in Medellin, as part of a wider urban 
transformation and development effort, departed from the construction of 
marginalised urban communities as areas of vulnerability and as sources of 
instability and illegality. In order to be integrated into what was regarded as 
the prosperous city order, these ungoverned areas and their populations 
were seen by policymakers and security agents as in need of state 
transformation, control and normalisation, and for that purpose a combination 
of sovereign and biopolitical forms of power was put in place. Once subject 
to multiple mechanisms of state power, these ungoverned areas became 
useful displays for the internationalisation of the city, for the attraction of 
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capital and the marketization of a so called innovative model of urban 
transformation.  
As it was analyzed in chapter five and six, the construction of the problem of 
urban violence in terms of state weaknesses and the characterization of 
these communities as neglected and ungoverned, permitted the preservation 
of security discourses and practices that stigmatized their residents and 
particular population groups, even within an urban development model that 
promoted their integration to the city proper. Young people from poor 
communities for example, received more attention from the state, but were 
still regarded as potential risks to society and as subjects that needed 
control, disciplining and persuasion in order to avoid criminality. This led, for 
example, to the implementation of violence prevention programmes that 
were widely perceived as favoring a minority of young people linked to illegal 
economies, while the majority of young people living in marginalized areas 
received comparatively few state incentives and continued to be exposed to 
legal and illegal forms of coercion and to structural forms of marginalization 
and exclusion. 
Making explicit the assumptions behind public security programmes, 
identifying them and critically analyzing them, allowed us to see security 
policies from a new perspective and to reveal their governmental 
implications. Critical discourse analysis of authorities’ assumptions showed 
that the approach to provide security In Medellin involved a process of 
subjectification of residents of marginalised communities as ‘ungoverned 
citizens’. In the authorities’ view this justified the use of multiple mechanisms 
of power to bring these communities under state influence and to transform 
them physically and culturally. In this context, state intervention aimed at 
reducing the likelihood of violence, but also at constructing law abiding and 
loyal citizens of the state in historically ungoverned areas. The evidence 
collected showed that once subject to state multifaceted intervention, these 
subjects were expected to become loyal citizens whose assumed support to 
illegal actors would be replaced by allegiance and support to the state in the 
fight for dominance in these areas. 
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It was important to reveal the way in which power was exercised on residents 
of marginalised communities in order to achieve particular objectives. While 
other analyses of state interventions in Medellin during the last decade have 
overlooked the governmental implications of efforts to contain violence, the 
critical approach used in this research allowed us to recognise them. It 
revealed that residents of marginalised areas became subjects of new forms 
of state power as a result of a security strategy which prioritised the 
establishment of state permanent presence in neighbourhoods, the reduction 
of levels of homicides and the improvement of state’s capacity to occupy 
urban space, to transform illegal cultures and to persuade those regarded as 
prone to violence.  
The third step of the critical analysis of the security strategy in Medellin 
exposed some of the unforeseen impacts the implementation of this security 
approach had on targeted communities from the perspective of its residents. 
Accessed through ethnography, resident’s daily experiences of this type of 
state presence and power revealed for example that the combination of 
repressive and preventive interventions did not lead to changes in 
problematic entrenched police practices which helped reproduce 
stigmatization of vulnerable groups and violences at the neighbourhood 
level. Also that some of the mechanisms used by the state to try to pacify 
and transform these communities, unleashed processes that allowed 
violent illegal actors to deepen their influence in communities and created 
unforeseen challenges to community organisations and residents who 
challenged violence and strived to build democratic forms of citizenship in 
these contexts.  
These contradictory aspects of the state intervention in marginalised 
communities were often disregarded by security experts and authorities in 
the city who measured the security effort in terms of state’s capacity to 
exercise permanent presence in these areas and reductions in the most 
visible indicators of violence. Revealing the problematic role of knowledge 
production around security provision in the city played in highlighting some 
outcomes and obscuring others, is another important advantage of the use of 
the analytical approach used here. The critical analysis of the way 
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knowledge production supported governmental practices in Medellin 
revealed for example that the emphasis on homicides rates and state 
permanent presence in marginalized areas as main indicators of success in 
the security effort, contributed to making invisible in the public debate the 
persistence of structural factors that continued to reproduce violence and 
insecurity in intervened urban communities. It also revealed that those 
targeted by the mixed security approach however, had little capacity to 
influence the assessment of its alleged success in reducing violence and 
insecurity and continued to face huge difficulties in building dignifying lives. 
As evidence presented in chapter six suggests, they continued to endure 
high levels of insecurity and violence, at the same time that illegal violent 
actors continued to find opportunities to consolidate their capacity to exercise 
social, economic, and territorial forms of control over these communities.  
The critical analytical approach developed in this thesis also revealed an 
unexpected outcome of state efforts to govern the ‘ungoverned areas of 
Medellin’ as a mean to secure the city. Despite increments in public spending 
and urban upgrading efforts, governmental efforts by the state in these 
communities led to the creation of conditions that favoured the 
consolidation of a complex social order characterised by still chronic, but less 
visible levels of violence and insecurity, in which legal and illegal actors 
continue to simultaneously exercise forms of authority on citizens. In this 
urban order many urban dwellers continue to be subject to the violent control 
and influence of armed actors, while at the same time their communities are 
epicentres of forms of state intervention that favor the consolidation of 
Medellin as a global city. 
The Government of Insecurity and the State in Medellin 
The critical analysis of the rationality of government of urban violence in 
Medellin in the 2000s also exposed some aspects of the state and the way it 
seeks to exercise power in this urban context. The security approach was not 
only about reducing violence, but about rendering ‘ungoverned spaces’ and 
their communities governable by a capable and efficient local state which 
was in the process of advancing an urban development agenda focused on 
the city’s integration to the global economy.  Concerns with signs of state 
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fragility and the characterization of the urban space as fragmented, with 
orderly, prosperous and effectively functional areas on one side and feral 
areas with complex problems of poverty, violence, entrenched cultures of 
illegality, and in hands of armed actors on the other, led policymakers at 
national and local level to justify the implementation of special measures in 
the latter.  
Constructed as ‘ungoverned’ and vulnerable, marginalized communities, and 
their populations, were made visible as objects of public policy. Their 
inclusion to the city order was seen as strategic for building the state’s 
capacity to govern and pacify a city with a global reputation for violence and 
crime, but with global economic aspirations. In this context, these historically 
neglected urban communities became the epicentre and stage for a state 
consolidation process, with an emphasis on the institutional strengthening of 
the local state and its efficient management of urban space.   
As Foucault and other scholars have noted, the state’s nature, attributes, 
organisation and activities are shaped not only by the materiality of its 
institutions, but by reconfigurations of forms of exercising power (Foucault 
2007:108) and by institutionalised symbolic, ideological and discursive 
processes and by condensations of social relations (Holsti 1996:84; Muller 
2012; Jessop 2001,2008; Migdal 2001).  As analysed through this thesis, 
security programmes and initiatives used to reduce violence in Medellin, also 
intended to build a stronger and capable state and produced new forms of 
interaction between state, citizens and a diversity of community and local 
actors.  
By looking at these differential relations of power, it is possible to identify 
some attributes of the consolidating local state. The security strategy did not 
necessarily allow the state to achieve legitimacy within marginalized urban 
communities.  State institutions still are not the main providers of justice and 
security either; however a multifaceted security approach allowed the state to 
be present in these areas, exercising some forms of authority and power. 
This became useful in the management, rather than elimination, of urban 
271 
 
violences in the context of efforts to pursue neoliberal urban development 
agenda.  
This security strategy also allowed the state to project to those living outside 
these communities an image of efficiency and diligence, in other words, it 
allowed it to be seen as less fragile. The local state in Medellin is considered 
today one of the most robust and efficient entities in the country, capable of 
delivering services to its citizens and innovative solutions to acute urban 
problems and as successful at adapting the city to the requirements of a 
global status city. While these are important aspects, these do not tell us 
much about the way the state exercises its authority while becoming a less 
fragile entity. The analysis of the government of insecurity in the city in the 
last decade, on the other hand allows us to identify the emergence of a 
particular form of governmentality focused on pacifying the survival of big 
proportions of the urban population which remain excluded from the legal 
economy and from the benefits of neoliberal urban development.  
In their analyses of social structuration, Foucault and Agamben have 
suggested that the exercise of power in modern societies relies on the 
categorization of different types of citizens and on the enactment of different 
forms of engagement with these citizens (Foucault 1994; Agamben 2005). 
Agamben for example suggested that through the staging of ‘states of 
exception’, special forms of regulation are exercised over particular 
populations, often regarded as ‘invalid’ citizens (Agamben 2005). In Medellin, 
the categorization of certain populations as ‘ungoverned’, abandoned by the 
state and prone to illegality and violence, also justified the implementation of 
‘special’ interventions in these areas regarded as vulnerable, but also 
dangerous for the urban order. It also led to the use of biopolitical forms of 
power to construct passive and loyal citizens of the state in these areas. 
However, in Medellin, the intention of establishing such differential relations 
and interactions with ‘ungoverned citizens’ , was not to attack or eliminate 
them, as critics of neoliberal processes  suggest it is often the case with the 
way the state engages with ‘surplus populations’. The categorization of this 
type of communities and citizens and the state interventions this led to, 
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served instead to pacify as much as possible their convulsive survival in a 
highly exclusionary urban order.   
This form of governmentality is a key feature of the way the state has 
attempted to consolidate its authority in Medellin in the last decade. This 
approach to build state power has proven useful in this case, especially in 
the context of increasing expectations that cities aspiring to become 
prosperous enclaves are governed through the parameters of good, 
democratic and inclusive forms of governance.  Through the pacification of 
the precarious life of ‘ungoverned citizens’, the local state in Medellin was 
able to build its capacity to exercise power –although not encompassing or 
unchallenged. It was also able to develop its institutional capacity for the 
delivery of services and implementation of a wide range of programmes at 
local level. And finally, the local state could also pursue the 
internationalization of the city in a context of fierce urban competition for 
capital and marketise its approach to urban development.  
The evidence analyzed in this thesis suggests however that despite the 
advantages that this form of governmentality represented for the state, it only 
enabled a limited integration to the city for marginalized communities, given 
that it left untouched existing patterns of accumulation and distribution of 
capital. It also constructed residents of these areas as highly visible for policy 
purposes, but as passive subjects of state power. As the research revealed, 
the experience of this type of state power and limited form of citizenship for 
residents of marginalised communities, was still plagued by chronic 
insecurity, risks, precariousness and illegal and legal forms of coercion.  
 General Conclusions 
This research offers a new perspective on the role that socio political 
relations play in the provision of security in fragile cities and the interface 
between security provision and governing processes in these contexts. It 
also develops an analytical approach which allows us to critically explore the 
way urban security problems are understood and addressed in fragile cities 
and what this means for the kind of security that is delivered to the most 
vulnerable sectors of the population. The analysis of urban security provision 
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through this alternative analytical approach provides a better understanding 
of how security responses are crafted in particular contexts and of their 
profound impact on the way state power and legitimacy are constructed. It 
also provides a more nuanced understanding of how particular security 
approaches are experienced by those who become targets of public efforts 
to contain, prevent or manage urban violence in fragile cities.  
This research highlights the importance of incorporating these dimensions to 
analyses of the processes by which violence, crime and instability are being 
addressed in cities of the global South. The knowledge produced through a 
critical exploration of security provision which takes into account the role of 
power and the experiences of those who are subject of state power through 
the implementation of security initiatives, is relevant for academic and policy 
debates on urban security, but also for the expansion of the research agenda 
and methodological innovation within the emerging field of urban security. 
Building on Foucault’s work on power, this research encourages us to 
‘denaturalize’ the assumptions that support security policies, crime 
prevention programmes and security management initiatives and to reveal 
the political aspects of such interventions. This means, understanding how 
these assumptions have governmental consequences and serve to achieve 
governmental purposes. Through the analysis of the Medellin case, this 
thesis demonstrated the advantages of undertaking studies of security that 
look at the rationality and techniques of government involved in the provision 
of security. For example, the possibility of uncovering how forms of social 
governance used in the process of reducing violence impact on the way 
states attempt to build legitimacy and authority in challenging contexts, such 
as those characterised by rapid urbanisation and multiple forms of violence.   
The trend towards the use of more complex security strategies, to deal with 
acute problems of urban violence and instability in the global South, 
highlights the importance of moving beyond predominant analytical 
approaches for the study of urban security. Forms of state intervention, 
combining coercive, preventive, social and spatial components, have been 
promoted as promising strategies that can be replicated in different urban 
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contexts, by international organizations, cooperation agencies, by local and 
national authorities or by security consultants. This is often the case because 
policy oriented analyses of urban security have tended to rely on a limited 
and often quantitative set of indicators to assess the impact of security 
responses. By showing a more complex picture of the multiple processes 
affecting the configuration of security responses and their contradictions in 
particular contexts, this thesis calls for caution on the replication of strategies 
to deal with complex problems of violence and insecurity in different urban 
contexts. 
Critical analyses developed through the approach suggested in this thesis, 
could provide a better understanding of how security strategies emerge and 
develop under particular social, economic and institutional conditions and 
how these are experienced by those who were targeted by the initiatives, 
before or despite a particular security approach is constructed as a replicable 
model, circulated through academic and policy expert circles and legitimized 
as promising. The analysis of the security component of the ‘Medellin Model’ 
developed in this thesis, is an example of how a critical investigation of the 
discursive practices involved in the provision of security and ethnographic 
engagement with people’s experiences of the outcomes of those practices, 
can reveal contradictions in security approaches which are normally 
assumed to have a positive impact on the integration of historically 
marginalised urban communities, while responding more efficiently to their 
security needs. The analysis of the Medellin Model in particular, showed that 
integral security strategies can also reproduce stigmatizing discourses and 
practices and invisibilise people’s voices and needs, while drawing attention 
away from prevailing structural conditions that reproduce urban violence. 
This was the case in this city given that the multifaceted state intervention to 
tackle security problems was built on the assumption that urban insecurity 
was a consequence of lack of government and state presence in certain feral 
areas, and this led authorities to prioritise state’s capacity to control urban 
territory over other issues.  
These are all aspects that cannot be explored through the analytical 
approaches that dominate urban security thinking in the global South at the 
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moment. They only become apparent when other analytical lenses and 
conceptual and methodological tools are used. In this context, this thesis 
demonstrates the importance of incorporating critical discourse analysis 
informed by Foucault’s work on power, and ethnographic approaches to 
research and analysis in the emerging field of urban security. These can help 
to expand the research agenda in this field and enhance our understanding 
of security provision, and of how similar security responses might lead to 
different outcomes in different urban contexts.  
Until now the analytical approaches that dominate the knowledge production 
in urban security in fragile cities have not recognised the importance of 
looking at discourse practices as key aspects of the security provision 
process, even though these have become recurrent objects of analysis in 
other fields of study, including critical security studies. Similarly, the use of 
ethnography as a mean to explore the nature of the provision of security in 
fragile cities has also been very limited. Through the use of participant 
observation in this research, this thesis demonstrates how the experiences 
and narratives of those who tend to be ignored within academic and policy 
debates on urban security, can lead us to a better understanding of how 
security policies work and impact on local contexts, often in contradictory 
ways.  
As was analysed in chapter three, the advantages of using methods inspired 
on ethnographic methodologies to investigate security provision do not come 
without significant challenges. In contexts of chronic levels of violence and 
insecurity, ethnography demands researchers’ disposition to undertake 
constant assessments of the ethical implications of the research process. It 
also demands her/his capacity to develop protection mechanisms for those 
involved in the research, patience and capacity to overcome logistical 
problems common in highly volatile contexts, as well as support from a wide 
range of institutions –including local organisations with deep knowledge of 
local contexts for example. This research demonstrates that the advantages 
of using ethnographic approaches to critically interrogate contemporary 
forms of security in cities are worth the effort of dealing ethically with these 
challenges. 
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Finally the type of analysis developed here does not presuppose the form 
that security should take -in its objectives and subjects, or the forces shaping 
security in a particular context–as critical analyses through the lens of 
neoliberalism often do; neither does it assume the political effects that the 
government of urban insecurity might have in a particular context. On the 
contrary, the alternative critical approach to urban security developed in this 
thesis, allows us to see security as a result of imaginaries, assumptions, and 
processes that are geographically and historically specific. It also 
encourages us to see security as a ‘contestable’ notion. This is particularly 
important because thinking about security on those terms opens 
opportunities for policy innovation in a field that urgently needs to provide 
relevant insights on how rising levels of violence and crime can be 
addressed bearing in mind different urban contexts. If we see security 
responses as the result of particular ways of thinking about urban problems, 
then it is possible to question if there are other ways of understanding such 
problems which might lead to other type of responses.  
Through the analysis of the Medellin case, this critical analysis of urban 
security made visible the existence of local forms of resistance to 
governmental process unleashed by security responses. This points to the 
existence of spaces where alternative understandings of what it means to be 
secure and how to build urban security in fragile contexts are constantly 
developed. Expanding the research agenda of the urban security field to 
include analyses that recognize and value such local processes of resistance 
can have profound academic and policy implications and constitute my 
suggestion and commitment for future research in this area. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Interviews with Community Residents    
Jose. Interview Male Community Leader Comuna 1, 05/11/2009 
Soraya. Interview Young female resident Comuna 1, 14/11/2009 
Antonio. Interview Young Community Leader Comuna 1, 14/11/2009 
Gerardo. Interview Male Community leader, 05/11/2009 
Teo. Interview with Male Community Leader Comuna 1, 05/11/2009 
Gloria. Interview with female resident Comuna 1, 15/11/2009 
Alvaro. Interview with Professional working in Comuna 1, 07/09/2009  
Yonny. Interview Young male resident Comuna 1 interview, 09/10/2010 
Omar. Interview Young resident and member of youth group in Comuna 13, 
15/11/2010 
Manuel. Interview Young male resident Comuna 1, 20/11/2010 
Rodrigo. Interview with Male resident Comuna 1, 05/08/2010 
Carlos. Interview Young male resident Comuna 1, 11/12/2010 
Sara. Interview with Female resident Comuna 1, 12/09/2010 
Juana. Interview with Female resident Comuna 1, 16/10/2010 
Fabio. Interview with Male resident Comuna 1, 10/09/2010 
Simon. Interview with Male resident Comuna 1, 20/10/2010 
Martin. Interview with Male resident Comuna 1, 12/08/2011 
Francisco. Interview with Male resident Comuna 1, 06/08/2011 
Pepe. Interview Young male resident Comuna 13, 11/08/2012 
Luisa. Interview Female Community Leader in Comuna 1, 12/03/2012 
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Andrea. Interview Female Community Leader in Comuna 1, 04/08/2012 
Alicia. Interview female resident Comuna 1, 10/03/2012 
Margarita. Interview Female Resident Comuna 1, 02/03/2012 
Pablo. Interview Young Community leader Comuna 13, 11/06/2012 
 
Interviews with Local Government Officials, Security Experts and 
Police Officers  
Former Secretary of Government, Interview Medellin 4/11/2009 
Commander of the Metropolitan Police, Interview Medellin 12/11/2009 
Municipal official at Sub-Secretary of Government, Interview Medellin 
18/11/2009 
Municipal official at Secretary of Government, Interview Medellin 10/02/2010 
Municipal Official at Secretary of Social Development, Interview Medellin 
25/11/09 
Security Adviser to Municipality of Medellin and Coordinator of City Security 
Strategy, Interview 05/02/10 
Municipal Social Work Specialist in Comuna 1, Interview Medellin 12/08/ 
2010 
Municipal official at the Research Centre for Security and Coexistence, 
Interview Medellin 20/07/2010 
Former Coordinator of Security and Coexistence Plan, Department of 
Antioquia, Interview 06/10/2010  
Municipal Official at Secretary of Youth, Interview Medellin 10/07/2011 
Community Police Officer based in Comuna 8, Interview Medellin 19/11/2009 
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Community Police Officer based in Comuna 10, Interview Medellin 
21/11/2010 
Police Officer based in Comuna 9, Interview Medellin 06/09/2010 
 
Interviews with Members of Civil Society Organisations  
Professor at University of Antioquia (Department of Law and Political 
Sciences), 12/11/2009   
Human Rights Defender at Corporacion Region, Interview Medellin 15/11/09 
Director of NGOs Association in Medellin, Interview 18/11/2009  
Human Rights Defender at IPC, Interview Medellin 20/11/2009 
Director of Civil Society Organisation (Viva la Ciudadania), Interview Medellin 
22/11/2009 
Senior Researcher at IPC, Interview Medellin 12/10/2010 
Professor at University of Antioquia (Department of Sociology and Political 
Sciences), 12/10/2010 
Senior member of IPC, Interview Medellin 18/10/2010 
 
 
 
